See attached document for literature review instructions. Use attached beginning paragraph for reference. Use the following citation, plus ones attached (4): Best, L. M., & Shelley, D. J. (2018).

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See attached document for literature review instructions.

Use attached beginning paragraph for reference.

Use the following citation, plus ones attached (4):

Best, L. M., & Shelley, D. J. (2018). Academic dishonesty: Does social media allow for increased and more sophisticated levels of student cheating? International Journal of Information and Communication Technology Education, 14(3), 1-14. https://doi.org/10.4018/IJICTE.2018070101

Use following hyothesis:

We have several predictions in this study. Generally, if participants take the perspective of an eager-cheater or a hesitant-cheater, then they will more strongly disagree that using an answer key is cheating than if they take the perspective of a non-cheater, with little to no differences expected between the eager-cheater and hesitant-cheater conditions. Conversely, if participants take the perspective of an eager-cheater or a hesitant-cheater (compared to taking the perspective of a non-cheater), then they should more strongly agree that using an answer key is acceptable if the answers are already easy to find, if the professor does not bother to change the exam, if the exam is extremely difficult, if the person using the answer key is not paying for the answers, and if other students are likely to use the answers.

See attached document for literature review instructions. Use attached beginning paragraph for reference. Use the following citation, plus ones attached (4): Best, L. M., & Shelley, D. J. (2018).
LITERATURE REVIEW 0 Instructions for Paper I: Study One Literature Review Instructions (Worth 25 Points) Maria L. Reid Florida International University Purpose of Paper I: Study One Literature Review 1). Psychological Purpose This paper serves several purposes, the first of which is helping you gain insight into research papers in psychology. As this may be your first time reading and writing papers in psychology, one goal of Paper I is to give you insight into what goes into such papers. This study one-lit review will help you a). better understand the psychology topic chosen for the course this semester (See note #3 below), b). learn about the various sections of an empirical research report by reading five peer-reviewed articles (that is, articles that have a Title Page, Abstract, Literature Review, Methods Section, Results Section, and References Page), and c). use information gathered from research articles in psychology to help support your hypotheses for your first study this semester. Of course, you’ll be doing a study two literature review later in the semester, so think of this Paper I as the first part of your semester long paper. I recommend looking at the example Paper V, actually, to see what your final paper will look like. It might give you a better idea about how this current paper (as well as Papers II, III, and IV) all fit together into your final paper of the semester. In this current paper (Paper I), you will read five research articles, summarize what the authors did and what they found, and use those summaries to support your hypothesis. IMPORTANT: Yes you need five references, but keep in mind that you can spend a lot of time summarizing a few of them and just a sentence or two summarizing others. Thus, spend more time on the more relevant summaries! For this paper, start your paper broadly and then narrow your focus (think about the hourglass example provided in the lecture). My suggestion is to give a brief overview of your paper topic in your opening paragraph, hinting at the research variables you plan to look at for study one. Your next paragraphs will review prior research (those five references required for this paper). Make sure that you draw connections between these references rather than just listing them. Use smooth transitions between paragraphs, and build a case that supports your study predictions. Your final paragraphs should use the research you just summarized to support your research hypothesis. And yes, that means you MUST include your study one predictions in Paper I (which we provided in the researcher instructions and the debriefing statement. Use them!). A good hint is to look at the literature reviews on the articles that you are using as references as you write your own paper! See what those authors did in their literature reviews, and mimic their style, though in Paper I you will with your hypothesis rather than moving into your study methods. In Paper II, you will pick the topic up again, but in that future paper you will talk about your own study methods and results. 2). APA Formatting Purpose The second purpose of Paper I: Study One Literature Review is to teach you proper American Psychological Association (APA) formatting. In the instructions below, I tell you how to format your paper using APA style. There are a lot of very specific requirements in APA papers, so pay attention to the instructions below as well as your APA Formatting powerpoint presentation! Keep in mind that methods at FIU uses the 7th edition of the APA formatting manual. 3). Writing Purpose Finally, this paper is intended to help you grow as a writer. Few psychology classes give you the chance to write papers and receive feedback on your work. This class will! We will give you extensive feedback on your first few paper in terms of content, spelling, and grammar. You will even be able to revise aspects of Paper I and include them in future papers (most notably Papers III and V). My hope is that you craft a paper that could be submitted to an empirical journal. Thus readers may be familiar with APA style but not your specific topic. Your job is to educate them on the topic and make sure they understand how your study design advances the field of psychology. In fact, your final paper in this class (Paper V), might be read by another professor at FIU and not your instructor / lab assistant. Thus write your paper for that reader – a person who may know NOTHING about your topic and your specific study but is familiar with the mechanics of APA formatted papers and research methodology. Note #1: The plagiarism limit for Paper I is 30%. This excludes any overlap your paper might have with regard to citations, references, and the hypotheses. Make sure your paper falls under 30% (or 35% if including your predictions). Note #2: I am looking for 2.5 pages minimum for Paper I, including your study predictions, but that is the bare minimum. If it is only 2 pages, it better be really, really good (as I don’t think I could write Paper I in less than three pages and do the research topic justice, so aim for 3 to 4 pages). Note #3: Although the study topic changes each semester, these paper instructions remain the same. The topic for this particular semester will be discussed in class and in Lab as well as posted in the modules and the relevant assignments. If you have any doubts, questions or concerns, ask Prof Reid, or your TA. Instructions for Paper I: Study One Literature Review (Worth 25 Points) Students: Below are lengthy instructions on how to write your study one literature review. There is also a checklist at the end of this document, which I recommend you print out and “check off” before submitting your final paper (Your graders are sticklers for APA format, so make sure it is correct! We mark off if you have a misplaced “&”, so carefully review all of your work and use the checklist! It WILL help you get a good grade). Also look at the example paper in Canvas. It will show you what we expect. We use the 7th Edition of the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association for all paper formatting in this class (though note that we adhere to the professional paper formatting, not the separate student formatting version also present in the APA publication manual). Title Page: I expect the following format. (5 Points) You must have a header and page numbers on each page. If you don’t know how to insert headers, ask your instructor or watch this very helpful video! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XZTCN6yOgSg The header goes at the top of the paper and it is left justified. Use “Insert Headers” or click on the top of the page to open the header. Alternatively, click anywhere at the top of the page and it should open the headers. Your header title is simply a shortened version of your original title. Pull a few relevant words from your title (no more than 3) Just make sure that it is in ALL CAPS. It should be no more than 50 characters including spaces and punctuation Insert a page number as well. The header is flush left, but the page number is flush right. The page number for the title page is 1. This same header will appear on every page of your document including the title page. Want an example header? Look at the title page of these instructions! You can use other titles depending on your own preferences (e.g. PRIMING SEXUALITY; PRIMING STUDIES; SOCIAL MEDIA AND SEX; FACEBOOK AND ADVERTISEMENTS; etc.). Your Title itself should be midway up the page. Again, see my “Title” page on the first page of this current document as an example of the placement, but for your title you must come up with a title that helps describe your study one. Do NOT put “Paper One” or a variation of “Literature Review” for your title. Rather, think about the titles you saw in PsycInfo. Titles need to let the reader know what YOUR paper involves, so make your title descriptive. You title should be about a line long. Your title must also be in bold text. Make sure that every word with four or more letters starts with a capital letter. You can use lower-case letters for words like “and”, “with”, “the”, but in general start each title word with a capital letter. Follow this with two spaces Your name (First and Last) and the name of your institution (FIU) are beneath the title. For this class, your own name (and ONLY your name) will go on this paper. Double space everything! You can also refer to the APA Format powerpoint for guidance, though I suggest looking at the example papers. There is one from a prior student in this course and one based on a document provided by the APA. Both have comments and notes to direct you toward correct formatting. This Title Page section will be on page 1 Abstract? You DO NOT need an abstract for Paper I. In fact, because your abstract needs to summarize your study results, you cannot write it until you run your studies. So omit the abstract until you get to Paper V. Literature Review Section (12 points) First page of your literature review (Page 2) Proper header with page numbers. Your running head title will appear in the header of your page WITHOUT the phrase “Running head”. To insert this header, use the headers program. The title of your paper should be on the first line of page two, centered. It is IDENTICAL to the title on your title page. Just copy and paste it! The beginning text for your paper follows on the next line Citations for the literature review Your paper must cite a minimum of five (5) empirical research articles that are based on studies conducted in psychology. That is, each of the three citations you use should have a literature review, a methods section, a results section, a conclusion/discussion, and references. For this first paper, you MUST use at least three of the five articles provided in the blackboard folder. You can use four if you like, but your must use three at minimum – however, you cannot use all five. For that fifth article, you must find it using PsycInfo. There are some other conditions for this fifth article that you must follow: First, remember that the fifth article cannot be any of the five you have been given. Second, for your fifth article, it can be based on a wide variety of topics, etc. Trust me, there are TONS of topics that can help you in your paper. Just choose one that will help you support your experimental hypothesis for your study. That is, it has to help you justify your study one hypothesis (all students are using this same hypothesis, so make sure to read it. You can find it in the researcher instructions along with the questionnaires you are giving to participants. I actually suggest copying and pasting that hypothesis into this first paper at the end). Finally, you can have more than five references if you want, but you must have a minimum of five references. Proper citations must be made in the paper – give credit where credit is due, and don’t make claims that cannot be validated. If you use a direct quote, make sure to provide a page number for where you found that quote in the citations. Do not directly quote too often, though. You can have no more than one direct quote in the whole paper (though zero quotes would be even better). Instead, I would like you to paraphrase when possible. Requirements for the information in your literature review Your study one literature review should use prior research as a starting point, narrowing down the main theme of your specific project – think about the hourglass example I gave in class. The last part of your literature review should narrow down your focus onto your own study, eventually ending in your study hypothesis. However, DO NOT go into specific details about your methods. You will talk about your specific methods in Paper II in a few weeks. Again, to make it clear, at the end of your paper you will give an overview of your research question, providing your specific predictions/hypotheses. The literature review must have minimum of two (2) full pages NOT INCLUDING THE HYPOTHESES. It has a maximum of five (5) pages (thus, with the title page and references page, the paper should be between 4.5 and 7 pages). If it is only four and a half pages (again, including the hypotheses), it better be really, really good. I don’t think I could do this paper justice in fewer than five pages, so if yours isn’t at least five pages I doubt it will get a good grade. References (6 points) The References section starts on its own page, with the word References centered and bold. Use proper APA format in this section or you will lose points. All five references that you cited in the literature review must be in this section (there should be more than five references here if you cited more than five articles, which is fine in this paper). However, at least three must come from the article folder on blackboard while the remaining two can come from either the last blackboard paper or two new ones from psychinfo. Only peer-reviewed articles are allowed here (no books, journals, websites, or other secondary resources are allowed for paper one). For references, make sure you: use alphabetical ordering (start with the last name of the first author) use the authors’ last names but only the initials of their first/middle name give the date in parentheses – e.g. (2007). italicize the name of the journal article give the volume number, also in italics give the page numbers (not italicized) for articles provide the doi (digital object identifier) if present (not italicized) Writing Quality (2 Points) This includes proper grammar and spelling. The above information is required for your paper, but I wanted to provide a few tips about writing your literature review as well. Students often struggle with the first paper, but hopefully this will give you some good directions: First, remember that you need 5 references, all of which MUST be peer-reviewed (three coming from the blackboard folder and one or two that you find on your own using PsycInfo). Second, I don’t expect a lengthy discussion for each and every article that you cite. You might spend a page talking about Article A and a sentence or two on Article B. The amount of time you spend describing an article you read should be proportional to how important it is in helping you defend your hypotheses. See if there is a prior study that looks a lot like yours (hint – there is at least one, which I based this study on, but you’ll have to find it on your own!). I would expect you to spend more time discussing that prior research since it is hugely relevant to your own study. If an article you read simply supports a global idea that ties into your study but has very different methods (like “frustrated people get mad!”), you can easily mention it in a sentence or two without delving into a lot of detail. Tell a good story in your literature review, but only go into detail about plot elements that have a direct bearing on your study! Third, this paper is all about supporting your hypotheses. Know what your hypotheses are before you write the paper, as it will help you determine how much time to spend on each article you are citing. My suggestion is to spend some time describing the nature of your topic, and then talking about studies that looked at this area. Use those studies to help defend your own study hypothesis. That is, “Since they found X in this prior study, that helps support the hypothesis in the present study”. Do you remember your two hypotheses? Okay, I’ll be really helpful here. BELOW are your hypotheses. In your paper, support it! Just remember that the rest of your paper needs to be at least two full pages NOT INCLUDING the hypothesis below. In other words, including the hypotheses below, your actual text for your paper should be at least two and a half pages! Look at the researcher instructions for Study One for the hypotheses Finally, make sure to proofread, proofread, proofread! Good luck! Checklist – Paper One: Study One Literature Review Use the check sheet below to make sure your paper is the best it can be! Make sure you answer “Yes” to all questions before submitting your paper or you will lose points! General Paper Format Yes No Is everything in your paper double spaced, including references (here I mean the spacing above and below each line, not the spaces following a period)? Do you have one inch margins on all sides of the paper (one inch from the top of the page, one inch from the bottom, and one inch from each side) Are the first lines of all paragraphs indented roughly ½ inch? Are your paragraphs aligned left? (That is, text should be flush left, with lines lining up on the left of the page, but text should NOT line up on the right side of the page – it should look ragged) Do you need help figuring out how to configure a word document in APA format (inserting headers, page numbers, proper indents, etc.)? If YES or NO, I highly recommend watching this video which walks you through setting up an APA formatted paper! https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XZTCN6yOgSg Title page Yes No Header Is your running head 3 words or less? Is the rest of your Running head title in ALL CAPS? Is your Running head in 12 point Times New Roman font? Do you have a page number that is flush right Title / Name / Institution Is your title at least a line long? Do all title words with four letters or more start with a capital letter? Is your title bold? Is there an extra space after? Are your name and institution correct? Are your title, name, and institution elements centered Literature Review Yes No Header Is your header title present and identical to your header title on the title page? Is your header title in ALL CAPS Do you have a page number starting on page 2 Title for the literature review Do you have the identical title you used on the title page rewritten at the top of your literature review? Is this title centered? And bold? Literature Review Continued Yes No Main body of the literature review Does your literature review start broadly, giving a brief overview of the paper to come? Does your literature review start to narrow down toward your hypotheses? Do your paragraphs transition from one to the next? (That is, avoid simply listing studies you read. Tie them together. How does Study A in paragraph A relate to Study B in paragraph B?) Does your paper end in your hypotheses? Is your paper at least two pages long (not including the hypotheses)? Citations for the literature review Did you cite a minimum of 5 citations? (Note that you can give a lot of detail for some articles you cite but only a sentence or two for others. How much detail you go into depends on how important the article is in helping your support your hypotheses) Are your citations in APA format (That is, ONLY the last name of the author(s) and date of publication)? Note that you do NOT include first names, initials, or the title of the article the authors wrote when citing. That information belongs in the references pages only. Also note that you only use an ampersand – the & symbol – when it occurs within parentheses. In other instances, use the word “and” If you quoted, did you provide a page number for the direct quote? If you paraphrased in any way, did you cite the source of that information? References Page Yes No Title for the references page Do references start on their own page? Is the word “References” centered and bold?? References – Make sure these are in APA format! Are references listed in alphabetical order (starting with the last name of the first author listed)? Are all citations from the literature review referenced? Is the first line of the reference flush left while subsequent lines are indented (Note: Use the ruler function for this. DO NOT simply tab)? Did you use the “&” symbol when listing more than one author name? Did you include the date of publication For article references, is the article title (which is not italicized) present, with only the first word and proper names starting with a capital letter? For article references, is the name of the journal present with all major words starting with a capital letter (Note: this journal title is italicized)? For article references, is the volume number italicized For article references, are the page numbers present (not italicized) For article references, is the DOI present
See attached document for literature review instructions. Use attached beginning paragraph for reference. Use the following citation, plus ones attached (4): Best, L. M., & Shelley, D. J. (2018).
BRIEF REPORT Active Perspective Taking Induces Flexible Use of Self-Knowledge During Social Inference Andrew R. Todd and Austin J. Simpson University of Iowa Diana I. TamirPrinceton University Social life hinges on the ability to infer others’ mental states. By default, people often recruit self-knowledge during social inference, particularly for others who are similar to oneself. How do people’sactiveperspective- taking efforts— deliberately imagining another’s perspective—affect self-knowledge use? In 2 experiments, we test theflexible self-applicationhypothesis: that the application of self-knowledge to a perspective-taking target differs based on that person’s similarity to oneself. We found consistent evidence that, when making inferences about dissimilar others, perspective taking increased the projection of one’s own traits and preferences to those targets, relative to a control condition. When making inferences about similar others, however, perspective taking decreased projection. These findings suggest that self-target similarity critically shapes the inferential processes triggered by active perspective-taking efforts. Keywords:perspective taking, projection, similarity, social cognition, theory of mind Supplemental materials:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000237.supp Much of social life hinges on the ability to infer others’ mental states. Despite the inherent opacity of others’ minds, people are quite skilled at inferring their contents. What do people do when actively trying to imagine another’s viewpoint? This question has mystified philosophers for millennia and has received considerable attention from contemporary scholars throughout psychology and cognitive science (Apperly, 2010;Epley & Waytz, 2010). Here, we investigated the inferential processes initiated by explicitly imagining another’s perspective. Although people never have direct access to others’ minds, they do have immediate access to a useful proxy: their own minds. Indeed, people regularly use self-knowledge as a starting point for inferring others’ mental states (Epley et al., 2004;Nickerson, 1999). For example, to infer how another person feels in a particular situation, one might first think about how they themselves would feel in that situation, and then assume the other person feels similarly. Impor- tantly, people do not always default to using self-knowledge. Self- knowledge is useful for inferring another’s feelings only insofar asthat personactuallyfeels similarly. One factor known to affect the recruitment of self-knowledge is the degree of similarity between a target and oneself: By default, people commonly recruit self- knowledge when thinking about similar, but not dissimilar, others (Ames, 2004a,2004b;O’Brien & Ellsworth, 2012;Tamir & Mitchell, 2013;Todd et al., 2011). When thinking about dissimilar others, people instead often recruit stereotypes as a primary source of infor- mation (Ames, 2004a,2004b). Notably, this research characterizes self-knowledge use under default circumstances, absent any active efforts to take the target’s perspective. This qualification is important becauseactivelyimag- ining another’s perspective leads people to process information differently from how they do by default (Todd et al., 2012;Vescio et al., 2003). One of the most emblematic consequences of active perspective-taking efforts is a tendency to process information in a more “self-like” manner (Galinsky et al., 2005,2008). Put differ- ently, perspective taking has been found to strengthen the overlap in representations of self and other by prompting people to imagine another’s viewpoint from that person’s first-person perspective, rather than one’s original outsider, third-person perspective. For example, in one study, people instructed to imagine another’s perspective evinced greater neural activity implicated in self- referential processing while making inferences about the person’s preferences and opinions (Ames et al., 2008). Similarly, imagining a woman’s feelings as she discussed personal health problems increased self-related thought accessibility (Davis et al., 2004). Typically, this heightenedactivationof self-knowledge is accom- panied by greaterapplicationof this information to perspective- taking targets. For instance, actively imagining another’s perspec- tive increases the likelihood of ascribing self-descriptive traits and Andrew R. Todd and Austin J. Simpson, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of Iowa; Diana I. Tamir, Department of Psychology, Princeton University. We thank Tong Ge, Nicole Ito, Mina Jyung, and Alex TeBockhorst for research assistance, and Adam Galinsky and Paul Windschitl for helpful discussions in the early stages of this work. This research was facilitated by NSF Grant BCS-1523731 (awarded to A.R.T.). Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to An- drew R. Todd, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Uni- versity of Iowa, E11 Seashore Hall, Iowa City, IA 52242. E-mail: [email protected] This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General© 2016 American Psychological Association 2016, Vol. 145, No. 12, 1583–15880096-3445/16/$12.00http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000237 1583 other personal characteristics to that person (Davis et al., 1996; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a;Todd & Burgmer, 2013). Based on this research, one might conclude that active perspective-taking effortsuniformlyincrease self-knowledge use during social judgment. However, this prior work has asked people to take the perspective of targets who differ from oneself in some salient way. Many everyday perspective-taking activities involve targets known to besimilarto oneself. Thus, an important underexplored question is whether active perspective-taking ef- forts have comparable or divergent effects on social-inference processes involving similar others. The findings described above are frequently interpreted as re- flecting an unmitigated application of self-knowledge to perspective-taking targets; however, they may instead reflect a specific instance of a more flexible inferential approach. Accord- ing to theflexible self-applicationhypothesis, the inferential pro- cesses initiated by perspective taking will differ based on charac- teristics of the specific target. We suggest that perspective taking, along with activating self-knowledge, triggers a comparative pro- cess wherein targets are compared with oneself (seeMussweiler, 2003). This comparative process prompts a consideration of how a target is both similar toanddifferent from oneself (cf.Tetlock et al., 1989). If similarity is initially assumed to be strong by default, this comparative process might bring to light previously over- looked self-other differences. Preliminary support for this process comes from research on hypothesis-testing, where perspective taking has been found to reduce confirmatory thinking by prompt- ing a balanced consideration of both confirming and disconfirming information (Todd et al., 2012). When applied to social inference, perspective taking might simi- larly prompt a balanced consideration of self-other similarities and differences. On this account, perspective taking should lead people to view initially dissimilar others (e.g., outgroup members) as more similar to them, and to view initially similar others (e.g., ingroup members) as less similar to them, than they do by default. These shifts in perceived self-other similarity and difference, in turn, should pro- duce corresponding changes in the projection of self-referential infor- mation. Importantly, the flexible self-application account predicts that perspective taking increases self-knowledgeactivationfor similar and dissimilar targets; the two targets should only differ in how this activated knowledge isappliedto them (for more on distinguishing knowledge activation and application, seeSchwarz & Bless, 1992). We tested these predictions in two experiments wherein partic- ipants read about an unknown person who either shared or did not share their political orientation. Some participants actively imag- ined the person’s perspective; others did not. We assessed projec- tion by having participants rate how well a list of traits (Experi- ment 1) or a list of preferences (Experiment 2) characterize themselves and the target. The outcome of interest was the dis- crepancy between self-ratings and target ratings, with lower self- other discrepancies reflecting greater projection. Experiment 1 Method Participants.Sample size in Experiment 1 was based on a heuristic of at least 20 participants per cell; data were collected until this number was surpassed. Native English-speaking under-graduates (N 84, 51 women, 33 men;M age 19.52,SD 2.21) participated for course credit. This sample afforded 80% power to detect a large effect (Faul et al., 2007). Procedure.Participants first reported demographic informa- tion (e.g., age, gender) and answered three items assessing political orientation (Carney et al., 2008): [Overall/In terms of social and cultural issues/In terms of economic issues], where would you place yourself on the following scale? (1 very conservative,7 very liberal). Responses were averaged ( .85,M 4.26,SD 1.23); higher scores reflect a more liberal political orientation. Participants then viewed (in randomized order) a list of 90 traits from prior research on self-other merging (Smith & Henry, 1996). They rated how well each trait characterized them personally (1 not at all,7 extremely). Next, participants read a vignette about an unknown, gender- matched target who appeared in a photo. 1Depending on condition, the person was depicted as either liberal or conservative. The vignettes, which were adapted from prior work (Tamir & Mitchell, 2013) and appear in the Supplemental Material, served as the target-similarity manipulation. After reading the vignette, participants composed an essay de- scribing a typical day in the person’s life (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a). Participants in theperspective-takingcondition received the following additional instructions (adapted fromTodd & Burg- mer, 2013): As you’re writing, we ask that you take [his or her] perspective. In your mind’s eye, visualize clearly and vividly what [he or she] might be thinking and feeling, and what [his or her] intentions and goals are. 2 Participants in thecontrolcondition received no additional instructions. Participants then viewed (in randomized order) the same list of 90 traits from earlier. This time they rated how well each trait characterized the target. Finally, participants answered a dichotomous item about the target’s political orientation. They also completed several other items for exploratory purposes; these items and analyses appear in the Supplemental Material. Results Manipulation checks.All but 4 participants ( 95%) cor- rectly identified the political orientation of their assigned target. We retained their data to maximize power; however, excluding their data produced nearly identical results. To assess the efficacy of the perspective-taking manipulation, we calculated the proportion of mental-state verbs (e.g., thinks, felt, want; see the Supplemental Material for a complete list) in the essays, using Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software (Pennebaker et al., 2007); higher scores reflect greater consider- ation of the target’s mental states. As expected, perspective takers 1Across experiments, we used two photos of each gender. Analyses revealed no moderating effects of the particular photo. 2These instructions reflect animagine-otherform of perspective taking that entails imagining the target’s perspective in the situation; this can be contrasted with animagine-selfform of perspective taking that entails imagining one’s own perspective in the target’s situation (Batson et al., 1997;Stotland, 1969). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 1584 TODD, SIMPSON, AND TAMIR used more mental-state verbs than did control participants,t(82) 2.49,p .015, Hedges’g 0.54. Self-knowledge activation.We predicted that, relative to the control condition, perspective taking would increase self- knowledge activation for both similar and dissimilar targets. To test this prediction, we calculated the proportion of first-person singular pronouns (e.g., I, me, my) in the essays, again using LIWC software; higher scores reflect greater accessibility for self-related thoughts. Prior work has used personal-pronoun usage as an indirect measure of self-knowledge activation (Davis et al., 2004). For interpretive ease, we used participant political orienta- tion (reverse-scored in the conservative-target condition) as a continuous proxy for target similarity in all analyses below; higher scores reflect greater perceived self-other similarity. Regressing self-knowledge activation on target similarity (stan- dardized), essay instructions ( 1 control, 1 perspective taking), and their interaction revealed that perspective takers used more personal pronouns than did control participants ( .44,t 4.38,p .001). This effect was not moderated by target similarity ( .08,t 1,p .43), indicating that perspective taking produced comparable increases in self-knowledge activation for both similar and dissimilar targets. Self-knowledge application.The flexible self-application ac- count predicts that perspective taking should increase projection for dissimilar targets but decrease it for similar targets. To test this prediction, we created self-other discrepancy scores by taking the absolute value of the difference between self-ratings and target ratings for each of the 90 traits and then averaging across all traits (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a); lower values reflect lower self- other discrepancy, or higher projection. Regressing these scores on the same predictors as before re- vealed that, overall, projection was greater for similar versus dissimilar targets ( .34,t 3.49,p .001). Consistent with the flexible self-application hypothesis, the two-way interaction was also significant ( .38,t 3.87,p .001; seeFigure 1). 3 For dissimilar targets ( 1SD), perspective taking increased pro-jection relative to the control condition ( .36,t 2.62,p .010). For similar targets ( 1SD), however, perspective taking decreased projection relative to control ( .39,t 2.85,p .005). Approaching this interaction differently, projection was greater for similar versus dissimilar targets among control partic- ipants ( .62,t 5.26,p .001), but not perspective takers ( .04,t 1,p .79). Experiment 2 Experiment 1 provided initial evidence for the flexible self- application account. Whereas perspective taking increased self-knowledge activation across the board, its effects on self- knowledge application differed based on target similarity. In Experiment 2, we conducted a high-powered replication, aim- ing to extend these findings in a couple ways. First, we exam- ined the interactive effect of target similarity and perspective taking on the projection of one’s own preferences rather than one’s own traits. Second, instead of assessing self-ratings im- mediately before introducing the target, which may have arti- ficially increased self-knowledge activation, we inserted a delay between the self-ratings and the target introduction. Method Participants.Experiment 2 was a high-powered replication of Experiment 1. We aimed to collect as much data as possible in one semester. Native English-speaking undergraduates (N 419) par- ticipated for course credit. We excluded data from 1 participant who gave the same response on all target ratings and 31 partici- pants who exceeded recommended thresholds on the Attentive Responding Scale (Maniaci & Rogge, 2014), leaving a final sam- ple of 387 (247 women, 140 men;M age 18.95,SD 1.45). This sample afforded 99% power to detect the interaction effect size from Experiment 1 (Faul et al., 2007). Procedure.Participants first reported the same demographic and political-orientation information ( .88,M 4.08,SD 1.26) from Experiment 1, after which they viewed (in randomized order) 50 statements about their opinions and preferences (e.g., “dislikes mushrooms on pizza”). These items were drawn from a larger pool of statements used in prior social-inference research (Tamir & Mitchell, 2010,2013). Participants rated the likelihood that each statement applied to them personally (1 very unlikely, 7 very likely). After working on unrelated tasks for about 30 min, participants underwent the same target-similarity manipulation from Experi- ment 1. We modified the target vignettes to better reflect political issues at the time of testing (see the Supplemental Material). After reading a vignette about one target, participants rated how similar they and the target are to each other (1 not at all,7 extremely). Next, participants underwent the same perspective-taking ma- nipulation from Experiment 1. They composed a day-in-the-life essay while actively imagining the target’s perspective or with no additional instructions. 3This interaction was not moderated by target political orientation here or in Experiment 2, indicating comparable results for liberal and conser- vative targets. Figure 1.Self– other discrepancy by target similarity (similar vs. dissim- ilar) and essay instructions (perspective taking vs. control); error bars depict 1SEM(Experiment 1). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 1585 PERSPECTIVE TAKING AND SOCIAL INFERENCE Participants then viewed (in randomized order) the same 50 preference statements from earlier. This time they rated the like- lihood that each statement applied to the target. Finally, as a manipulation check, participants rated the target’s political orientation, using the same three items ( .96) from earlier. They also completed several other items for exploratory purposes; these items and analyses appear in the Supplemental Material. Results Manipulation checks.The liberal target (M 5.36,SD 0.90) was rated as more liberal than the conservative target (M 2.66,SD 1.04),t(385) 27.41,p .001,g 2.78. Target political-orientation ratings differed from the scale’s midpoint in the predicted direction in both conditions (ps .001,gs 1.28). To assess the efficacy of the perspective-taking manipulation, we calculated mental-state-verb usage as in Experiment 1. Per- spective takers used more mental-state verbs than did control participants,t(385) 2.29,p .022,g 0.23. Self-knowledge activation.We predicted that, relative to the control condition, perspective taking would increase self- knowledge activation for both similar and dissimilar targets. To test this prediction, we calculated personal-pronoun usage as in Experiment 1. FollowingTamir and Mitchell (2013), we used participants’ ratings of similarity between the target and them- selves as a continuous measure of target similarity. Regressing self-knowledge activation on target similarity, essay instructions, and their interaction revealed that perspective takers used more personal pronouns than did control participants ( .26,t 5.27,p .001). This effect was not moderated by target similarity ( .02,t 1,p .67), indicating that perspective taking produced comparable increases in self-knowledge activa- tion for both similar and dissimilar targets. Self-knowledge application.The flexible self-application ac- count predicts that target similarity should moderate the effect of perspective taking on self-knowledge application. To test this prediction, we calculated self-other discrepancy scores as in Ex- periment 1. Regressing these scores on the same predictors as before re- vealed that, overall, projection was greater for similar versus dissimilar targets ( .27,t 5.47,p .001). Consistent with the flexible self-application account, the two-way interaction was also significant ( .15,t 3.00,p .003; seeFigure 2). For dissimilar targets ( 1SD), perspective taking marginally in- creased projection relative to the control condition ( .13,t 1.90,p .058). For similar targets ( 1SD), however, perspective taking decreased projection relative to control ( .16,t 2.34, p .020). Approaching this interaction differently, projection was greater for similar versus dissimilar targets among control partic- ipants ( .40,t 6.10,p .001), but only marginally so among perspective takers ( .12,t 1.72,p .087). To estimate more precisely the effect of perspective taking on the projection of self-knowledge to similar and dissimilar targets across our experiments, we conducted an internal meta-analysis (Cumming, 2014). This analysis revealed that perspective taking had small-to- medium-sized projection effects in the opposite direction for dissim- ilar targets (g 0.26, 95% CI [ 0.08, 0.44]) and similar targets (g 0.30, 95% CI [0.12, 0.49]). Discussion We tested how active perspective-taking efforts affect self- knowledge activation and application during social inference. Two experiments found consistent support for the flexible self- application account, whereby the effect of perspective taking on projection differs depending on self-target similarity. As in prior work, actively imagining a target’s perspective increased self- knowledgeactivation(Davis et al., 2004), regardless of whether the person was initially viewed as similar to or different from oneself. Importantly, though, target similarity shaped how this activated self-knowledge wasapplied. When making inferences about dissimilar others, perspective taking increased the projection of one’s own traits and preferences to those targets. When making inferences about similar others, however, perspective taking de- creased projection. Prior research has enhanced our understanding of the inferential processes triggered by active perspective taking, yet much of this work used targets who differed from oneself in some salient way (e.g.,Davis et al., 1996;Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a). Our findings extend this earlier work by showing that these inferential processes operate differently when taking the perspective of some- one who issimilarto oneself. The current work thus sheds new light on how active perspective taking shapes social inference based on characteristics of the perspective-taking target and, in doing so, suggests multiple future research directions. First, we examined how perspective taking and target similarity interact to affect the activation and application ofself-knowledge to social targets. Another frequently invoked source of top-down information stems fromstereotypes. Absent active perspective- taking efforts, people often default to using stereotypes when making inferences about dissimilar others (Ames, 2004a,2004b). Although perspective taking with dissimilar others typically re- duces stereotyping (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000a;Wang et al., 2014), it is unknown how perspective taking withsimilarothers affects it. Insofar as projection and stereotyping operate hydrauli- cally (Ames, 2004a,2004b), it is possible that actively imagining Figure 2.Self– other discrepancy by target similarity (similar vs. dissim- ilar) and essay instructions (perspective taking vs. control); error bars depict 1SEM(Experiment 2). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 1586 TODD, SIMPSON, AND TAMIR a similar other’s perspective increases stereotyping. Because pro- jection is a primary mechanism through which perspective taking improves interpersonal outcomes (Galinsky et al., 2005), an in- triguing implication suggested by our findings is that perspective taking with similar others may have some unexpected negative consequences (e.g.,Vorauer & Sucharyna, 2013), such as less interpersonal positivity (see the Supplemental Material) and more distancing behaviors. Given that intergroup conflict is often more strongly rooted in ingroup positivity than in outgroup negativity (Brewer, 1999), however, any negative immediate consequences for ingroup members may be accompanied by reduced intergroup conflict more generally. Future research should explore these possibilities. Second, given the divisiveness of contemporary politics (Pew Research Center, 2014), it is vital to understand how people think about others on both sides of the political aisle. Thus, following others (e.g.,O’Brien & Ellsworth, 2012), we focused on political- orientation similarity in the current experiments. Future research should explore how other meaningful bases of similarity (e.g., ethnicity, sexual orientation) interact with perspective taking to shape the use of self-knowledge and other available information (e.g., stereotypes) during social inference. Third, we have conceptualized our work in terms of target similarity; however, a related factor,familiarity, can have compa- rable effects on self-knowledge use: Projection tends to be greater with well-known others (e.g., friends) than with strangers (Savitsky et al., 2011). All targets in our experiments were un- known to participants; thus, familiarity cannot explain our find- ings. Nonetheless, future work should explore how perspective taking interacts with target familiarity to affect projection. Addi- tionally, because people typically have individuating information about well-known others (Welborn & Lieberman, 2015), future research should also explore how perspective taking affects the use of target-specific information during social inference. Fourth, our operationalization of active perspective taking in- volved experimental instructions to imagine a target’s perspective. However, we acknowledge that there is natural variation in ten- dencies to actively imagine others’ perspectives (Davis, 1983) and that people high in such tendencies mightspontaneouslydeploy a similar set of inferential processes, absent explicit instructions to do so. Given that some prior research has found comparable relationships between measured and manipulated perspective tak- ing and social judgment (e.g.,Galinsky et al., 2008;Wang et al., 2014), future research should explore this possibility. Finally, although the central claims of our flexible self- application account concern how activeperspective takingshapes social inference, it is possible that perspective taking is one of a larger class of procedures that encourage people to step outside their usual mental routines and default information-processing tendencies. For instance,counterfactual thinking(Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000b),conflict mindsets(Kleiman & Hassin, 2013), andconsider-the-opposite strategies(Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984), like active perspective taking (Todd et al., 2012), have all been found to reduce confirmatory thinking during hypothesis- testing by increasing the consideration of disconfirming informa- tion. Future research will be needed to determine whether the effects reported here are unique to active perspective taking or whether other “non-default” reasoning strategies produce compa- rable effects on social inference.The current research offers new insights into how active perspective-taking efforts shape inferences about others’ traits and preferences. Departing from prior findings suggesting that such efforts uniformly increase the application of self-knowledge to all perspective-taking targets, our findings paint a more nuanced picture: Whereas active perspective taking increased projection with dissimilar others, it decreased projection with similar others. References Ames, D. R. (2004a). Inside the mind reader’s tool kit: Projection and stereotyping in mental state inference.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87,340 –353.http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.87.3 .340 Ames, D. R. (2004b). 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ETHICS & BEHAVIOR,24(1), 53–72 Copyright © 2014 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1050-8422 print / 1532-7019 online DOI: 10.1080/10508422.2013.819783 The In uence of Personality on the Decision to Cheat Melissa McTernan Department of Psychology University of California, Davis Patrick Love and David Rettinger Psychology Department & Center for Honor, Leadership, & Service University of Mary Washington Seventeen transgressive behaviors were studied in the context of six personality variables using survey methods. The personality variables were impulsivity, sensation seeking, empathetic perspective tak- ing, guilt, and shame, with social desirability used as a control. Con rmatory factor analysis indicated a ve-factor model as having the best t. Those ve factors are competitive cheating, self-cheating, school cheating, relationship cheating, and breaking a social contract. A structural equation model indicated that only impulsivity, sensation seeking, and empathetic perspective taking were related to frequency of transgressive behaviors, thus supporting the hypothesis that moral decision making has a critical automatic component. Keywords: cheating, impulsivity, sensation seeking, guilt, shame, moral decisions Most early research on the moral decision-making process suggests that it is driven by reason (Kohlberg, 1973). This view postulates that at the moment of a decision, people perform a quick analysis of the situation, weighing each possible action in an attempt to select the optimal behav- ior (Ellison, 1996). Recent research on the topic argues for decision making as a process largely based on emotion or intuition, not purely on logic (Haidt, 2001; Peters, Västfjäll, Gärling, & Slovic, 2006). Naturally, there are individual differences in the use of these emotional and intu- itive processes. Some of these differences include an individual’s use of intuition, the availability heuristic, representative heuristic, anchoring, and con rmation bias while making a moral judg- ment (Rogerson, Gottlieb, Handelsman, Knapp, & Younggren, 2011). The researchers propose that aspects of personality mediate these differences, including empathy and impulsivity. One way to study the moral decision-making process is to examine the morally or socially transgressive behaviors in which people engage. Morally transgressive behaviors take many forms (e.g., cheating in school, relationship in delity), and those who transgress do not always transgress in all domains (Lovett-Hooper, Komarraju, Weston, & Dollinger, 2007). These behav- iors differ in many ways, including the severity of social sanction, effort required to perform Correspondence should be addressed to David Rettinger, Psychology Department & Center for Honor, Leadership, & Service, University of Mary Washington, 1301 College Avenue, Fredericksburg, VA 22401. E-mail: [email protected] 54 MCTERNAN, LOVE, RETTINGER them, and others. Some behaviors characterized as “cheating” are not universally considered to be transgressions against others but against one’s own values or goals. Thus, although it is pos- sible that those individuals who engage in one cheating type will engage in all cheating types at similar rates, it is more likely that people might be prone to engage in one or some cheating behaviors while abstaining from others, based on the different characteristics of the behaviors. Further, because the decision to engage in those behaviors may be the result of an automatic pro- cess rather than a rational decision (that would likely be based on situational factors); personality may be a predictor of speci c types of transgressive behavior. Automatic processes are de ned broadly as the constellation of processing that is beyond deliberate control. Many intuitive pro- cesses (Haidt, 2001) fall under this category, including but not limited to those that are emotion focused (Damasio, 1994). PERSONALITY FACTORS Although both situational and personal factors are involved in moral decision making, this study examines differences in personality between people who commit particular transgressions, those who do not, and between people who tend to commit transgressions in different categories. In par- ticular, this research emphasizes factors like shame- and guilt-proneness, empathic perspective taking, impulsivity, and sensation seeking, which have been associated with a variety of risky behavior in previous literature (Corcoran & Rotter, 1987; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Vorauer, Martens, & Sasaki, 2009; Zuckerman, 1979). Understanding the stable individual differences associated with differences in transgressive behavior can provide us with insight into the process involved in making transgressive choices. Empathic perspective taking is one such personality characteristic that could affect decisions about actions. Perspective taking is the ability to see a situation from another person’s point of view; it helps an individual see the negative consequences his or her actions have on oth- ers (Vorauer et al., 2009). Although little research has explored the direct relationship between perspective taking and transgressive behavior, previous research has examined the relationship between empathy, a personality trait that encompasses perspective taking, and its relationship to academic cheating (Staats, Hupp, Wallace, & Gresley, 2009). More empathetic people reported engaging in less cheating than less empathetic people. Because strongly empathic individuals are likely to be better at perspective taking, a negative correlation between perspective taking and the frequency of competitive cheating behaviors is likely. Perspective taking will also have a stronger in uence on an individual’s behavior when there is a salient victim of the transgression, apparent at the time of the decision. Perspective taking is unlikely to strongly affect decisions to engage in self-cheating behaviors (cheating on a diet or budget) when there is no other obvious perspective to take. Impulsivity, like perspective taking, affects the types and amounts of cheating behaviors in which an individual engages (Anderman, Cupp, & Lane, 2009; Bravo & Lumpkin, 2010). Bravo and Lumpkin (2010) reported that individuals who score high on impulsivity measures are more likely to have extramarital affairs and are less likely in general to delay grati cation when faced with opportunity for immediate reward. This idea is closely related to recent research on self- control, the ability to resist impulses toward an immediate reward (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). Self-control is a limited resource that is depleted immediately after use (Muraven et al., INFLUENCE OF PERSONALITY ON DECISION TO CHEAT 55 1998), and when an individual’s self-control has been depleted, he or she is more likely to engage in behaviors that satisfy immediate needs to the detriment of long-term goals. In other words, the more impulsive an individual is, the less self-control he or she will have to resist temptation. Thus, more impulsive people may be more likely to commit a variety of moral transgressions when faced with an opportunity for immediate gains. This behavioral phenomenon is likely a contribut- ing cause of academic cheating and other transgressive behaviors, such as cheating on budgets (Vohs & Faber, 2007) and diets (Baucom & Aiken, 1981; Guerrieri, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 2007), as impulsive people may be less able to control automatic responses toward immediate reward. Sensation seeking is highly correlated with impulsivity and is characterized by the need to engage in activities that are novel and or intense in nature as well as the willingness to take risks to achieve such experiences (DeAndrea, Carpenter, Shulman, & Levine, 2009; Kalichman, Simbayi, Jooste, Cain, & Cherry, 2006; Zuckerman, 1979). As with impulsivity, there is a wealth of research linking sensation seeking with various risky behaviors. A small sample of this liter- ature shows that individuals with high levels of sensation seeking were more likely to perform risky behaviors such as increased use of alcohol, engagement in risky sexual practices (Kalichman et al., 2006), increased use of illicit drugs (Dunlop & Romer, 2010), increased delinquent behav- ior (Newcomb & McGee, 1991), and academic cheating (DeAndrea et al., 2009). Given these ndings, it is not unreasonable to expect that sensation-seeking individuals would be more likely to engage in various forms of cheating behavior where the danger of getting caught would cause increased level of arousal, such as cheating in the workplace and cheating in sports or games. However, it was predicted that sensation seeking would not correlate with cheating behaviors that have little or no consequence for getting caught, such as cheating on a diet or budget. Furthermore, sensation seekers are predicted to be less likely to set budgets or engage in dieting, and thus much less likely to violate those self-imposed strictures. More emotion-related personality traits like shame- and guilt-proneness also have been shown to in uence an individual’s decision to engage in speci c cheating-type behaviors. According to Eisenberg (2000), shame and guilt are self-conscious emotions that arise when thinking about the self, especially in relation to the violation of moral standards. Shame and guilt are highly related, so there is a frequent co-occurrence of the two emotions; however, important differences do exist between the two (Harder, Rockart, & Cutler, 1993). Although shame and guilt both focus on the self, they differ in their level of focus (Eisenberg, 2000). According to Corcoran and Rotter (1987), shame is motivated by a desire to avoid external punishment and is more centered on the self (Leith & Baumeister, 1998). In contrast, feelings of guilt are less self-centered and more focused on one’s social relationship with others. Guilt results from engaging in behaviors that might lead to the disapproval of others, even if those others are unaware (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Of the two emotions, guilt is more likely to be impacted by one’s adherence to social mores (Eisenberg, 2000). Those who are shame motivated are less likely to engage in cheating when there is a high risk of being caught, whereas those who are guilt motivated are less likely to cheat if the behavior does not t their moral standards (Corcoran & Rotter, 1987). Unlike shame, moderate levels of guilt will increase socially acceptable behavior because of the increased desire to adhere to moral standards (Ausubel, as cited in Dost & Yagmurlu, 2008; Leith & Baumeister, 1998). Given these differences, shame-proneness will have the greatest effect on behaviors that one could easily be caught while doing, or would result in severe social consequences if caught. It is 56 MCTERNAN, LOVE, RETTINGER therefore predicted that for self-cheating behaviors, like cheating on a budget, guilt would be more predictive than shame because performing these behaviors is a violation of one’s internal rule set. Social contract violations may show the reverse pattern because they are more likely to be detected and less morally objectionable to some participants. Further, individuals who are better at perspective taking are predicted be more likely to experience guilt because of their heightened ability to understand the effects of their behavior on others. Silfver and Helkama (2007) found that guilt caused by cheating on a quiz was positively associated with perspective taking and overall empathic concern in males. Therefore, research suggests that perspective-taking scores and guilt scores in our survey will be positively correlated. This combination of traits represents a key factor in the automatic decision process. If there is a strong link between the presence of these traits and moral transgressions, this provides evidence for an automatic emphasis in decision making about transgressive behavior. If moral decision making is instead an automatic process, as Haidt (2001) argued, then the link between moral transgressions and how likely an individual is to seek excitement and/or how impulsive that indi- vidual is will be stronger than the link between the transgressions and other personality factors. This relationship may be different for different kinds of transgressions, and so it is essential to examine a wide range of behaviors independently. TRANSGRESSIVE BEHAVIORS When studying moral transgressions, most authors have focused on only one transgression at a time (Jordan, 2001; Lucas & Friedrich, 2005; Silva, 1981). There is a lack of literature that explores the relationships between various moral transgressions. It is therefore dif cult to deter- mine if there exist any factors that in uence moral decision making across a variety of situations. The research presented here explores these relationships by including a set of transgressions that occur in a variety of settings and that require different motivations in order to determine if there is any relationship between them. The resulting hypotheses involve four main “cheating types,” or factors: competitive cheating, or cheating to gain an advantage over others; personal relationship cheating; violations of social contracts; and “cheating oneself.” The rst cluster of transgressive behaviors, which is labeled competitive cheating, includes dishonest actions intended to gain a competitive advantage over others. Examples include cheating in school (Jordan, 2001), cheating in sports or games (Silva, 1981), and cheating in the workplace (Lucas & Friedrich, 2005). Lucas and Friedrich (2005) found academic and workplace dishonesty to be correlated. It can be inferred that commonalities among these behaviors are a desire for a competitive advantage and a tendency for those who are intrinsically motivated toward success to cheat less (because they will be less focused on the immediate gain than on the feelings associated with an honest win; Jordan, 2001; Kavussanu & Spray, 2006). Impulsivity has been implicated in academic cheating in previous research (Kelly & Worell, 1978) and is hypothesized as a link binding this category together. Cheating in a relationship differs from competitive cheating in that the victim is particu- larly salient. Cheating of this type may occur when an individual is aware of the relationship boundaries that de ne cheating as unacceptable but is unable to exhibit the self-control necessary to refrain from engaging in the behavior (McAlister, Pachana, & Jackson, 2005). Impulsivity INFLUENCE OF PERSONALITY ON DECISION TO CHEAT 57 and sensation seeking are expected to be predictive of this type of cheating, as the individual is receiving an immediate thrill or gain from the experience. Individuals poor at perspective taking will also be more likely to cheat on romantic partners. Another form of cheating is the violation of social contracts. Some social contracts are under- stood cultural rules, such as forming a line without “cutting.” Violating social contracts may involve breaking explicitly stated rules or laws, such as littering, bringing outside food into an event when it is explicitly forbidden, not paying for a meal at restaurant, sneaking into an event without a ticket, or using a carpool (HOV) lane improperly. The researchers see two common characteristics among these behaviors: They seem to lack a direct victim, and they confer a perceived advantage to the cheater relative to his or her own alternative outcome. Barnett, Sanborn, and Shane (2005) found that American college students were less likely to engage in minor moral and legal violations that involved an obvious human victim. The stu- dents also perceived these behaviors as more serious than violations with no clear human victim. For example, in research speci cally on line cutting, B. H. Schmitt, Dubé, and Leclerc (1992) explained the behavior as a “disrespect of essential human concerns” (p. 814). Among these con- cerns, they include equality and fairness and personal space. Because the victim is not as obvious in social contract violations, individuals who are better at perspective taking should be better able to recognize the victim in such situations. As a result, they would be less likely to engage in the behaviors. Further, because there is an immediate gain related to social contract violations, impulsivity also will play an important role in this cluster of behaviors. Although some transgressions can be explained by the desire to maximize some future bene- t, others can be seen as simple failures of self-control at a particular moment, with no particular advantage gained and no victim, either direct or indirect, except oneself. Although this is poten- tially true of all transgressive behaviors, Baumeister (2002) and Wertenbroch (1998) indicated that a failure of self-control may be particularly related to cheating oneself. This type of cheating occurs when an individual breaks the rules of a regimen he or she has set for him- or herself (e.g., a personal diet program or a nancial budget). These behaviors are different from the other behav- iors discussed in that there are no clear social rami cations and there is no clear victim (other than oneself) related to the behaviors. As such, self-cheating behaviors will cluster together, clearly distinct from other types of cheating. Cheating on a self-imposed diet or failing to adhere to one’s own budget may result in a short-term gain, but in the very act of creating the diet or budget, the individual acknowl- edges the potential negative long-term effects of its absence. A decision that offers short-term bene ts but long-term harm may be referred to as a vice (Wertenbroch, 1998). The decision liter- ature has long understood this trade-off as temporal discounting (Raineri & Rachlin, 2006), and Ostaszewski (1996) demonstrated that temporal discounting is associated with individual differ- ences in impulsivity. Baumeister (2002) showed that, in the absence of self-control, individuals will most often act upon their vices. In other words, even though the individual recognizes both the bene ts of a set regimen and its previously de ned constraints, he or she fails to resist temp- tation or impulse to engage in the cheating behavior. Therefore, it is hypothesized that impulsive individuals would be more likely to engage in self-cheating. A goal of this study was to determine how different types of moral transgressions are related to each other. First, the frequencies of 17 different transgressive behaviors, ranging in sever- ity from littering and using the HOV lane improperly to lying on a resume, were examined to determine if there were patterns of behavioral transgressions. The researchers predicted that 58 MCTERNAN, LOVE, RETTINGER these 17 transgressions would be generally correlated but that distinct categories also would emerge according to the four hypothesized factors discussed in the previous section. In sum- mary, researchers expected to nd four categories of transgressive behavior: competitive cheating (e.g., cheating on a test or lying on a resume), cheating in a relationship (i.e., cheating on a spouse or partner), self-cheating (e.g., cheating on a diet or budget), and the breaking of social contracts (e.g., using the HOV lane improperly or bringing outside food into an event) and hypothesized that these categories would be in uenced by different personality factors. SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES Given that personality seems to play a role in the decision-making processes that lead to social transgressions, it is important to address speci c personality characteristics and their relationships with different kinds of cheating behaviors so we may better understand the moral decision- making process as a whole. This study evaluated these constructs with the goal of gaining a better understanding of the speci c cheating behaviors in general, as well as what kinds of people tend to engage in those cheating behaviors. Five hypotheses were tested to strengthen our understanding of the relationship between cheat- ing behaviors and the traits of the people who commit them. First, transgressive behaviors are predicted to fall into at least four different clusters of cheating: competitive cheating, relationship cheating, violations of social contracts, and self-cheating. A single factor model of transgressive behaviors was also tested for comparison. Second, people with higher impulsivity and sensation- seeking scores likely to cheat across various situations. Third, participants who cheat to gain an advantage over others (competitive cheating) would display this behavior consistently, have low levels of perspective taking, and have high levels of impulsivity and sensation seeking. Fourth, it was hypothesized that self-cheating behaviors would not be likely to have any correlation with perspective taking but would have a strong positive correlation with impulsivity and a negative correlation with shame. Likewise, people who engage in self-cheating would behave consistently when such cheating opportunities arise. Fifth, it is predicted that people with lower guilt- and shame-proneness scores would be more likely to cheat across various situations. METHOD Participants Six hundred sixteen participants were recruited over the Internet using the social networking site Facebook. Three hundred sixty (58.4%) of these participants were female, 252 (40.9%) were male, and four declined to respond (0.6%). A Facebook Event and Facebook Group were created to publicize the survey and ask Facebook users to participate. Facebook Events and Groups allow users to share information about a particular topic with select users or the general public by creating a special page for that topic. Each page allows the creators to share posts and send messages to all of the page’s members in mass. Individual researchers (aged 20–22) recruited participants from among their “friends,” those with connections on the site, and in turn asked each “friend” who was invited to the study’s Facebook Event or Group page to forward the INFLUENCE OF PERSONALITY ON DECISION TO CHEAT 59 study’s information to other Facebook users. This technique is a convenience version of snowball sampling (Goodman, 1961). Participants ranged in age from 18 to 80 years old; however, the most frequently occurring age was 21 years old (M=30.06,SD=13.77). The majority of participants identi ed them- selves as Caucasian (538; 87.3%). The Asian/Paci c Islander (21; 3.4%), African American (6; 0.9%), Hispanic (17; 2.8%), Native American/Alaska Native (3; 0.5%), and Other/Multiracial (17; 2.8%) communities were also represented. Fourteen (2.3%) participants declined to pro- vide ethnic background information. Almost half (43%) of the participants had completed some college, and 45% reported their relationship status as single. Participants were largely from the United States (94.4%), although other countries were represented. Materials Transgressive Behavior Scale.The Transgressive Behavior Scale was created for this study with the goal of combining transgressive behaviors across domains for the rst time. One goal of this study was to determine the internal factor relationships among these behaviors, thus validating the scale for future research. Therefore the scale was designed to measure how often participants had engaged in cheating and other socially transgressive actions. It consisted of a list of 17 items describing actions or behaviors accompanied by a 6-point response scale. Participants used the scale to indicate how often they had performed the actions or behaviors since they entered high school. The scale ranges fromnevertodaily. The items include such transgressive and rule-breaking actions as plagiarism and other types of academic dishonesty (Jordan, 2001), cheating at a sport or game (Silva, 1981), adultery in a relationship (Hall & Fincham, 2009; Lucas & Friedrich, 2005; D. P. Schmitt, 2004), and social norm violations such as breaking a budget (Cheema & Soman, 2006; Kidwell & Turrisi, 2004) and littering. Note that the scale was not labeled as “transgressive behavior” when presented to participants. Participants were asked to report how often they performed each of the behaviors since they were 14 years old, or entered high school. The participants chose among “never,” “less than once or twice per year,” “once per year,” “once or twice per month,” “once or twice per week,” “daily,” or “no answer/don’t know/not applicable” for each behavior. For a list of items on this scale, see Table 1. Personality measures.The Brief Sensation Seeking Scale (BSSS; Hoyle, Stephenson, Palmgreen, Lorch, & Donohew, 2002) is an eight-item measure of sensation seeking speci – cally designed to be a shorter and more practical alternative to Sensation Seeking Scale Form 5 (Zuckerman, Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978), the most commonly used measure of sensation seek- ing. The BSSS-4 was validated to be used speci cally as part of large-scale surveys (Stephenson, Hoyle, Palmgreen, & Slater, 2003). Participants indicated their responses on a 5-point Likert scale anchored bystrongly agreeandstrongly disagree. The four items on the BSSS-4 are “I would like to explore strange places”; “I like to do frightening things”; “I like new and exciting experiences, even if I have to break the rules”; and “I prefer friends who are exciting and unpredictable.” The BSSS-4 was correlated at thep<.001 level with the BSSS (r=.89) and the Impulsive Sensation Seeking scale from the Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire (r=.81; Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Joireman, Teta, & Kraft, 1993). The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) is the most frequently used self-report measure of impulsivity (Spinella, 2007). It contains 30 items that each states an action or thought such as 60 MCTERNAN, LOVE, RETTINGER TABLE 1 Frequency of Participants Who Reported Committing a Transgression TransgressionN% Snuck food into a movie or other event where outside food is not allowed. 526 85.4 Set a budget and not followed it. 466 75.6 Was aware of someone else cheating on a test and did not report it. 431 70.0 Cheated on a homework assignment or copied information for a paper. 406 65.9 Was aware of someone else cheating on a boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse/partner and did not tell the person being cheated on.393 63.8 Cheated on a diet.390 63.3 Cheated in a game (including board games, card games, etc.). 389 63.1 Cut someone in line. 385 62.5 Knew of someone else lying or cheating on a work task and did not report it. 383 62.2 Littered (dumped trash improperly). 354 57.5 Lied or cheated on a task at work (including job searches). 319 51.8 Cheated on a test.311 50.5 Snuck into any event without the proper ticket. 243 39.4 Cheated while playing a sport. 209 33.9 Cheated on a boyfriend/girlfriend/spouse/partner. 189 30.7 Used a carpool (HOV) lane improperly (e.g., with no passengers). 124 20.1 Not paid for a meal at a restaurant. 37 6.0 “I do things without thinking” (Haden & Shiva, 2008). Participants responded on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (rarely or never)to4(almost always) how often they have had the thought or per- formed the action. To keep the current survey as ef cient as possible participants were presented a 15-item version of the BIS (BIS15). Spinella (2007) found that the BIS15 had a Cronbach’s alpha of .79 and all of the items were strongly correlated with the original BIS (r=.65,p< .001 throughr=.94,p<.001). The Harder Personal Feelings Questionnaire-2 (PFQ-2) serves as a measure of both shame- and guilt-proneness (Fischer & Corcoran, 2007; Harder et al., 1993). The PFQ-2 is a 22-item scale comprising two subscales. Six of the items measure guilt, 10 measure shame, and the addi- tional six items on the scale are null items, included to make it more dif cult for subjects to identify the constructs being measured. Participants were asked to indicate the frequencies of par- ticular feelings on a scale from 0 (never)to4(continuously/almost continuously). For instance, participants were asked to indicate how often they experienced “embarrassment,” “regret,” or “remorse.” Higher scores on this scale indicate higher levels of both shame- and guilt-proneness. This scale has acceptable reliability with alpha levels of .72 for guilt and .78 for shame, as well as decent construct validity (Harder & Zalma, 1990). Given its acceptable reliability and validity, along with the simplicity of this scale, researchers chose this over a more popular measure of shame and guilt, which requires more interpretation of hypothetical emotion-inducing situations (see Giner-Sorolla, Piazza, & Espinosa, 2011, for a more in-depth critique of the frequently used TOSCA scale). The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) is arguably the most effective and widely used measure of social desirability. This scale consists of 33 true/false INFLUENCE OF PERSONALITY ON DECISION TO CHEAT 61 items and has a reliability of .88, using the Kuder-Richardson formula 20 (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). Crowne and Marlowe (1960) found that the scale is well correlated with social desir- ability scales within the MMPI and the Edwards Social Desirability Scale. A short version of the Marlowe-Crowne (M-C Form C) was used in this study (Reynolds, 1982). It contains 13 true/false items such as “I am always willing to admit when I make a mistake” and “There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they were right” (Reynolds, 1982). The scale has a reliability ofrkr20=.76 (Reynolds, 1982). Reynolds (1982) observed correlation coef cients between his short versions and the original version of the Marlowe-Crowne and found thatr=.93 when Form C was compared to the original Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. The perspective taking subscale of Davis’s (1980, 1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index con- sists of seven items, each of which is measured on a scale ranging from 0 (does not describe me well)to4(describes me very well). This subscale was used to measure participants’ perspec- tive taking component of empathy, or how he or she tends to consider the viewpoint of others. An example of one of the items that measures the tendency to engage in perspective taking is, “When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to ‘put myself in his shoes’ for a while” (Davis, 1980). Procedure All participants began this survey by linking to the SurveyGizmo.com website. The rst page required an informed consent from each participant. The informed consent told the participants that the study examined the how certain personality characteristics are related to the decision- making process. Once the participant gave consent, the survey began. (If consent was not given, participants were forwarded to a thank-you page.) Participants completed the transgressive behav- ior inventory rst, followed by the personality scales in a randomly generated order. After completing the scale items, participants completed a set of demographic questions before they were directed to a debrie ng page where the true nature of the study was revealed. Each partici- pant had an option to remove his or her data from the study at this point in the survey, although none chose to do so. Participants were permitted to stop taking the survey at any time and resume it at a later date. Data Analysis A con rmatory factor analysis (CFA) was rst used to estimate the extent to which the speci c behaviors cluster together into cheating domains as hypothesized. This method is most appro- priate for this study as it allowed the researchers to observe the relationships between different cheating behaviors and to test the hypothesis that there are distinct latent factors of cheating that will comprise particular cheating behaviors. Finally, a path model was estimated using the obtained factors from the CFA to assess how impulsivity, sensation seeking, perspective taking, shame, and guilt are related to an individual’s likeliness to engage in different domains of cheating behaviors. 62 MCTERNAN, LOVE, RETTINGER RESULTS Frequencies of Cheating Behaviors Analyses were conducted on all valid data to determine the frequency each of the 17 behav- ioral transgressions. No participants chose to remove their data from the study after completing the survey. Those who had responded as having performed the transgression with any frequency other than “never” were coded as having “ever” performed the behavior, whereas only those who had responded with “never” were coded as such. For each transgression, cases where the partic- ipant had not responded or had marked a response of “N/A” were excluded from the analyses; as a result, each behavior has a different sample size. All participants (100%) reported having performed at least one of the transgressions. See Table 1 for frequencies of the 17 behaviors. It is interesting to note that the highest percentage of participants, 85.4% (526 respondents), reported having snuck food into an event. Breaking a personal budget was also highly reported, with 75.6% of valid responders (466 people) having admitted to this transgression. Relationship cheating was less frequent, with 30.7% of respondents (189 people) reporting having ever cheat- ing on a spouse or signi cant other. Finally, the behavior of not paying for a meal at a restaurant was reported by the lowest number of respondents, with a frequency of only 37 positive responses, or only 6% of all the valid responses. Scale Reliability Reliability tests con rmed that the personality scales used were reliable. The Cronbach’s alpha for each of the scales were as follows: perspective taking, Davis’s Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Perspective Taking subscale):α=.79; social desirability, M-C Form C:α=.74; sensation seeking, BSSS-4:α=.79; impulsivity, BIS:α=.86; Guilt and Shame subscales, PFQ-2:α= .85; Shame subscale only, PFQ-2:α=.79; and Guilt subscale only, PFQ-2:α=.75. Correlations Between Personality Measures Signi cant relationships emerged amongst the personality measures. Scores on shame and guilt were positively correlated,r(590)=.591,p<.01, as were impulsivity and sensation-seeking scores,r(582)=.333,p<.01, as expected. Impulsivity and shame scores were also positively correlated,r(578)=.270,p<.01. Finally, and of interest, impulsivity and perspective-taking scores were signi cantly negatively correlated,r(583)=–.222,p<.01. All correlations between the personality measures in this study are displayed in Table 2. Relationships Among Transgressive Behaviors Recall that it was hypothesized that the observed transgressive behaviors would cluster into several “types” of transgressions. Speci cally, we expected to nd that competitive cheating, cheating within relationships, self-cheating, and social contract violations would tend to be asso- ciated within each group. Based on our theoretically motivated predictions, a CFA was performed to verify the t of these four factors to the individual transgressive behaviors. Data were analyzed INFLUENCE OF PERSONALITY ON DECISION TO CHEAT 63 TABLE 2 Correlations Between Personality Traits and Overall Cheating Frequency Sensation SeekingGuilt Proneness ImpulsivityShame PronenessPerspective TakingCheating Behavior Sensation Seeking−0.06 0.33 ∗∗∗ 0.07 0.02 0.32 ∗∗∗ Guilt Proneness 0.09 0.59 ∗∗∗ 0.07 0.09 Impulsivity 0.27 ∗∗∗ −0.22 ∗∗∗ 0.43 ∗∗∗ Shame Proneness−0.07 0.23 ∗∗∗ Perspective Taking−0.16 ∗∗∗ ∗∗p<.01. ∗∗∗ p<.001. using EQS 6.1 (Bentler & Wu, 1995) using maximum likelihood estimation. Six hundred sixteen participants’ data were initially entered, but 22 were excluded because of missing data. The fac- tors were allowed to correlate, as it was predicted that all transgressive behaviors would be at least mildly correlated. Upon initial observation, it was clear that two behaviors, HOV lane vio- lations and witnessing cheating in school, did not associate with other forms of cheating. These behaviors were thus excluded from future analyses. The t of the hypothesized model was not acceptable,χ 2(116)=1150.85,p<.001; compara- tive t index (CFI)=.99, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)=.12, standardized root mean square residual (RMR)=.14, 1and it was clear that the “competitive cheating” factor was heterogeneous. Thus, a ve-factor model was estimated in which that factor was split into two: school-related transgressions and competitive transgressions (in sports, games, and work situations). The t of the ve-factor model was good,χ 2(62)=188.78,p<.001; CFI=.89, RMSEA=.06, standardized RMR=.04. Factor loadings and correlations among factors for this nal model are provided in Figure 1. As the gure indicates, the CFA estimated ve factors. The factor loadings in the model indi- cate the magnitude of the regressions of the factors on their respective speci c cheating behaviors. This model represents the data well, indicating that the behaviors within each factor (where each factor is representative of a domain of cheating) hold together well and that the factors are rep- resentative of distinct domains. The estimated covariances between the factors indicate that the different domains of cheating are nonetheless related, as expected. Cheating oneself is somewhat less correlated with cheating in school, competitive cheating and social contract violations, but other relationships are quite robust. However, a single-factor model (treating all cheating behav- iors as belonging to the same factor) showed relatively poor t,χ 2(91)=528.33,p<.001; CFI =.59, RMSEA=.10, standardized RMR=.08, supporting the hypothesis that, although over- laps exist between the different clusters of behaviors, the differences among them are notable. 1CFI>.90 and RMSEA/RMR<.10 are typically representative of a good tting model. 64 MCTERNAN, LOVE, RETTINGER FIGURE 1Con rmatory factor analysis showing clusters of transgressive behaviors.Note.BF/GF represents the behavior of cheating on a partner. Other BF/GF represents the behavior of knowing someone else has cheated on a partner and not doing anything about it. Cheating Factor School Relationship SelfSocial Contract Competitive 0.32 0.69 0.21 0.47 School — 0.34 0.12 0.55 Relationship — 0.57 0.45 Self—0.26 Social contract— Personality and Transgressive Behaviors To assess the relationships between the estimated cheating factors and the measured person- ality traits, a structural equation model (SEM) was estimated using EQS 6.1 among the 616 participants who completed the survey. A total of 277 participants were excluded for incom- plete data. Maximum likelihood estimation was used to build a model that used ve personality variables to explain the ve kinds of transgressive behaviors found using CFA. The personality variables were sensation seeking, impulsivity, shame proneness, guilt proneness, and perspective taking. Shame and guilt were allowed to correlate as were impulsivity and sensation seeking based on the close theoretical relationship between the pairs. The t of this model was not acceptable, χ 2(10)=66.09,p<.001; CFI=.91, RMSEA=.13, standardized RMR=.07. Upon exami- nation, it was clear that neither shame nor guilt was useful in explaining transgressive behavior (no regression weight exceeded .11). A model excluding those variables was then estimated. The resulting model is displayed in Figure 2. The t of this model was good,χ 2(2)=13.50,p=.003; CFI=.98, RMSEA=.10, standardized RMR=.04, demonstrating the importance of sensation INFLUENCE OF PERSONALITY ON DECISION TO CHEAT 65 FIGURE 2Structural equation model indicates that personality traits are associated with all transgressions equally.Note.Factor weights are all signi cant at the .05 level. seeking and impulsivity in all forms of transgressive behavior and the relatively lesser importance of perspective taking across the board. DISCUSSION Many of our hypotheses were supported by the obtained results, although a number of them are quite surprising. The following is clear: (a) Self-reports of transgressive behavior tend to be asso- ciated with one another, but in clusters. Not all behaviors are equally correlated. (b) Transgressive behaviors are associated with personality traits, particularly sensation seeking, impulsivity, and to a lesser degree perspective taking. (c) The observed personality traits themselves are associated in the expected ways. As our rst hypothesis predicted, transgressive behaviors do cluster into separate domains, as indicated by the CFA. As had been hypothesized, three of the cheating domains were clearly dis- tinct:self-cheating, which included straying from a personal diet or budget;relationship cheating, comprised of cheating on a romantic partner or knowing about another person cheating on his or her romantic partner and not reporting it; andsocial contract violations, which included cutting in line, littering, sneaking into an event without the proper ticket, sneaking outside food into an event, and not paying for a meal at a restaurant. The fourth predicted factor, cheating for gain, produced a better model t when it was broken down into two separate factors. The researchers labeled the two resulting factorsschool cheating, comprising cheating on homework or tests, and competitive cheating, which includes behaviors such as cheating at work, lying on resumes, and cheating in sports and games. 66 MCTERNAN, LOVE, RETTINGER An individual who transgresses in one of the cheating domains is likely to commit transgres- sions in the others. However, an individual who breaks a diet or budget may not necessarily be as likely to commit the other transgressions, as the self-cheating factor showed a weaker corre- lation with the others. Although all of the clusters did correlate signi cantly, a one-factor model of transgression did not create a good t. The ve-factor model resulting from the CFA showed a much better t than the single factor model, indicating that the differences between the clusters are meaningful and should not be ignored. The rst two clusters of behaviors (labeled Competitive Cheating and School Cheating) include behaviors that are performed in order to gain an advantage or “get ahead” without taking the appropriate steps toward the end goal. In other words, these behaviors are all “shortcuts” and, as such, the model shows that impulsive individuals are most likely to engage in them. The second cluster (Social Contract Violations) includes behaviors that violate explicit laws or rules established either by society or by a legal system. The violation of such rules is risky, especially because the consequences for violating the rules are as explicit as the rules themselves. Thus people who violate these rules despite knowing the consequences are likely to be sensation seekers, as indicated by the SEM. The model also shows that these individuals are likely to be impulsive, likely because all of the behaviors in this category yield short-term gains at the risk of detrimental effects later. Further, these laws are often set into place in order to protect other individuals or an entire system. Someone who violates these laws, then, is causing direct or indirect harm to someone else. Therefore, it is not surprising that, according to the model, people who are better at perspective taking are less likely to engage in these behaviors. The third category (Self-Cheating) represents behaviors that violate rules set by oneself. These behaviors are clearly different from the other categories of behavior. Short-term gain is especially highlighted by these behaviors, and they are guaranteed violations of the actor’s long-term intent, as made clear by the setting of the rule in the rst place. It is understandable that the SEM revealed a strong relationship between impulsivity and self-cheating behaviors, because individuals who lack self-control will be more likely to violate long-term goals for short-term gain. This nding was supportive of our hypotheses. Finally, behaviors involving romantic in delity (Relationship Cheating) fall into a category of their own. These behaviors differ from the others in that they would be obviously hurtful to another individual if the behavior were exposed, and because the victim is harmeddirectly, unlike the victims of social contract violations or academic cheating violations. Further, victims of behaviors in this cluster are likely to be closer to the actor than in other clusters. As such, it is not surprising that, as hypothesized, the violators of this behavior cluster are sensation seekers and impulsive individuals. Our second hypothesis that impulsivity and sensation seeking would predict transgressions was supported by the positive path coef cients in the second model leading from these personality traits to the various cheating domains. However, the SEM did not support our fth hypothesis. Shame and guilt were not associated with transgressions, and perspective taking played a smaller role than expected. The negative path coef cient between sensation seeking and the self-cheating domain was also surprising. It indicates that individuals higher on sensation seeking are less likely to stray from a diet or budget than individuals who are low on sensation seeking. This is probably because sensation-seeking individuals likely never set budgets or diets for themselves, and therefore can stray from them. INFLUENCE OF PERSONALITY ON DECISION TO CHEAT 67 The speci c path coef cients between the personality traits and the cheating factors in the model are also independently meaningful. For example, the path coef cient from sensation seeking to relationship cheating is .24 and the path coef cient from impulsivity to relationship cheating is .13. Sensation seeking is a much stronger predictor of relationship cheating than an impulsive personality. This suggests that people who cheat on their partners cheat primarily for the excitement and only secondarily because they lack self-control. It is also interesting to note that perspective taking has an effect of only –.05 on relationship cheating. This result suggests that either (a) people cheat regardless of whether they take their partner’s perspective, or (b) perhaps perspective taking as a trait not required in situations where the effect on others is so obvious. (c) It is also possible that relationship cheaters assume no harm will accrue to their partner because the partner will not nd out about the transgression. Further, the coef cients linking impulsivity and sensation seeking with competitive cheating behaviors (.24 and .18, respectively) seem to speak to the idea that people who cheat in sports, in games, and at work may be likely to do so because of a lack of self-control and less so because it is produces a thrill. Impulsivity also has a very large effect on self-cheating behaviors (.37), especially when compared to the small contribution from sensation seeking (–.14). This result indicates that self-control is the most important factor in being able to stick to one’s budget or diet. These ndings support our third and fourth hypotheses, respectively. Finally, by looking at the speci c path coef cients in the SEM, it can be concluded that per- spective taking plays a much smaller role in all of the cheating factors than impulsivity and sensation seeking. Perspective taking was found to have signi cant negative path coef cients with all of the cheating factors except the self-cheating factor, with which perspective taking was not associated at all. We had predicted that perspective taking would be related to the cheating factors that directly or indirectly involve other people. It was also predicted it to be unrelated to the self-cheating factor, because cheating one’s self does not include making decisions that will negatively affect others. However, it was surprising that perspective taking had the lowest path coef cient with relationship cheating. This nding is initially counterintuitive but can be explained by victim salience. Even the least empathic individual can understand that cheating on a partner will impact that partner, and so perspective taking is not associated with differences on that behavior. In contrast, social contract violations require a good deal of perspective taking, as the victim is not always obvious. This difference cannot be accounted for by the victims’ ignorance of the transgression, as this is consistent between social contract and relationship cheating. The harm that comes as the result of the transgression is not solely the result of their knowledge of the transgression. There is an objective harm to being cheated, either in a relationship or in a social contract, whether the victim is aware or not. In contradiction with our fth hypothesis, the model showed better t statistics when shame- and guilt-proneness were removed. This result may be theoretically important, but it may be the result of the survey method. Participants rst answered questions about their cheating behaviors, which may have induced state shame or guilt, affecting responses on the later scale that was meant to measure trait shame and guilt. Those with more transgressions to report would therefore feel more state shame or guilt. Behavior scales were presented rst in this study to avoid priming effects from the personality scales. However, in future research it would be wise to completely counterbalance the order of presentation to prevent carryover in the opposite direction. 68 MCTERNAN, LOVE, RETTINGER Another possibility is that shame- and guilt-proneness do not, in fact, cause changes in transgressive behavior. This result would be truly surprising. Although it is unwise to overin- terpret a null result such as this one, it is interesting to speculate that impulsivity overrides an individual’s desire to avoid guilt or shame in the future. If that is so, it calls into question the use- fulness of anticipated emotions (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003) in the moral decision process. This has strong implications for transgression prevention. We are often reminded of the emotional con- sequences of our actions in an attempt to lead individuals to avoid transgressions. If impulsiveness trumps a tendency to feel guilt about our transgressions, this strategy is unlikely to be effective. There are also limitations to shame and guilt personality measures. As mentioned previously, the Shame and Guilt scales were intended to measure trait emotions (and an individual’s level of guilt and shame proneness); however, due to the order of the questions, it is possible that they measured state emotions (the level of shame and guilt felt at the time of answering the questionnaire). Our data indicate that emotions are not a large factor in the decision-making process. Although we are con dent in our results, it is possible that this nding may have a more methodological than theoretical explanation. Additional research should account for this when designing future studies on shame and guilt. Our nding that impulsivity is highly related to all the cheating domains supports an automatic moral decision-making process, such as the social-intuitionist model of moral decision making (Haidt, 2001). Because impulsive people are less able to resist the temptation to respond to inter- nal or external stimuli without forethought, planning, or an appreciation for the consequences of the action (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995), they would be less likely to adhere to their moral judgments and thus more likely to commit a moral transgression. The results from this study sup- port this hypothesis. Haidt (2001) also argued that a second “cold” system of moral behavior can block the impulses of the hot system using rationality-based cognitions like perspective taking. Although results of this study indicated that one’s ability to engage in perspective taking is related to lower levels of cheating, the lower strength of the relationship indicates that impulsivity level is the most in uential cognitive-base trait as related to moral transgressions in most cases. Future research may further explore the relationship between these “hot” and “cold” systems of decision making. The ndings in the present study are less supportive of theories that suggest people perform behaviors that will allow them to maintain their self-concepts (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). For example, if an individual believes him- or herself to be highly moral, he or she would be likely to act in a way that does not threaten that sense of morality. The results from the present study suggest that the decision-making process is less rational than Mazar et al. (2008) had pro- posed. Because impulsivity appears to be strongly related to cheating behaviors, it might follow that people who engage in transgressive behaviors are quick to act and likely would not have time to evaluate their self-concepts beforehand. Further, the strong effect of sensation seeking on transgressive behavior suggests that some people enjoy the thrill from transgressing. In other words, they may choose to transgress despite their self-concepts. Although there is literature that indicates that self-report measures lack external validity, our ndings do not support this assertion. Real-world examples of moral transgressions are widely available. A self-report survey administered over the internet, like the one used in this study, creates a suf ciently secure and anonymous environment that the participants will be more likely to report previous transgressions. Furthermore, social desirability scores did not interact with the any other variables measured and was not likely a factor when affecting the participants’ decision INFLUENCE OF PERSONALITY ON DECISION TO CHEAT 69 to report past behaviors. This result, paired with our nding that 100% of the participants reported committing some sort of moral transgression, supports the argument that our participants did not feel the need to hide past transgressions. Another limitation results from the sampling method and resulting sample. Because the survey was only posted on Facebook, and the population of Facebook users may differ from nonusers, the population to which these ndings can be generalized may be limited. The demographics of this sample are skewed young, White, and American. Although this is an improvement over the traditional General Psychology sample, it still is not an accurate representation of a national population, and certainly not a global population. The size of the sample does represent a strength of the study, as it allows for appropriate parameter estimation in SEM. It is possible, however, that small effects, such as that of perspective taking, may be overstated with such a large sample. The present research excluded morality variables because the link between moral functioning and transgressive behavior is well established (Haidt, 2001). Given the interesting ndings regard- ing impulsivity, future research should explore the interactions between “cold” moral reasoning and “hot” emotional or impulsive behavior. Despite these limitations, the results of this study expand our understanding of the role of per- sonality in transgressive behavior. It is clear that sensation seeking and impulsivity are extremely important across the board and that more impulsive people do tend to transgress more frequently. Also, this study presents the possibility that shame and guilt proneness are not important pre- dictors of transgressive behavior, as one might have thought. Finally, the results suggest that the ability to take the perspective of another is most in uential during those decisions about trans- gressions where the harm to others is more abstract or remote. 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Perspective Mistaking: Accurately Understanding the Mind of Another Requires Getting Perspective, Not Taking Perspective Tal Eyal Ben Gurion University of the Negev Mary Steffel Northeastern University Nicholas EpleyUniversity of Chicago Taking another person’s perspective is widely presumed to increase interpersonal understanding. Very few experiments, however, have actually tested whether perspective taking increases accuracy when predicting another person’s thoughts, feelings, attitudes, or other mental states. Those that do yield inconsistent results, or they confound accuracy with egocentrism. Here we report 25 experiments testing whether being instructed to adopt another person’s perspective increases interpersonal insight. These experiments include a wide range of accuracy tests that disentangle egocentrism and accuracy, such as predicting another person’s emotions from facial expressions and body postures, predicting fake versus genuine smiles, predicting when a person is lying or telling the truth, and predicting a spouse’s activity preferences and consumer attitudes. Although a large majority of pretest participantsbelievedthat perspective taking would systematically increase accuracy on these tasks, we failed to find any consistent evidence that it actually did so. If anything, perspective taking decreased accuracy overall while occasionally increasing confidence in judgment. Perspective taking reduced egocentric biases, but the information used in its place was not systematically more accurate. A final experiment confirmed that getting another person’s perspective directly, through conversation, increased accuracy but that perspec- tive taking did not. Increasing interpersonal accuracy seems to require gaining new information rather than utilizing existing knowledge about another person. Understanding the mind of another person is therefore enabled bygettingperspective, not simplytakingperspective. Keywords:egocentrism, empathy, interpersonal accuracy, perspective taking, social cognition Supplemental materials:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000115.supp Understanding the minds of others is essential for social func- tioning, but another person’s mind is one of the most complicated systems that any person will ever think about. Just consider the numbers. The average human brain contains roughly one hundred billion neurons connected to anywhere between one thousand and 10 thousand other neurons through synapses that can be in a variety of excitatory or inhibitory states. Based on these figures, neuroscientists calculate that a human brain could be in more possible brain states than there are elementary particles in the known universe (Ramachandran, 2004, p. 3). Given the complex- ity of another person’s mind, what strategy should people use to understand the mind of another person more accurately? One strategy is so routinely endorsed that its effectiveness seems taken for granted: perspective taking. That is, to understandanother person’s mind accurately you have to overcome your own egocentric perspective, “put yourself in another person’s shoes,” and try to perceive a situation from another person’s point of view. This suggestion appears in politics, as when Barak Obama argued before the United Nations, “the deadlock [between the Israelis and Palestinians] will only be broken when each side learns to stand in each other’s shoes.” It appears in best-selling wisdom about human relations, as whenDale Carnegie (1936)lists the principles that will teach youHow to Win Friends and Influence People.Principle #8 is “a formula that will work wonders for you:….Tryhonestly to see things from the other person’s point of view.” And, accord- ing to a survey we conducted, it appears so routinely in people’s intuitions as to qualify as genuine common sense. In this survey, 336 Amazon.com Mechanical Turk workers read about a series of experiments we conducted in which participants completed one of eight tests of interpersonal understanding (de- scribed later in detail). Four tests were taken from the existing scientific literature: The Mind in Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, Wheel- wright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001), the Diagnostic Analysis of Nonverbal Behavior for faces (DANVA-faces,Nowicki & Duke, 1994), the Diagnostic Analysis of Nonverbal Behavior for postures (DANVA-postures,Nowicki & Duke, 1994), and the Fake Smiles Test (BBC science website; e.g.,Bernstein, Sacco, Brown, Young, Tal Eyal, Department of Psychology, Ben Gurion University of the Negev; Mary Steffel, D’Amore-McKim School of Business, Northeastern University; Nicholas Epley, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Tal Eyal, Department of Psychology, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beer- Sheva 84105, Israel. E-mail:[email protected] This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology © 2018 American Psychological Association2018, Vol. 114, No. 4, 547–571 0022-3514/18/$12.00http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000115 547 & Claypool, 2010). Four additional tests were relatively routine social judgments: predicting a romantic partner’s consumer atti- tudes, movie preferences, activity preferences, and joke prefer- ences. Participants were randomly assigned to read a short descrip- tion of just one of these tests and were presented with one sample item. Participants then predicted which of two groups of people was more accurate in an experiment: people in a control condition who simply completed the test without further instruction, or people in a perspective taking condition who were asked to com- plete the test while “trying to adopt the perspective of the other person, putting yourself into the other person’s shoes as if you were that person.” Participants predicted the outcome of the ex- periment by choosing one of three options: “Condition 1 (Control) did significantly better,” “Condition 2 (Perspective Taking) did significantly better,” or “No significant difference between the two conditions in performance on the test.” As shown inFigure 1, most participants predicted that partici- pants in the perspective taking condition were more accurate than those in the control condition (67.75%). Few believed that partic- ipants in the control condition were more accurate (16%) or that participants in the two conditions differed in accuracy (16.25%). Even those who are unlikely to have ever read Dale Carnegie’s book seem likely to believe in his “formula that will work wonders for you.” Despite a large scientific literature on the consequences of perspective taking in social interaction, whether perspective taking actuallyincreases accurate insight into the mind of another person is unclear. Many experiments test how perspective taking affects social cognition or interpersonal interaction. Very few measure the accuracy of interpersonal judgments. Those that do provide incon- sistent results, or confound egocentrism and accuracy, making it difficult to assess whether perspective taking merely shifts per- spective or actually increases accurate insight. Here we report a large number of experiments that test whether perspective taking increases interpersonal accuracy, using the very same tests from the pretest described above plus several others. These experiments are important because they are the first to systematically examine the validity of a widely endorsed strategy for increasing interper- sonal insight. They make an important theoretical advance byclarifying the nuanced consequences of a frequently studied topic in social psychology, thereby providing a better understanding of how perspective taking may affect interpersonal interactions. These experiments also offer practical advice about how to under- stand the mind of another person more accurately. Perspective taking may indeed work wonders for you in social life. Is increas- ing accurate insight into the mind of another person one of them? Known Consequences of Perspective Taking Each person views the world from a potentially unique vantage point, collecting information through physical senses and inter- preting it through his or her own beliefs, attitudes, knowledge, experiences, and personality. Children become aware of their unique perspective as they age because they learn that others sometimes evaluate the world differently. This learning develops a highly sophisticated capacity to imagine another person’s unique perspective in adulthood, a capacity for social cognition that seems unmatched by any other species (Herrmann, Call, Hernández- Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007). Having a capacity and using that capacity, however, are two very different things. Considering another person’s perspective does not seem to be automatic and effortless, but instead requires time, motivation, and attentional resources to execute. Anything that reduces the time, inclination, or attention available for per- spective taking increases reliance on a relatively automatic ego- centric default in judgment (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilov- ich, 2004;Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004;Karniol, 2003). Likewise, explicitly encouraging perspective taking, by instructing people to “put themselves in another person’s shoes” and imagine another’s thoughts and feelings as if they were this other person, reliably affects people’s inferences and actions toward others com- pared with receiving no explicit encouragement. Existing research on perspective taking typically does not assess interpersonal accuracy, but instead measures intrapersonal conse- quences that follow directly from being asked to shift from an egocentric perspective to an allocentric perspective. For instance, people who are explicitly instructed to attend to another’s perspec- tive are more likely to engage in deliberate thinking (e.g.,Epley et 0 10 20 30 4050 6070 80 Mind in Eyes DANVA FacesDANVA PosturesFake Smiles Consumer attitudesMovie preferencesActivity preferencesJoke preferences % of Participants Control Bette r PT Better The Same Figure 1.Percentage of participants who predicted that accuracy would be higher in the perspective taking condition, higher in the control condition, or equally the same in both conditions (Pretest). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 548 EYAL, STEFFEL, AND EPLEY al., 2004;Todd, Bodenhausen, Richeson, & Galinsky, 2011;Todd, Galinsky, & Bodenhausen, 2012), mimic another person (Char- trand & Bargh, 1999;Genschow, Florack, & Wanke, 2013), report empathizing with another person’s emotional state (Batson, Early, & Salvarni, 1997;Davis, 1983;Maner et al., 2002; cf.Vorauer & Sasaki, 2009), take on another person’s stereotypic attributes (Ga- linsky, Wang, & Ku, 2008), and rely less on egocentric defaults in judgment (Caruso, Epley, & Bazerman, 2006;Savitsky, Van Boven, Epley, & Wight, 2005;Steffel & LeBoeuf, 2014;Wade- Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996;Yaniv & Choshen- Hillel, 2012;Zhang & Epley, 2009). Imagining oneself as another person also increases a sense of similarity with the other person (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996), reduces the use of group- based stereotypes when evaluating others (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), and reduces prejudice toward outgroups (Todd, Boden- hausen et al., 2011). In negotiations, perspective taking can in- crease coordination and cooperation, improving outcomes for both sides in contexts where a purely self-focused approach is detri- mental (Galinsky, Maddux, & Gilin, & White, 2008;Gilin, Mad- dux, Carpenter, & Galinsky, 2013;Trötschel, Huffmeier, Loschelder, Schwartz, & Gollwitzer, 2011). All of these results suggest that being told to put oneself into another’s perspective may result in increased interpersonal accu- racy. First, deliberation increases accuracy on many decisions (e.g.,Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988, but seeAmbady & Gray, 2002andHall et al., 2009). Second, mimicking another’s facial expression or body language could increase emotion recognition accuracy (e.g.,Niedenthal, Brauer, Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 2001;Oberman, Winkielman, & Ramachandran, 2007;Stel & van Knippenberg, 2008; cf.,Hess & Blairy, 2001;Cheung, Slotter, & Gardner, 2015). Third, shifting attention to another’s perspective (Yaniv & Choshen-Hillel, 2012;Zhang & Epley, 2009) may lead perceivers to focus on cues that yield more accurate judgment. Fourth, perspective taking can create a merging of one’s cognition, emotion, motivation, and action with those of another person (Davis et al., 1996), thereby increasing the sense of similarity to that person and strengthening relational bonds (Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005). Unknown Consequences of Perspective Taking At first glance, merging of self and another by reducing ego- centrism and decreasing stereotyping would seem to qualify as evidence of more accurate insight. However, most existing exper- imental research examines the psychological consequences of per- spective taking only in the mind of the perspective taker. Without measuring the mind of the person whose perspective was taken, researchers cannot tell whether perspective taking increases accu- racy in judgment or not. Perspective taking may increase the tendency to feel the pain another person ispresumedto be feeling (Batson et al., 1997), but does it increase the accuracy of recog- nizing how much pain another person isactuallyfeeling? Adopt- ing an adversary’s perspective in a negotiation could improve outcomes in some specific settings (Galinsky et al., 2008;Gilin et al., 2013), but does it do so by increasing insight into the other side’s sophisticated preferences or through some other mechanism (such as an increased willingness to cooperate, or incorporating another person’s known preferences into one’s own behavior)?Reducing a bias like egocentrism or stereotyping is not the same as increasing accuracy in judgment, even though evidence of the former could easily be mistaken for direct evidence of the latter. A bias in judgment is a systematic tendency that departs from a normative standard. The normative standard could be logical, rational, or moral, but it need not be accuracy. Likewise, reducing an egocentric bias or reliance on a stereotype could increase accurate insight into the mind of another person, but it does not have to. For instance, one of the most reliable egocentric biases in judgment is a tendency to assume that others’ attitudes and pref- erences are relatively similar to one’s own (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). If two people actually have verydifferentattitudes, then reducing egocentrism through perspective taking should log- ically increase accuracy at predicting another person’s beliefs, not necessarily because a person has achieved genuinely greater in- sight into the mind of another person but rather because they have simply relied less on a known source of error. If, however, two people actually have verysimilarattitudes, then reducing egocen- trism to an equivalent degree through perspective taking could decrease accuracy. In one experiment consistent with the latter possibility, married couples would have been more accurate pre- dicting each other’s preferences if they simply projected their beliefs completely onto their partner (Hoch, 1987). Decreasing egocentrism in this experiment could have decreased accuracy because married couples tend to have very similar beliefs. Reducing reliance on stereotypes also does not necessarily in- crease accuracy (Jussim, Crawford, & Rubinstein, 2015). When beliefs about a group (that is, a stereotype) contain some degree of accuracy, such as believing that tigers are dangerous but rabbits are not, then reducing reliance on it could decrease the overall accu- racy of judgments about a specific individual. For instance, per- spective taking in one experiment reduced the tendency of rela- tively young participants to rely on stereotypes about the elderly when evaluating a relatively old person (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). However, age-related stereotypes appear to contain a large degree of accuracy, qualifying as perhaps the most accurate ste- reotype that psychologists have identified (Chan et al., 2012). Reducing a young person’s use of an age-related stereotype when thinking about an elderly person does not necessarily mean that she will evaluate an elderly person more accurately. In fact, she might evaluate an elderly personlessaccurately. A person standing in front of a wild tiger who fails to consult his tiger stereotype is unlikely to gain more insight into the tiger’s likely behavior. Without measuring the actual attitudes or experience of an elderly person, or the behavioral proclivities of a tiger, a researcher cannot tell whether reducing reliance on a stereotype increases the accu- racy of judgment or not. Unfortunately, existing experiments often subtly confound a reduction in bias with an increase in accuracy because researchers purposely study contexts in which people’s perspectives are known to diverge. These include known perspective gaps between buyers and sellers (Galinsky et al., 2008), givers and receivers (Adams, Flynn, & Norton, 2012;Baskin, Wakslak, Trope, & Novemsky, 2014;Cavanaugh, Gino, & Fitzsimons, 2015;Flynn & Adams, 2009;Gino & Flynn, 2011;Teigen, Olsen, & Solås, 2005; Zhang & Epley, 2009,2012), Republicans and Democrats (Van Boven, Judd, & Sherman, 2012), speakers and listeners (Stinson & Ickes, 1992), actors and observers (Davis et al., 1996;Pronin & Ross, 2006), or negotiators with opposing incentives (Epley, This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 549 PERSPECTIVE MISTAKING Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006;Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Trötschel et al., 2011). In these nonrandomly selected situations where there is a known egocentric bias that creates a systematic error in judgment, reducing an egocentric bias will increase accu- racy by necessity in much the same way that decreasing a bias to pick “tails” in a coin flip would increase accuracy in predicting a two-headed coin. For instance, if Republicans and Democrats are known to have opposing views on an issue, and researchers select only this issue to study instead of a randomly sampled set of issues that vary in the degree of opposition, then reducing egocentrism by encouraging perspective taking would increase accuracy by neces- sity even if a person does not actually gain any new insight into the mind of the opposition. Increased accuracy from perspective tak- ing would be reflected in an ability to differentiate between atti- tudes that truly differ and attitudes that do not. Testing whether explicit perspective taking actually increases understanding of another’s mind requires measuring sensitivity to the actual mental states of another person in cases where two minds are not already known to have systematically opposing viewpoints. The surprisingly few published experiments that actually do measure interpersonal accuracy following perspective taking yield inconsistent results. In one involving a dictator game (Gilin et al., 2013), the authors report that encouraging perspective taking in- creased participants’ ability to accurately identify good potential game partners from bad ones (defined as partners who were likely to be generous vs. selfish) based on cognitive appeals, compared with participants who were asked to empathize with their partner. However, the “partners” in the one experiment that measured accuracy (Study 4) were hypothetical rather than real, and accu- racy was defined as agreement with the authors’ assessment of these hypothetical appeals rather than agreement with actual be- havior of real people. Nevertheless, these results suggest that perspective taking might focus attention on cues that increase accuracy in judgment. Other results suggest no increase in accuracy following perspec- tive taking or even a decrease in accuracy. In two different exper- iments, participants were asked to predict how attractive a member of the opposite sex would evaluate them. Being explicitly asked to adopt an observer’s perspective did not significantly increase people’s ability to accurately predict others’ evaluations of them (Eyal & Epley, 2010). In a series of competitive negotiations, adopting the perspective of an opponent led participants to over- estimate how selfish their partners would be compared with a control condition, suggesting less accuracy following perspective taking (Epley et al., 2006). In a study of close relationships, encouraging perspective taking increased the tendency to overes- timate how transparent one’s values, preferences, traits, and feel- ings were to a close relationship partner (Vorauer & Sucharyna, 2013). These results do not invalidate the common wisdom and occa- sional experimental evidence that perspective taking increases accuracy in social judgment, but these results along with method- ological confounds and potential misinterpretations suggest that the common wisdom about putting oneself in another person’s shoes deserves systematic empirical attention. On the one hand, being explicitly asked to engage in perspective taking could in- crease accuracy in interpersonal judgment by highlighting accurate information that a person might otherwise overlook. On the other hand, being explicitly asked to engage in perspective taking mighthave no meaningful effect on accuracy if the information people consult is not systematically more accurate than the information they would have consulted without being asked to engage in perspective taking. In general, we would expect interpersonal accuracy to increase only when people get additional information about another person that is more accurate than what they would have consulted otherwise. Our current experiments test whether perspective taking does this reliably across many different con- texts, or not. Answering this question is essential for developing accurate theories of the consequences of perspective taking in social interactions. Preview of Current Experiments We report the results of a long process of testing many different methods and measures to examine whether or not perspective taking systematically increases interpersonal accuracy. We began by using direct tests of interpersonal accuracy taken from the empirical literature that both our pretest participants and existing psychological theory predict would increase accuracy. From our very first experiments, we identified reliable effects of perspective taking on some measures, including increased self-reported effort to take another person’s perspective, increased mental effort (e.g., greater response times), and occasionally, increased confidence in judgment. However, we found no reliable increases in accuracy. If anything, accuracy was somewhat worse (and sometimes signifi- cantly worse) among perspective takers than among control par- ticipants. These initial results led us on a long empirical trail of testing whether any theoretically relevant measure of accuracy would benefit from perspective taking. Our selection of experi- mental stimuli was guided by presumed mechanisms by which perspective taking could increase accuracy in an effort to be as comprehensive as possible, using both standardized measures from the existing literature as well as more naturalistic tests derived for our purposes. Our experiments tested accuracy among strangers, acquaintances, friends, and spouses. Our experiments found no evidence that the cognitive effort of imagining oneself in another person’s shoes, studied so widely in the psychological literature, increases a person’s ability to accurately understand another’s mind. Of course, it is always possible that our experiments failed to test just the right measure, or the precise context in which perspective taking could increase accuracy. We simply note that our experiments involved contexts in which we, and our pretest participants, expected that perspective taking could plausibly in- crease accuracy. Indeed, our pretest participants predicted signif- icantly more accurate judgments in the perspective taking condi- tion on every measure we asked them about. Because of the large number of experiments we conducted, the main text will describe each of the 25 experiments in general terms and report only the primary analyses for the comparison between perspective taking and control conditions. The Supplemental Ma- terials describe details for each experiment including additional conditions, measures, and secondary analyses. All data are publi- cally available online (https://osf.io/4k7tv/). We divide our experiments into three groups. The first group (Experiments 1–15) includes standard interpersonal accuracy tests between strangers taken largely from the existing experimental literature that could be affected by perspective taking based on current theorizing. The second group (Experiments 16 –24) in- This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 550 EYAL, STEFFEL, AND EPLEY cludesmore naturalistic tests between people who were familiar with each other, or who had meaningful information about another per- son’s potentially unique perspective. In these cases, someone engag- ing in perspective taking might have more information about another person’s perspective to guide their thinking and might therefore benefit more from considering another person’s perspective. These relationships included romantic partners, friends, spouses, or strangers following a get-acquainted conversation who were trying to predict another person’s attitudes, preferences, or beliefs in a variety of different domains. Because each of these experiments included a comparison between a perspective taking condition and a control condition, we report the primary results from these two sets of experiments in two meta-analyses (plus a meta-analysis of all exper- iments in the General Discussion). We report additional experiment- specific analyses in the Supplemental Materials. A final experiment (Experiment 25) compares perspective tak- ing to a more direct approach to increasing accuracy, which we refer to asperspective getting(see alsoZhou, Majka, & Epley, 2017). This experiment demonstrates that it is indeed possible to increase interpersonal accuracy, tests the degree to which people are aware of the effectiveness of different prediction strategies, and suggests a subtle distinction that is critical for both scientific theorizing about the consequences of perspective taking and for attempting to understand the mind of another person more accu- rately in everyday life. Experiments 1–15: Standard Tests of Interpersonal Accuracy Participants completed standard tests that assess people’s ability to determine others’ mental states by viewing their eyes (the Mind in the Eyes Test,Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001), facial expressions (DANVA-faces,Nowicki & Duke, 1994; Fake Smiles,Bernstein, et al., 2010), or body postures (DANVA-postures;Nowicki & Duke, 1994). Participants also completed a test of lie detectionusing a standard experimental procedure. We chose commonly used tests from the existing interpersonal accuracy literature (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2010;Castelli et al., 2010;Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006;Nowicki & Duke, 1994;Ruben & Hall, 2013; Van Doesum, Van Lange, & Van Lange, 2013). Participants were randomly assigned to one of several different conditions across these experiments. In each experiment, one group was asked to take the target’s perspective, following the standard instructional manipulation used in the existing psycho- logical literature (e.g.,Batson et al., 1997;Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). A control group in each experiment received no special instructions. Other groups across experiments were asked to apply a different strategy that we selected for a specific theoretical reason (e.g., encouraging participants to think hard, to mimic the target’s expressions, to rely on their own feelings or intuitions). We chose comparison conditions that we believed would help explain our observed results, either because of patterns we ob- served in our data (e.g., perspective taking increased effort com- pared with control, so we encouraged participants in one condition to think hard) or because of assumptions in the literature about how perspective taking operates (e.g., via mimicry). We also included one test that measures egocentrism directly (and con- founds it with accuracy): a false-belief task (Birch & Bloom, 2007). We included this test simply to confirm, consistent with past research, that explicit perspective taking can reduce egocen- tric biases in judgment. It was not included in the meta-analysis on accuracy because it is confounded with a reduction in egocentrism. Method Participants.We sampled participants in Experiments 1–15 (N 1476) from a wide range of populations: Undergraduate students from a non–American university (non–US U.), under- graduate students from an American university (US U. #1), people in the community (Community), and MTurk workers (SeeTable 1 Table 1 Demographics and Meta-Analysis on Manipulation Check for Perspective Taking Versus Control Conditions, Experiments 1–15 Experiment Task Location (N) Mean age#of women ControlPT: Other’s shoesMeta-analysis results dSECI lower limitCI upper limitZp 1 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (57) 23.23 (1.46) 46 4.14 (1.58) 5.55 (.99) 1.07 .28 .52 1.63 3.79 .001 2 DANVA Postures Non-US U. (124) 23.42 (1.65) 81 5.03 (1.45) 5.38 (1.28) .26 .18 .10 .61 1.42 .156 3 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (62) 23.78 (2.07) 72 5.19 (1.72) 5.45 (.85) .19 .26 .31 .69 .75 .452 4 DANVA Faces US U. #1 (88) 19.91 (3.01) 5.29 (2.91) 7.44 (1.89) .87 .22 .44 1.31 3.91 .001 5 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (80) 23.00 (.91) 72 5.03 (1.54) 5.55 (1.24) .37 .23 .07 .81 1.65 .099 6 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (61) 24.80 (1.69) 33 4.61 (1.84) 5.77 (94.) .79 .27 .27 1.31 2.97 .003 7 DANVA Faces MTurk (109) 29.61 (9.34) 33 6.74 (2.66) 8.62 (2.32) .75 .20 .36 1.14 3.79 .001 8 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (57) 24.19 (1.73) 33 4.89 (1.47) 5.69 (1.31) .57 .27 .04 1.10 2.12 .034 9 Mind in the Eyes Non-US. U (76) 24.77 (4.36) 39 5.24 (1.15) 5.63 (94.) .37 .23 .08 .83 1.61 .109 10 Mind in the Eyes Non-US. U (37) 25.11 (1.87) 21 5.42 (90.) 5.94 (73.) .63 .34 .03 1.29 1.88 .060 11 Mind in the Eyes Community (85) 38.35 (14.87) 7.64 (1.99) 8.19 (.207) .27 .22 .16 .70 1.24 .217 11 DANVA Faces Community (84) 38.35 (14.87) 6.02 (2.29) 7.24 (2.17) .55 .22 .11 .98 2.48 .013 12 Fake Smiles Community (70) 33.93 (13.09) 36 6.61 (2.60) 7.56 (1.85) .42 .24 .06 .89 1.73 .083 13 Fake Smiles Community (61) 34.52 (13.47) 33 6.39 (2.57) 7.13 (2.36) .30 .26 .21 .80 1.16 .245 14 Fake Smiles Non-US U. (55) 23.16 (1.53) 41 7.11 (2.52) 8.14 (1.11) .53 .27 .01 1.07 1.94 .052 15 Detecting Lies Community (81) 39.46 (15.32) 40 7.20 (2.53) 7.83 (2.00) .28 .22 .16 .71 1.24 .217 Total.49 .06 .37 .62 7.90 .001 Note. Participants made their ratings on a 7-point scale in Experiments 1–3, 5, 6, and 8 –10 and on an 11-point scale in Experiments 4, 7, and 11–15. Participants did not report their gender in Experiments 4 and 11. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 551 PERSPECTIVE MISTAKING for sample sizes and demographics for each experiment). Our first experiments targeted sample sizes of typically 30 participants per cell, but we used larger sample sizes in later experiments to test the robustness of a null result. The only exception for this rule is a sample of 37 participants in Experiment 10 for which we stopped data collection before completion due to technical problems, and include it here for the sake of completeness. We sought to maxi- mize power by running multiple experiments with varied samples all utilizing the same experimental manipulation of perspective taking. We present results only for the perspective taking and control conditions in the main text (N 1103). Results of other conditions are presented in the Supplemental Materials. Interpersonal accuracy measures.Participants completed the experiments individually in a laboratory, except for Experi- ment 7 that was conducted online. To measure interpersonal ac- curacy, participants completed standard tests in which they were asked to identify people’s feelings, thoughts, and intentions by watching a target’s picture or video. All participants completed one test, except for Experiment 11 in which participants completed both the DANVA-faces and the Mind in the Eye Test, Experiments 4, 5, and 8 in which participants completed the DANVA-faces and the false-belief task, and Experiment 13 in which participants completed both the Spot the Fake Smiles Test and the false-belief task. All tasks were computerized, except for the false-belief task. We describe each test below. Diagnostic analysis of nonverbal accuracy (DANVA,Now- icki & Duke, 1994).We used two subtests of the DANVA: faces and postures. The DANVA consists of 24 pictures of male and female faces (Experiments 1, 3– 8, 11) or body postures (Experi- ment 2) expressing one of four basic emotions: happiness, sadness, anger, or fear. Participants indicated the emotion the person in the picture feels. Reading the mind in the eye (ME,Baron-Cohen et al., 2001, Experiments 9 –11).This test consists of 36 black and white pictures of the area around the eyes of males and females. The actual task was preceded by one practice trial. Participants indi- cated which of 4 words (e.g., serious, ashamed, alarmed, bewil- dered) described what the person in the picture was thinking or feeling. Spot the fake smile (Experiments 12–14).This task was obtained from the BBC science website (http://www.bbc.co.uk/ science/humanbody/mind/surveys/smiles) and has been used pre- viously in experiments (e.g.,Bernstein et al., 2010). The test consists of 20 videos, approximately 4 seconds long, showing an individual (13 men and 7 women) with an initially neutral expres- sion that shifts into a smiling expression and then returns to a neutral expression (10 Duchenne and 10 non-Duchenne smiles of 20 different models trained to activate the Zygomaticus muscles involved in genuine smiles or not). For each video, participants indicated whether the smile was genuine or fake. Each video was shown only once. Lie detection (Experiment 15).We created this task based on a standard procedure for testing lie detection in the existing ex- perimental literature (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). This test consisted of 10 videos of individuals (6 men and 4 women) answering a question posed by a research assistant about their experiences and preferences (e.g., “What is your happiest childhood memory? Please describe it briefly,” “What celebrity would you most like to meet? What would you say to them?”). Following the video,participants were reminded of the question the participant in the video was asked and then indicated whether they thought the answer was true or false. The order of videos was fixed. Half of the answers were true and half were false. False-belief task (Experiments 4 –5, 8, 13).To test whether perspective taking reliably reduces egocentric biases in judgment, consistent with considerable amounts of prior research, we used a modified version of the false-belief task designed byBirch and Bloom (2007). Participants were handed two pictures, one at a time. The first picture portrayed a girl playing the violin beside a sofa. There were four containers in different sizes and colors (red, purple, blue, and green) in front of her. Participants read: “This is Vicki. She finishes playing her violin and puts it in the blue container. Then she goes outside to play.” The second picture portrayed a different girl holding a violin beside a different array of the same containers. Participants read: “While Vicki is outside playing, her sister, Denise, moves the violin to the red container. Then, Denise rearranges the containers in the room until the room looks like the picture below.” Participants indicated the likelihood that Vicki would first look for her violin in each of the four containers. The percentage participants assign to the red box is an indication of egocentrism, because participants know that the violin has been moved to the red box but Vicki in the scenario does not know this. Independent variables.Each experiment included a perspec- tive taking condition and a control condition in which participants were given no specific instructions. This served as our primary comparison in each experiment, and the focus of this paper. Seven experiments included additional conditions that tested the impact of other strategies. We added these additional conditions based on the results of our initial experiments that found a negative impact of perspective taking on accuracy. Because they did not yield very meaningful insights, we will describe these conditions briefly in the main text and present them in detail in the Supplemental Materials. Participants in each condition received a brief descrip- tion of the experimental task, and then were given additional instructions depending on their experimental condition. Perspective taking conditions.Our primary manipulation asked participants to engage in perspective taking using instruc- tions taken from the existing literature (e.g.,Batson et al., 1997; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). In particular, participants in the perspective taking conditions read: “While watching the pictures [videos], please think about the person in the picture . Try to adopt the perspective of the person in the picture as if you were the person who is answering the question. Do your best to adopt his or her perspective, putting yourself into the other person’s shoes as if you were that person. Remember that the person in the picture may have a different perspective than you do as the viewer of the picture .” The perspective taking instructions for the false-belief task (Experiments 4, 5, 8, 13) were adapted to fit details of the task: “When answering the question, we would like you to do your best to adopt Vicki’s perspective, putting yourself into Vicki’s shoes as if you were her. Remember that Vicki may have a different perspective than you do.” Additional conditions.Our initial results from Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that perspective taking might diminish accuracy. We therefore introduced several additional conditions across ex- periments to explore this potential negative effect in more detail. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 552 EYAL, STEFFEL, AND EPLEY These included instructions to consult one’s own feelings (Exper- iment 3), to think especially hard (Experiment 3), to rely on one’s intuitions (Experiments 4, 14), to personally display the facial expressions posed in the pictures before guessing the emotions expressed (Experiment 6), to empathize with the person in each photo (Experiment 7), to consider similarities or differences (Ex- periment 8), to predict how most people would answer the question (Experiment 11), and to mimic the target’s facial expressions while observing each picture (Experiment 13). None of these conditions significantly increased accuracy compared with the control condi- tion, but two conditions significantly decreased accuracy com- pared with the control condition (consult one’s own feelings in Experiment 3 and follow your intuition in Experiment 4). These experimental conditions did not prove to be especially informative. We therefore highlight notable findings from these additional conditions in the General Discussion and report these results in full in the Supplemental Materials. Additional measures.We also collected several additional measures to provide further tests of reliable consequences of perspective taking: Manipulation check.Participants completed a manipulation check to assess how hard they tried to adopt the other person’s perspective. We used a 7-point scale (1 not at all,7 very much) in Experiments 1–3, 5, 6, and 8 –10. We used an 11-point scale (1 not at all,11 extremely) in Experiments 4, 7, and 11–15. Participants in some experiments completed additional manipulation checks consistent with the conditions we added to our basic perspective taking versus control comparison. These are described in the Supplemental Materials. Difficulty.Participants reported how difficult they found the task to be. We used a 7-point scale (1 not at all,7 very much) in Experiments 1–3, 5, 6, and 8 –10 and an 11-point scale (1 not at all,7 extremely) in Experiments 4, 7, and 11–15. Response times.We measured participants’ response times to complete the computerized tasks in all but Experiment 7 to provide an indirect measure of mental effort (with more time indicating more effort expended). Confidence.Participants reported their confidence in judg- ment by indicating the number of responses they thought they predicted accurately. In Experiments 12–14, participants rated how confident they were with their answer after every one of the 20 predictions they made (1 just guessing,11 absolutely certain) and we computed an average confidence score. Results Meta-analyses.Our primary interest was testing whether per- spective taking increases interpersonal accuracy. To ease presen- tation of such a large number of experimental results, we present only the primary comparisons between the perspective taking and control conditions on our primary outcomes: the manipulation check, accuracy, confidence, perceived difficulty, and response times. Because the experiments were run on diverse populations and used different tests of interpersonal accuracy, we conducted random effects meta-analyses using the Comprehensive Meta- analysis 2 software (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2010) to identify the robust effects across all experiments. We did not observe reliable gender differences on accuracy or the impact of perspective taking in these 15 experiments, or those we reportin the remainder of this paper. We therefore do not discuss gender differences further. 1 Manipulation checks.Participants seemed to do as they were instructed. Those in the perspective taking conditions reported considering others’ perspective more than those in the control conditions across Experiments 1–15,d 0.49, 95% CI [0.37, 0.62],z 7.90,p .001 (seeTable 1). This significant result is important for understanding the consequences of perspective tak- ing on accuracy that we discuss next, because it demonstrates that participants were indeed attempting to follow the critical experi- mental manipulation. Accuracy.Participants in the perspective taking conditions were not significantly more accurate across Experiments 1–15 than participants in the control conditions. In fact, participants in the perspective taking conditions were significantlylessaccurate over- all than participants in the control conditions,d 0.26, 95% CI [ 0.40, 0.12],z 3.74,p .001. As can be seen inTable 2, this negative effect of perspective taking on accuracy, compared with the control conditions, was not especially robust across indi- vidual experiments. It was statistically significant in 4 of 17 instances, but even these 4 significant results were not reliable across replications of the same procedure. 2The Fake Smiles Test, for instance, produced one of the five significant negative effects of perspective taking on accuracy (Experiments 12), but one rep- lication yielded a significant result in theoppositedirection (Ex- periment 13). Although these experiments do not provide espe- cially reliable evidence that perspective taking systematically 1We observed significant gender effects in only four of these 25 exper- iments, and even these effects were inconsistent across experiments. In Experiment 5 we observed a significant gender perspective taking interaction,F(1,71) 4.05,p .048, p 2 .05. There was a marginally significant gender effect in the perspective taking condition—women were more accurate than men, (Ms 17.58 and 13.50,t(38) 1.84,p .078, d 0.60), but no gender effect in the control condition (Ms 18.82 and 19.50,t(38) 0.62,p .54,d 0.20). This difference might be driven by the small number of men compared with women in this sample (8 vs. 72). In Experiment 7 we observed a marginally significant main effect for gender such that women were more accurate than men (Ms 19.98 and 19.15),F(1,155) 21.40,p .072, p 2 .02. In Experiment 20 there was a Marginally Significant Gender Perspective Taking Interac- tion,F(1, 81) 3.58,p .062, p 2 .04. Women were more accurate than men in the perspective taking condition (Ms 1.13 and 1.38,t(38) 1.74, p .090,d 0.56) but not in the control condition (Ms 1.20 and 1.11, t(43) 0.80,p .43,d 0.24). Finally, in Experiment 21 there was a marginally significant main effect for gender,F(1, 85) 3.61,p .061, p 2 .04, but this effect was qualified by a Significant Gender Perspec- tive Taking Interaction,F(1, 85) 6.08,p .016, p 2 .07. Women were more accurate than men in the perspective taking condition (Ms 2.13 and 2.68,t(42) 3.09,p .004,d 0.95) but not in the control condition (Ms 2.19 and 2.12,t(43) 0.40,p .69,d 0.12). Given that we observed no reliable gender differences across our experiments, we do not discuss it further. 2We conducted heterogeneity tests to examine whether the effect sizes for accuracy obtained in the meta-analyses are more variable than expected from normal sampling variation. We obtained nonsignificant effects of heterogeneity in Experiments 1-15,Q(15) 21.07,p .14,I 2 28.80, Experiments 16-24,Q(12) 14.88,p .25,I 2 19.34, and also in all 25 experiments,Q(29) 38.27,p .12,I 2 24.23, indicating that dispersion in the effects of perspective taking on accuracy across experiments is not due to real differences in the experiments other than random error. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 553 PERSPECTIVE MISTAKING decreases accuracy, they provide no evidence whatsoever that perspective taking systematically increases accuracy. 3 Perceived difficulty and response times.Those in the per- spective taking conditions reported that their task was more diffi- cult than those in the control conditions across Experiments 1–15, d 0.16, 95% CI [0.04, 0.27],z 2.69,p .007 (seeTable 3). Participants in the perspective taking conditions were also slower in their responses compared with participants in the control con- ditions,d 0.40, 95% CI [0.28, 0.52],z 6.50,p .001 (see Table 4). Results on these two measures, along with the manipu- lation check, suggest that participants in the perspective taking conditions were indeed trying harder to consider another person’s perspective than participants in the control conditions. Confidence and overconfidence.Not only were participants in the perspective taking condition less accurate, they also believed they predicted fewer of their partner’s responses accurately com- pared with participants in the control conditions across Experi- ments 1–15,d 0.20, 95% CI [ 0.32, 0.09],z 3.48,p .001 (seeTable 5). This negative effect of perspective taking on confidence may be because participants had no knowledge about the targets they tried to mind read that they could use when encouraged to take their perspective, beyond the minimal infor- mation that appeared in the picture or video. Having both accuracy and predicted accuracy measures al- lows us to calculate whether participants were systematically overconfident in their evaluations. To assess overconfidence, we subtracted the number of accurate responses from the pre- dicted number of accurate responses. Overall, participants were underconfident in their performance on these measures, d 0.17, 95% CI [ 0.30, 0.03],z 2.39,p .017. This was the case in all experiments but one (Experiment 15), in which participants were significantly overconfident,d 0.80, 95% CI [0.55, 1.05],z 6.27,p .001. In addition, perspec- tive taking did not significantly affect overconfidence, d 0.03, 95% CI [ 0.14, 0.09],z 0.45,p .65.Reducing egocentrism: The false-belief test.Consistent with prior research, perspective taking reliably decreased egocen- tric biases in the four experiments that included the false-belief task (seeTable 6). Perspective taking participants indicated that it was significantly less likely for the protagonist to look in the location suggested by an egocentric perspective than participants in the control condition,d 0.28, 95% CI [ 0.51, 0.05], z 2.35,p .019. Discussion In a series of 15 experiments, using standard tests of interper- sonal accuracy, an explicit instruction to engage in perspective taking reliably altered judgments in a manner consistent with the explicit instruction to shift perspective from their own to another’s perspective. Consistent with past research (Todd et al., 2012), this shift in perspective leads to more deliberation reflected in our studies by increased response time and greater perceived difficulty. This reliable shift in perspective, however, does not systematically increase accuracy except in cases where egocentrism and accuracy are necessarily confounded (such as in the false-belief task). These findings suggest that the benefits of perspective taking for increas- ing accuracy may be very circumscribed, increasing accuracy only when an egocentric bias is known to be producing error. 3In Experiments 12–14 (Fake Smiles Test) and Experiment 15 (Lie Detection) we also computed accuracy using a detection theory sensitivity measure (d-prime, representing the difference between the proportion of hits and false alarms). The analyses yielded similar results to those ob- tained perspective taking effects on number of correct responses. In Ex- periments 12 and 14 the d-prime was directionally lower in the PT condition compared with control (Experiment 12:t(68) 1.28,p .204; Experiment 14:t(53) 0.70,p .485. In Experiment 13 the d-prime was significantly higher in the PT condition compared with control, t(59) 2.62,p .011. For the Lie Detection Test (Experiment 15) perspective taking did not have an effect on d-prime,t(79) 0.53,p .60. Table 2 Meta-Analysis on Accuracy (Number of Correct Responses) for Perspective Taking Versus Control Conditions, Experiments 1–15 Experiment Task Location (N) ControlPT: Other’s shoesMeta-analysis results dSECI lower limitCI upper limitZp 1 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (57) 19.14 (2.29) 17.89 (2.41) .53 .27 1.06 .00 1.97 .049 2 DANVA Postures Non-US U. (124) 16.54 (2.55) 15.94 (2.35) .25 .18 .60 .11 1.36 .174 3 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (62) 18.48 (2.71) 17.74 (2.75) .27 .26 .77 .23 1.06 .288 4 DANVA Faces US U. #1 (88) 18.89 (2.17) 17.91 (2.74) .40 .22 .82 .02 1.86 .065 5 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (80) 18.93 (2.47) 17.38 (3.14) .55 .23 1.00 .10 2.41 .016 6 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (61) 19.52 (1.63) 18.40 (2.81) .49 .26 1.00 .02 1.88 .060 7 DANVA Faces MTurk (109) 19.75 (1.95) 19.06 (3.20) .26 .19 .64 .11 1.37 .172 8 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (57) 18.38 (2.67) 18.17 (3.02) .07 .27 .59 .45 .28 .781 9 Mind in the Eyes Non-US U. (76) 23.60 (4.02) 22.58 (3.60) .27 .23 .72 .18 1.16 .246 10 Mind in the Eyes Non-US U. (37) 25.42 (4.77) 24.83 (4.56) .13 .33 .77 .52 .38 .701 11 Mind in the Eyes Community (85) 25.11 (4.46) 23.65 (5.58) .04 .22 .46 .39 .16 .873 11 DANVA Faces Community (84) 18.24 (2.43) 18.14 (3.27) .29 .22 .72 .14 1.32 .188 12 Fake Smiles Community (70) 13.72 (2.17) 12.24 (2.09) .69 .25 1.18 .21 2.82 .005 13 Fake Smiles Community (61) 12.42 (2.93) 14.13 (2.54) .62 .26 .11 1.14 2.38 .018 14 Fake Smiles Non-US U. (55) 13.63 (2.31) 12.68 (2.04) .44 .27 .97 .10 1.60 .110 15 Detecting Lies Community (81) 4.93 (1.62) 4.80 (1.51) .08 .22 .52 .35 .37 .709 Total .26 .07 .40 .12 3.74 .001 Note. There are 24 items in DANVA, 36 items in the Mind in the Eyes, 20 items in the Fake Smiles, and 10 items in Detecting Lies. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 554 EYAL, STEFFEL, AND EPLEY Experiment 1–15 tested the impact of perspective taking on inter- personal accuracy using standardized measures of interpersonal ac- curacy taken from the existing experimental literature. Although both existing theory and intuition (as indicated by our pretest) suggest that perspective taking could increase accuracy on these tests, our exper- iments indicate that perspective taking increased mental effort and decreased egocentrism but did not reliably increase accurate insight into the mind of another person. These standardized tests enable precise and reliable accuracy measurement, but they are also ab- stracted from everyday life in a way that makes it difficult to take the perspective of the targets being evaluated. For instance, participants knew nothing about the targets or about the thoughts, feelings, atti- tudes, or context that targets were actually in. Perspective takingmight have been especially ineffective in these contexts because there was no unique information that participants could access when they shifted attention to the targets’ perspective. We next explore whether the weak negative relationship between perspective taking and accu- racy generalizes to more naturalistic contexts. Experiments 16 –24: Naturalistic Tests of Interpersonal Accuracy Experiments 16 –24 tested the impact of perspective taking on interpersonal accuracy using judgments that people are more likely to make in everyday life, including predictions of others’ sense of humor, opinions, and preferences. They also involved predictions Table 3 Meta-Analysis on Perceived Difficulty for Perspective Taking Versus Control Conditions, Experiments 1–15 Experiment Task Location (N) Control PT: Other’s shoesMeta-analysis results dSECI lower limitCI upper limitZp 1 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (57) 2.79 (1.55) 3.24 (1.83) .27 .27 .26 .79 1.00 .319 2 DANVA Postures Non-US U. (124) 3.56 (1.43) 3.46 (1.55) .07 .18 .42 .29 .37 .709 3 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (62) 3.35 (1.79) 3.65 (1.58) .18 .26 .32 .68 .70 .485 4 DANVA Faces US U. #1 (88) 5.20 (2.38) 5.51 (2.00) .14 .21 .28 .56 .66 .510 5 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (80) 2.78 (1.33) 3.60 (1.41) .60 .23 .15 1.05 2.62 .009 6 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (61) 2.74 (1.63) 3.50 (1.53) .48 .26 .03 .99 1.85 .064 7 DANVA Faces MTurk (109) 4.23 (2.40) 4.63 (2.38) .17 .19 .21 .54 .87 .384 8 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (57) 2.86 (1.41) 3.21 (1.54) .24 .27 .28 .76 .89 .373 9 Mind in the Eyes Non-US U. (76) 3.84 (1.41) 4.03 (1.67) .12 .23 .33 .57 .54 .592 10 Mind in the Eyes Non-US U. (37) 3.84 (1.43) 4.33 (1.68) .32 .33 .33 .96 .95 .341 11 Mind in the Eyes Community (85) 6.79 (2.20) 7.09 (2.40) .13 .22 .30 .56 .59 .555 11 DANVA Faces Community (84) 5.52 (2.11) 5.50 (2.30) .01 .22 .43 .42 .04 .967 12 Fake Smiles Community (70) 6.14 (2.36) 6.59 (2.12) .20 .24 .28 .68 .83 .409 13 Fake Smiles Community (61) 6.81 (2.27) 6.50 (2.30) .14 .30 .72 .45 .45 .649 14 Fake Smiles Non-US U. (55) 6.52 (2.17) 6.75 (2.19) .11 .28 .45 .66 .38 .707 15 Detecting Lies Community (81) 7.59 (2.10) 7.68 (2.19) .04 .22 .39 .48 .19 .850 Total.16 .06 .04 .27 2.69 .007 Note.Participants made their ratings on a 7-point scale in Experiments 1–3, 5, 6, and 8 –10 and on an 11-point scale in Experiments 4, 7, and 11–15. Table 4 Meta-Analysis on Response Times for Perspective Taking Versus Control Conditions, Experiments 1–15 Experiment Task Location (N) Control PT: Other’s shoesMeta-analysis results dSECI lower limitCI upper limitZp 1 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (57) 78.95 (21.35) 102.37 (37.50) .76 .27 .23 1.30 2.78 .005 2 DANVA Postures Non-US U. (124) 101.17 (45.36) 122.23 (52.48) .43 .18 .07 .79 2.36 .018 3 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (62) 91.53 (42.59) 126.43 (71.32) .59 .26 .09 1.10 2.29 .022 4 DANVA Faces US U. #1 (88) 63.64 (12.59) 91.14 (45.94) .83 .22 .39 1.26 3.71 .001 5 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (80) 115.67 (48.30) 142.89 (55.37) .52 .23 .08 .97 2.30 .021 6 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (61) 76.65 (19.72) 76.71 (23.97) .00 .26 .50 .51 .01 .991 8 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (57) 93.47 (32.28) 109.62 (38.32) .46 .27 .07 .98 1.70 .089 9 Mind in the Eyes Non-US U. (76) 263.42 (83.01) 288.11 (126.01) .23 .23 .22 .68 1.01 .315 10 Mind in the Eyes Non-US U. (37) 251.88 (87.60) 279.32 (89.23) .31 .33 .34 .96 .94 .348 11 Mind in the Eyes Community (85) 133.96 (42.91) 143.32 (54.25) .19 .22 .24 .62 .88 .382 11 DANVA Faces Community (85) 102.01 (32.45) 121.33 (42.88) .51 .22 .08 .94 2.30 .021 12 Fake Smiles Community (70) 154.87 (21.02) 161.28 (23.78) .29 .24 .19 .76 1.19 .234 13 Fake Smiles Community (61) 159.27 (21.21) 163.98 (31.12) .18 .26 .33 .68 .69 .489 14 Fake Smiles Non-US U. (55) 191.41 (59.15) 200.42 (53.54) .16 .27 .37 .69 .59 .554 15 Detecting Lies Community (81) 27.05 (12.28) 35.30 (23.71) .44 .23 .00 .88 1.95 .051 Total.40 .06 .28 .52 6.50 .001 Note. We report the sum of the response times in seconds across the task. We did not measure response time in Experiment 7. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 555 PERSPECTIVE MISTAKING of actual interaction partners. Some involved evaluations of targets who were generally well known to our participants, such as a friend or spouse, and others involved evaluations of strangers after a brief get-to-know-you activity. These experiments involved con- texts where participants were likely to have at least some knowl- edge of their partners’ preferences, either because of existing relationship knowledge (e.g., a spouse’s preferences for going bowling or doing dishes) or group-based stereotype knowledge (e.g., a male or female partner’s reactions to movies, videos, or jokes targeted toward a stereotypically male or female audience). Each experiment used a perspective taking manipulation similar to those in Experiments 1–15, and several provided instructions asking participants to take their target’s perspective in a somewhat different way. These variants allowed us to test whether our results were restricted to simply the most common experimental approach for encouraging perspective taking. Finally, all experiments except for Experiments 21 and 24 included an “egocentric” condition in which participants were asked to assume that the other person perceived the world exactly as they did themselves. This conditioncould provide a more extreme test of whether or not considering another’s perspective increases accuracy by including a condition that does precisely the opposite. Because this is not our primary focus, we briefly discuss these results in the General Discussion and present these results in full in the Supplemental Materials. Method Participants.One thousand, one hundred thirty-two individ- uals participated in Experiments 16 –24. Participants were under- graduates from an American university (US U. #2), MBA students, and people in the community, from two locations (Community #1, Community #2; seeTable 7for sample sizes and demographics for each experiment). Targeted sample sizes were typically 30 partic- ipants per cell, but we increased our samples sizes in subsequent versions of our experiments to test the robustness of a null result. We made seven exclusions from the analyses: three participants received the wrong verbal instructions (Experiment 16), three participants did not have a partner (Experiment 21), and one Table 5 Meta-Analysis on Confidence (Predicted Number of Correct Responses) for Perspective Taking Versus Control Conditions, Experiments 1–15 Experiment Task Location (N) ControlPT: Other’s shoesMeta-analysis results dSECI lower limitCI upper limitZp 1 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (57) 17.75 (2.78) 17.17 (3.58) .18 .27 .70 .34 .68 .496 2 DANVA Postures Non-US U. (124) 16.48 (3.86) 15.97 (3.91) .13 .18 .48 .22 .73 .465 3 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (62) 17.61 (3.99) 16.39 (3.79) .31 .26 .81 .19 1.23 .220 4 DANVA Faces US U. #1 (88) 17.31 (4.21) 16.23 (4.02) .26 .21 .68 .16 1.22 .221 5 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (80) 18.38 (3.26) 16.83 (4.31) .41 .23 .85 .04 1.80 .073 6 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (61) 18.77 (2.49) 18.07 (3.05) .25 .26 .76 .25 .98 .327 7 DANVA Faces MTurk (109) 19.33 (3.13) 18.04 (3.31) .40 .19 .78 .02 2.07 .038 8 DANVA Faces Non-US U. (57) 18.68 (2.53) 17.24 (3.93) .44 .27 .96 .09 1.63 .103 9 Mind in the Eyes Non-US U. (76) 23.11 (5.78) 21.59 (6.15) .26 .23 .71 .20 1.11 .269 10 Mind in the Eyes Non-US U. (37) 25.37 (5.69) 22.39 (5.87) .52 .33 1.17 .14 1.54 .123 11 Mind in the Eyes Community (85) 21.40 (7.45) 21.16 (6.12) .04 .22 .46 .39 .16 .871 11 DANVA Faces Community (84) 16.81 (3.90) 17.27 (4.18) .11 .22 .31 .54 .52 .602 12 Fake Smiles Community (70) 12.88 (3.26) 11.41 (4.43) .38 .24 .85 .09 1.57 .116 13 Fake Smiles Community (61) 12.17 (4.28) 10.91 (5.12) .27 .27 .80 .26 .98 .325 14 Fake Smiles Non-US U. (55) 11.98 (3.65) 11.43 (3.00) .16 .26 .67 .34 .64 .522 15 Detecting Lies Community (81) 6.39 (1.72) 6.95 (1.69) .33 .22 .11 .77 1.47 .142 Total .20 .06 .32 .09 3.48 .001 Note. There are 24 items in DANVA, 36 items in the Mind in the Eyes, 20 items in the Fake Smiles, and 10 items in Detecting Lies. Table 6 Meta-Analysis on the Mean Ratings of the Likelihood That Vickie Will Search in the Red Box First in the False-Belief Task for Perspective Taking Versus Control Conditions, Experiments 1–15 Experiment Location (N) Control PT: Other’s shoesMeta-analysis results dSECI lower limitCI upper limitZp 4 US U. #1 (88) 20.62 (23.87) 16.90 (20.51) .17 .22 .59 .26 .78 .438 5 Non-US U. (80) 38.79 (29.03) 27.55 (22.19) .88 .23 .88 .01 1.92 .054 8 Non-US U. (57) 36.30 (30.93) 30.25 (26.26) .21 .27 .73 .31 .79 .428 13 Community (61) 27.13 (28.54) 19.61 (19.64) .31 .26 .82 .20 1.18 .237 Total .28 .12 .51 .05 2.35 .019 Note. Larger percentages indicate smaller egocentric bias. Thus, a negative sign of d indicates smaller egocentric bias in perspective taking condition compared to control. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 556 EYAL, STEFFEL, AND EPLEY Table 7 Demographics and Meta-Analysis on Accuracy (Absolute Difference Between Predicted Responses and Actual Responses) for Perspective Taking VersusControl Conditions, Experiments 16 –24 Experiment Task Location (N)#of womenLength of relationship (months) Mean age ControlPT: Other’s shoesMeta-analysis results dSECI lower limitCI upper limitZp 16 Activities (partners) Community #1 (74) 37 103.18 (108.31) 32.65 (9.17) 1.21 (.31) 1.15 (.34) .17 .23 .63 .29 .74 .461 17 Activities (partners) Community #1 (66) 33 133.70 (107.80) 37.06 (12.18) 1.13 (.26) 1.33 (.44) .57 .25 .08 1.07 2.28 .023 18 Movies (strangers) US U. #2 (80) 41 20.25 (1.65) 1.03 (.31) 1.20 (.41) .49 .23 .05 .93 2.16 .031 19 Jokes (strangers) Community #2 (78) 39 28.71 (11.35) 1.24 (.40) 1.46 (.50) .47 .23 .02 .92 2.06 .039 20 Videos (strangers) US U. #2 (85) 46 20.12 (1.57) 1.16 (.37) 1.26 (.48) .24 .22 .19 .66 1.08 .281 21 Art (strangers) US U. #2 (92) 42 20.12 (1.81) 2.15 (.59) 2.31 (.64) .26 .21 .15 .67 1.24 .214 22 Opinions (partners) Community #2 (82) 42 101.79 (117.44) 35.28 (11.68) 1.56 (.35) 1.52 (.42) .10 .22 .53 .34 .43 .664 23 Opinions (partners) Community #2 (80) 38 131.84 (151.97) 38.81 (14.00) 1.71 (.50) 1.71 (.36) .01 .23 .45 .44 .02 .984 23 Opinions (strangers) Community #2 (79) 37 38.57 (13.93) 1.97 (.42) 1.98 (.38) .02 .23 .43 .46 .08 .938 24Performance appraisal simulation Burke’s chance MBA (101) 21.08 (16.60) 27.89 (19.05) .38 .20 .02 .78 1.89 .059 24Performance appraisal simulation Stanley’s chance MBA (101) 22.04 (17.53) 24.92 (22.30) .14 .20 .25 .54 .72 .475 24Performance appraisal simulation Burke’s impression MBA (101) 1.89 (1.62) 1.67 (1.68) .13 .20 .53 .26 .67 .506 24Performance appraisal simulation Stanley’s impression MBA (101) 1.92 (1.91) 2.04 (1.70) .07 .20 .33 .46 .33 .740 Total.16 .07 .03 .30 2.44 .015 Note. Larger absolute differences indicate less accuracy. In Experiment 24 participants did not report their age and gender.This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 557 PERSPECTIVE MISTAKING participant’s predictions of a stranger because he or she predicted the preferences of a hypothetical stranger (Experiment 23). We were also unable to calculate accuracy in 24 instances: 10 in- stances in which participants did not make predictions or their partners did not report own responses (Experiments 16, 19, 22, and 23) and 14 instances in which we could not match participants to a partner because they mis-entered their Participant ID or because they were part of a triplet and it was unclear whose preferences they predicted (Experiment 20). Additionally, we could not calcu- late correlational accuracy in nine instances in which participants or their partners gave the same response to all items (Experiments 19 and 20). We present results only for the perspective taking and control conditions in the main text (N 825), as we did for Experiments 1–15. Participants completed each experimental session in pairs where each person served as both a “predictor” and a “target.” The pairs varied in their relationship status across experiments. Some were romantic partners (Experiments 16, 17, and 22), and others were strangers who had a short introductory conversation (Experiments 18 –21, and 24). Pairs were strangers of the opposite sex in Experi- ments 19 and 20, and included both heterosexual romantic partners and strangers of the opposite sex in Experiment 23. There were a few exceptions to these rules: four participants were not of the opposite gender and six participants were not strangers (Experiment 19), 34 participants were not of the opposite gender or were part of a triplet and six participants could not be matched to a partner (Experiment 20), four participants were not romantic partners (Experiment 22), eight participants predicted a romantic partner who was not of the opposite gender, two participants predicted someone who was not a romantic partner, and eight participants predicted a stranger’s prefer- ences who was not of the opposite gender (Experiment 23). Excluding these additional participants does not change the results in any mean- ingful way, and so we report the results with these participants included. Materials and procedure.Heterosexual romantic partners were recruited together in Experiments 16 –17 and 22. Individuals were recruited separately and paired with a stranger in Experi- ments 18 –21. Heterosexual romantic partners were recruited to- gether and paired with another couple that they did not already know in Experiment 23. Experiments involving pairs of strangers began with a get-acquainted session in which each participant introduced himself/herself guided by a series of questions: “Where are you from?,” “What are you doing in the lab/museum today?,” and “What are you doing when you are not at the lab/museum?” Participants in Experiments 16 –23 predicted their partner’s responses and stated their own responses. Participants in Experi- ments 18 –20 also predicted the responses of an average man and an average woman. Participants in Experiments 16, 18 –19, and 22–23 first predicted their partner’s responses for all of the items, and then stated their own responses for all of the items. We counterbalanced the order of these ratings in Experiments 17 and 21. Participants in Experiment 20 predicted their partner’s re- sponses, stated their own responses, predicted the responses of an average man, and predicted the responses of an average woman for each item before moving to the next. Participants in Experiment 24 first gave their own impressions based on the role they played and then predicted their partner’s response based on the partner’s role. Interpersonal accuracy measures.These experiments as- sessed interpersonal accuracy on predictions of partners’ responsesto six different judgments: activities, movies, jokes, videos, art, opinions, and a performance appraisal simulation. We summarize each task below. All stimuli from questionnaires are publically available online athttps://osf.io/4k7tv/. Activities (Experiments 16 & 17).Participants rated how much their partner liked or disliked 37 activities on 7-point scales (1 dislike very much,4 neutral or don’t know,7 like very much) using a measure taken fromSwann and Gill (1997; e.g., go to a bar or a pub, play tennis, visit with family, go bowling, do dishes). Movies (Experiment 18).Participants saw posters for 16 mov- ies targeted for female audiences (e.g.,Pretty Woman,Legally Blonde) or male audiences (e.g.,Casino Royale,Transformers). Participants rated how much they thought their partner would like each movie on 5-point scales (1 strongly dislike,5 strongly like). Jokes (Experiment 19).Participants read 12 sexist jokes tar- geted for female audiences (e.g., “Why are men like strawberries? Because they take a long time to mature and by the time they do most are rotten.”) or male audiences (e.g., “What is the difference between a battery and a woman? A battery has a positive side.”). Participants rated how funny they thought their partner would rate each joke on 5-point scales (1 not at all funny,5 extremely funny). Videos (Experiment 20).Participants watched eight 2–3 min videos with humorous dating advice targeted for female audiences (e.g., “How to survive shopping with your boyfriend,”) or male audiences (e.g., “How to tell her she looks terrible”). Participants rated how much their partner would like each video on 5-point scales (1 strongly dislike,5 strongly like). Art (Experiment 21).Participants viewed 18 pieces of art (paintings and photographs). They rated how much their partner would like each piece of art on 10-point scales (1 strongly dislike,10 strongly like). Opinions (Experiments 22 and 23).Participants read 21 opin- ion statements selected from Consumer Reports (taken fromHoch, 1987; e.g., “I would like to spend a year in London or Paris,” “I have somewhat old-fashioned tastes and habits,” “Police should use whatever force is necessary to maintain law and order”). They predicted how their partner would respond to each statement on 7-point scales (1 strongly disagree,” 4 neither agree nor disagree,7 strongly agree ). Performance appraisal simulation (Experiment 24).MBA students were divided into pairs and assigned to the role of a partner in a firm (Stanley) or a manager being evaluated for promotion (Burke). In this simulation, Stanley has evaluated all the managers in the division and is prepared to give Burke his or her appraisal. Burke is certain that he or she outperforms the other managers and should be promoted to partnership in the firm. Stanley believes Burke has many strong points, but he also has many concerns and estimates Burke has only a 10% chance of making partner in the next two years. Participants first received 10 min to read one-page long background about the person he or she was role playing. Each pair then conducted the performance eval- uation for 20 min. Finally, all participants answered four questions, according to their role. The first two questions were about their own impression: (1) “According to the materials you received and your performance appraisal, what do you think is the likelihood that you (manager Burke) [your manager Burke] will be promoted This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 558 EYAL, STEFFEL, AND EPLEY to partner at the end of the next two years?” (2) “What is your overall impression of yourself (Burke) [of Burke] as a manager?” Participants then made predictions regarding the thoughts of the other person: (3) “What do you believe Stanley (the partner) thinks is the likelihood that you will be promoted to partner at the end of the next two years [What do you believe Burke thinks is his or her likelihood of making partner]?” (4) “What do you believe is Stanley’s (the partner) overall impression of you as a manager [What do you believe Burke thinks is your overall impression of him or her as a manager]?” Answers on questions 1 and 3 were given on a line ending with a % sign. Ratings on questions 2 and 4 were given on an 11-point scale ( 5 very negative,0 neutral,5 very positive). Independent variables.All experiments shared a basic de- sign of at least a perspective taking condition and a control condition. All experiments included a perspective taking condition that encouraged participants to imagine they were the other person (“partner’s shoes condition”). Two experiments (Experiments 16 and 22) also included an additional perspective taking condition that encouraged participants to focus on the other person’s thoughts and feelings (“partner’s perspective condition”). All but Experiments 21 and 24 also included a condition that encouraged participants to base their predictions of their partners’ responses on their own responses (“egocentrism condition,” see Supplemental Materials). Control conditions.Participants in Experiments 17–21 and 23–24 were told: “We would like for you to use whatever strategy you think is best.” Participants in Experiments 16 and 22 received no instructions about how to predict the other person’s responses. Perspective taking (partner’s shoes) conditions.Part- icipants in Experiment 16 (Activities) were told: When predicting your partner’s responses, it is very important that you put yourself in your partner’s shoes. Try to envision what your attitudes toward the following activities would be if you were your partner. Concentrate on how you would feel about each activity if you were your partner: i.e., whether you would like to do it or would not like to do it. Imagine how strongly you would feel. Circle the answers that best reflect the thoughts and feelings you would have about each activity if you were your partner. Participants in Experiments 22 and 23 (Opinions) were told: When predicting your partner’s responses, it is very important that you put yourself in your partner’s shoes. Try to envision how you would react to each of the statements if you were your partner. Concentrate on what you would think if you were your partner, i.e., whether you would agree or disagree with each statement. Imagine how strongly you would feel. Circle the answers that best reflect the reactions, thoughts, and feelings you would have if you were your partner. Participants in Experiments 17–21 (Activities, Movies, Jokes, Videos, Art) were told: When rating how much your partner would like the following [activ- ities, movies, jokes, video clips pieces of art], it is very important that you put yourself in your partner’s shoes. Think carefully about what you know about your partner— consider their personality, their back- ground, and their tastes. Imagine what they would like and dislike about each [activity, movie, joke, video clip, piece of art], andconsider how that would influence their ratings of each activity [movie, joke, video clip, piece of art]. Participants in Experiment 24 (Performance Appraisal Simula- tion) were told: Try to adopt Stanley’s perspective (the partner’s perspective) [Burke’s perspective (the manager’s perspective)] as if you were him or her. Do your best to put yourself into Stanley’s [Burke’s] shoes, trying to understand your interaction through Stanley’s [Burke’s] eyes— considering what Stanley [Burke] isthinking, and what Stanley’s interests and purposesare. Remember that Stanley [Burke] may have a different perspective than you do. Perspective taking (partner’s perspective) conditions.Part- icipants in Experiment 16 (Activities) were told: When predicting your partner’s responses, it is very important that you consider what you know about your partner. The best way to do that is to think about your partner’s behavior and visible reactions in the past. Try to think about which activities your partner has engaged in and how often he/she has engaged in those activities, or in activities that are similar to the ones below. Concentrate on what your partner has actually said to you about each activity: i.e. whether he/she has said that he/she likes to do it or does not like to do it. Circle the answers that best reflect what you think are your partner’s prefer- ences, based as much as you can on how your partner has behaved or responded in the past to these activities or to similar activities. Participants in Experiment 22 (Opinions) were told: When predicting your spouse’s responses, it is very important that you consider your spouse’s perspective. Try to envision his/her reactions to each of the statements. Concentrate on what your spouse thinks, i.e., whether your spouse agrees or disagrees with each statement. Imagine how strongly he/she feels. Circle the answers that best reflect your spouse’s reactions, thoughts, and feelings. Additional measures.Lastly, participants answered addi- tional questions: Confidence.Participants in all but Experiments 18 and 24 predicted the number of responses they thought they predicted accurately. This provided us with a measure of participants’ con- fidence in the accuracy of their predictions. Difficulty.Participants in Experiments 20, 21, and 23 rated how easy or difficult it was for them to predict their partner’s preferences using the strategy they did on a 10-point scale (1 very easy,10 very hard). Measures about the relationship between partners included how well participants thought they knew their partners, how well they thought their partners knew them, how long they and their partner had known each other, how long they were romantically involved, whether they were married, and how long they were married. These measures are reported in the Supplemental Materials. Results Meta-analyses.Because Experiments 16 –24 used diverse populations and tests of interpersonal accuracy tests, we conducted random effects meta-analyses using the Comprehensive Meta- analysis 2 software (Borenstein et al., 2010) to identify the robust effects across experiments. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 559 PERSPECTIVE MISTAKING Accuracy.We conducted three meta-analyses to test the effect of perspective taking on accuracy. The first meta-analysis utilized the 13 comparisons in which we could calculate accuracy as the absolute difference between predicted opinions and preferences of others and their actual opinions and preferences (larger absolute differences indicate smaller accuracy). The second analysis was conducted for the eight comparisons in which we could calculate accuracy as the mean correlation between predicted opinions and preferences of others and their actual opinions and preferences. The third analysis was conducted for the eight comparisons in which we could count the number of participants’ correct predic- tions. These meta-analyses yielded a significantnegativeeffect for accuracy when calculated as absolute differences:d 0.16, 95% CI [0.03, 0.30],z 2.44,p .015 (a positive sign indicates less accuracy in perspective taking condition compared with control, Table 7), and nonsignificant effects for accuracy when calculated as mean correlations:d 0.10, 95% CI [ 0.25, 0.05], z 1.36,p .17 (a negative sign indicates less accuracy in perspective taking condition compared with control,Table 8), and when calculated as the number of correct predictions:d 0.01, 95% CI [ 0.23, 0.20],z 0.12,p .90 (a negative sign indicates less accuracy in perspective taking condition compared with control,Table 9). The results of the three analyses indicate that perspective taking did not increase accuracy in predicting partners’ opinions and preferences. If anything, it reduced accu- racy as we also observed in Experiments 1–15. These results did not change in a meaningful way when we replaced the “partner’s shoes” conditions with the “partner’s per- spective” conditions in Experiments 16 and 22. In addition, par- ticipants in the “partner’s shoes” condition were directionally more accurate than participants in the “partner’s perspective” condition. This difference was marginally significant for the number ofcorrect predictions measure in Experiment 22,t(74) 1.84,p .070,d 0.43, but nonsignificant in all other measures in Exper- iment 22 and in all measures in Experiment 16. Perceived difficulty.In a meta-analysis of the four compari- sons in which we measured perceived difficulty, we observed a nonsignificant difference between the perspective taking and con- trol conditions,d 0.03, 95% CI [ 0.30, 0.36],z 0.16,p .87 (seeTable 10). Note that this differs from Experiments 1–15 in which perspective takers reported experiencing more difficulty than those in the control condition. This different pattern of results could stem from participants’ increased familiarity with the targets of judgment in Experiments 16 –24. Confidence and overconfidence.In a meta-analysis of the eight comparisons in which we measured confidence, we observed a nonsignificant difference between perspective taking and control conditions,d 0.08, 95% CI [ 0.09, 0.25],z 0.90,p .37 (see Table 11). In contrast to Experiments 1–15, perspective taking did not significantly reduce confidence. If anything, it directionally increased it. This may again be because participants in Experi- ments 16 –24 had more knowledge about the other person’s per- spective to rely on in the perspective taking condition. We calcu- lated overconfidence by subtracting the number of accurate responses from confidence scores (i.e., predicted number of accu- rate responses). Overall, participants were highly overconfident in their predictions,d 1.50, 95% CI [1.23, 1.78],z 10.58,p .001. This overconfidence was statistically significant in all eight comparisons. In a meta-analysis of the eight comparisons in which we measured both confidence and accuracy, there was no effect of overconfidence, indicating that perspective taking did not influ- ence overconfidence,d 0.04, 95% CI [ 0.16, 0.24],z 0.39, p .70. Table 8 Meta-Analysis on Accuracy (Mean Correlations Between Predicted Responses and Actual Responses) for Perspective Taking Versus Control Conditions, Experiments 16 –24 Experiment Task Location (N) ControlPT: Other’s shoesMeta-analysis results dSECI lower limitCI upper limitZP 16 Activities (partners) Community #1 (74) .64 (.15) .65 (.16) .07 .23 .38 .53 .32 .751 17 Activities (partners) Community #1 (66) .68 (.14) .62 (.16) .36 .25 .84 .13 1.44 .150 18 Movies (strangers) US U. #2 (80) .40 (.36) .33 (.37) .14 .22 .58 .30 .63 .528 19 Jokes (strangers) Community #2 (74) .16 (.36) .07 (.38) .24 .23 .69 .22 1.01 .314 20 Videos (strangers) US U. #2 (84) .19 (.31) .10 (.45) .24 .22 .67 .19 1.10 .270 21 Art (strangers) US U. #2 (92) .35 (.26) .30 (.25) .20 .21 .61 .21 .97 .331 22 Opinions (partners) Community #1 (82) .48 (.21) .46 (.23) .11 .22 .54 .33 .47 .635 23 Opinions (partners) Community #1 (80) .33 (.28) .35 (.20) .03 .23 .41 .47 .14 .887 23 Opinions (strangers) Community #1 (79) .07 (.22) .11 (.17) .24 .23 .21 .68 1.06 .291 24Performance appraisal simulation Burke’s chance MBA (101) .30 .21 24Performance appraisal simulation Stanley’s chance MBA (101) .21 .14 24Performance appraisal simulation Burke’s impression MBA (101) .10 .05 24Performance appraisal simulation Stanley’s impression MBA (101) .17 .04 Total .10 .08 .25 .05 1.36 .173 Note. The meta-analysis was conducted on a Fisher-transformation of the correlations. For ease of interpretation we report the mean Pearson correlations. In Experiment 24, the correlations were calculated between two ratings rather than between mean ratings as in the other experiments. Therefore, it was not included in the meta-analysis. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 560 EYAL, STEFFEL, AND EPLEY Reducing egocentrism.We conducted two meta-analyses on the nine comparisons in which we measured participants’ own preferences that allow us to test whether or not perspective taking systematically decreases egocentric projection compared with a control condition. When calculating projection as the absolute difference between predicted opinions of others and self-opinions (larger absolute differences indicate smaller projection), we ob- served a nonsignificant reduction in egocentric projection in the perspective taking conditions compared with the control condi- tions,d 0.12, 95% CI [ 0.04, 0.27],z 1.49,p .14 (see Table 12). This was also the case when calculating projection as the mean correlation between predicted opinions of others and self-opinions (smaller correlations indicate smaller projection), d 0.14, 95% CI [ 0.34, 0.06],z 1.38,p .17, such that participants in the perspective taking condition were less egocen- tric than participants in the control condition (seeTable 13). Discussion Across nine experiments consisting of naturalistic tests of inter- personal accuracy—predicting a partner’s preferences and opin- ions—we found that an explicit instruction to engage in perspec- tive taking did not increase accuracy. If anything, it decreased accuracy. Experiments 16 –24 do not provide a clear explanation for why perspective taking failed to increase accuracy. Among pairs of participants who were encouraged to take the perspective of their partner, reading the mind of their partner was not perceived to bemore or less difficult, and did not yield more or less confidence, compared with control condition. Interestingly, unlike participants in Experiments 1–15 who were underconfident in their predictions, participants in Experiments 16 –24 were dramatically overconfi- dent. Participants in Experiments 16 –24 were more familiar with their targets’ perspectives and we therefore think it was likely that the judgment task was generally easier as a result, thereby increas- ing confidence. Participants’ overconfidence, however, did not differ systematically between perspective taking and control con- ditions. Perspective takers did seem to be less egocentric (i.e., projective) to some extent compared with control participants, but this effect was only marginally significant when measured as correlations between predictions and self-ratings but not when measured as absolute differences between predictions and self- ratings. Less projection, however, did not increase accuracy in the perspective taking condition compared with the control condi- tion. We believe the collective results of all of the experiments presented so far (Experiments 1–24) are especially interesting because they stand in stark contrast to the survey we presented in the introduction, where respondents tended to predict that perspective taking would increase accuracy across many of these tests. Common sense indicates that perspective taking should increase interpersonal understanding. Likewise, psychological theory predicts that perspective taking could increase interpersonal accuracy through a variety of different mech- anisms (such as behavioral mimicry, increased empathy, or reduced egocentrism). These mechanisms all presume that taking another’s Table 9 Meta-Analysis on Accuracy (Number of Correct Predictions) for Perspective Taking Versus Control Conditions, Experiments 16 –24 Experiment Task Location (N) ControlPT: Other’s shoesMeta-analysis results dSECI lower limitCI upper limitZp 16 Activities (partners) Community #1 (74) 11.89 (2.81) 13.03 (3.67) .35 .23 .11 .81 1.48 .138 17 Activities (partners) Community #1 (66) 12.24 (4.02) 10.66 (3.92) .40 .25 .89 .09 1.60 .110 18 Movies (strangers) US U. #2 (80) 5.03 (2.20) 4.13 (2.44) .39 .23 .83 .06 1.72 .086 19 Jokes (strangers) Community #2 (78) 3.35 (1.72) 3.24 (1.94) .06 .23 .50 .38 .27 .791 20 Videos (strangers) US U. #2 (79) 1.89 (1.21) 1.98 (1.23) .07 .22 .35 .50 .34 .734 21 Art (strangers) US U. #2 (92) 2.50 (1.56) 2.26 (1.41) .16 .21 .57 .25 .77 .440 22 Opinions (partners) Community #1 (82) 4.89 (2.25) 6.00 (1.90) .53 .23 .08 .98 2.33 .020 23 Opinions (partners) Community #1 (80) 4.64 (2.22) 4.03 (1.80) .30 .23 .74 .14 1.32 .186 23 Opinions (strangers) Community #1 (79) 3.40 (2.03) 3.83 (1.77) .23 .23 .22 .67 .99 .321 Total .01 .11 .23 .20 .12 .904 Note. There are 37 items in Activities, 16 items in Movies, 12 items in Jokes, 8 items in Videos, 18 items in Art, and 21 items in Opinions. Table 10 Meta-Analysis on Perceived Difficulty for Perspective Taking and Control Conditions, Experiments 16 –24 Experiment Task Location (N) Control PT: Other’s shoesMeta-analysis results dSECI lower limitCI upper limitZp 20 Videos (strangers) US U. #2 (93) 4.72 (1.57) 5.19 (1.26) .33 .21 .08 .74 1.58 .113 21 Art (strangers) US U. #2 (88) 6.44 (2.15) 7.07 (2.19) .29 .21 .13 .71 1.36 .176 23 Opinions (partners) Community #1 (80) 4.39 (1.96) 3.86 (1.55) .30 .23 .74 .15 1.31 .189 23 Opinions (strangers) Community #1 (79) 7.84 (1.99) 7.36 (1.87) .25 .23 .69 .20 1.09 .274 Total.03 .17 .30 .36 .16 .870 Note. Participants made their ratings on 11-point scales. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 561 PERSPECTIVE MISTAKING perspective will lead people to consider new information that they would not have considered otherwise, and that this new information will provide a systematically more accurate guide to another person’s mental experience. Our results simply suggest that the information people consider when they shift perspective may not be systematically more accurate than the information they would have considered otherwise. Experiment 25: Perspective Getting If taking another person’s perspective does not systematically increase accuracy, is there anything one can do to reliably increase understanding? If so, are people who are using this more effective strategy aware of its usefulness? In one final experiment, we compared the effectiveness of perspective taking against another approach that almost necessar- ily collects more accurate information directly from another per- son’s perspective, what we refer to asperspective getting.In particular, increasing insight into another person’s mind should require getting more accurate information about his or her per- spective. One obvious way to do this is by asking a person to report directly on his or her thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, and other mentalstates and then using that information as a guide, just as survey researchers do to assess public opinions with a relatively high degree of accuracy. Of course, self-reports are sometimes inaccurate, such as when asking people to explain their own mental processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), or when discussing topics with strong demand characteristics (Schwarz, 1999). However, self-reports of con- scious mental experiences, such as conscious beliefs, emotions, or attitudes, are still consistently the best predictors of behavior (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009;Oswald, Mitch- ell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013). More important, perspec- tive taking is often presumed to increase understanding of another person’s conscious experience, regardless of whether that experi- ence itself accurately reflects some objective reality or not. If you want to know whether your spousebelieveshe or she would prefer a weekend in London or Paris, or watchLove Actuallyrather than Iron Man 3,the most accurate strategy would likely be to get your spouse’s perspective byaskingwhat he or she prefers rather than trying to take his or her perspective and guess. Although this approach to increasing accuracy seems obvious, we believe it is worth comparing its effectiveness against perspec- Table 11 Meta-Analysis on Confidence (Predicted Number of Correct Responses) for Perspective Taking Versus Control Conditions, Experiments 16 –24 Experiment Task Location (N) Control PT: Other’s shoesMeta-analysis results dSECI lower limitCI upper limitZp 16 Activities (partners) Community #1 (74) 23.61 (6.21) 24.95 (4.66) .25 .23 .21 .70 1.05 .294 17 Activities (partners) Community #1 (65) 21.39 (7.38) 24.44 (7.06) .42 .25 .07 .91 1.68 .092 19 Jokes (strangers) Community #2 (75) 6.11 (2.22) 6.81 (2.59) .29 .23 .17 .75 1.25 .211 20 Videos (strangers) US U. #2 (93) 4.54 (1.53) 4.02 (1.44) .35 .21 .76 .06 1.68 .094 21 Art (strangers) US U. #2 (88) 7.60 (3.45) 7.74 (3.67) .04 .21 .38 .46 .19 .850 22 Opinions (partners) Community #1 (82) 12.94 (3.18) 12.42 (4.23) .14 .22 .58 .29 .63 .526 23 Opinions (partners) Community #1 (79) 13.43 (4.20) 13.77 (3.23) .09 .23 .36 .53 .40 .693 23 Opinions (strangers) Community #1 (79) 8.30 (4.07) 9.03 (4.07) .18 .23 .26 .62 .79 .428 Total.08 .09 .09 .25 .90 .370 Note. There are 37 items in Activities, 16 item in Movies, 12 items in Jokes, 8 items in Videos, 18 items in Art, and 21 items in Opinions. We did not measure confidence in Experiments 18 and 24. Table 12 Meta-Analysis on Egocentric Projection (Absolute Difference Between Predictions of Partners’ Responses and Own Responses) for Perspective Taking Versus Control Conditions, Experiments 16 –24 Experiment Task Location (N) Control PT: Other’s shoesMeta-analysis results dSECI lower limitCI upper limitZp 16 Activities (partners) Community #1 (74) 1.39 (.42) 1.43 (.38) .10 .23 .36 .56 .43 .667 17 Activities (partners) Community #1 (66) 1.50 (.48) 1.44 (.45) .13 .25 .61 .35 .52 .601 18 Movies (strangers) US U. #2 (80) 1.01 (.66) 1.03 (.47) .04 .22 .40 .47 .16 .876 19 Jokes (strangers) Community #2 (78) .93 (.50) 1.08 (.56) .28 .23 .16 .73 1.24 .214 20 Videos (strangers) US U. #2 (93) .91 (.42) .97 (.62) .11 .21 .29 .52 .55 .586 21 Art (strangers) US U. #2 (92) 1.57 (.67) 1.68 (.72) .16 .21 .25 .57 .76 .449 22 Opinions (partners) Community #1 (82) 1.21 (.54) 1.55 (.52) .64 .23 .20 1.09 2.82 .005 23 Opinions (partners) Community #1 (80) 1.55 (.46) 1.48 (.50) .15 .23 .59 .30 .65 .516 23 Opinions (strangers) Community #1 (79) 1.77 (.57) 1.75 (.55) .04 .23 .48 .41 .16 .875 Total.12 .08 .04 .27 1.49 .137 Note. Larger absolute values indicate less projection. We did not test projection in Experiment 24. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 562 EYAL, STEFFEL, AND EPLEY tive taking for three reasons. First, none of our experiments pro- vide concrete insight into how a person might actually increase interpersonal understanding above and beyond a control condition. Indeed, perspective taking across our experiments tended to de- crease accuracy. Testing the effectiveness of perspective getting would test whether it is even possible to systematically improve interpersonal accuracy. It would also offer practical advice about exactly what kind approach a person should take to understand another’s mind more accurately. Second, we believe our perspec- tive taking results highlight an important subtlety that is often overlooked in the existing psychological literature. Getting anoth- er’s perspective directly through bottom-up processes of direct questioning is different than trying to take another’s perspective through top-down inferences. It is important to clearly distinguish between these processes because they may have very different implications for interpersonal understanding. This distinction can also serve to refine the theoretical concept of perspective-taking, which is sometimes used broadly to describe both top-down pro- cesses of inference and bottom-up processes of direct questioning or personal experience in another person’s situation. Finally, per- spective getting may seem like an obvious approach to increasing interpersonal accuracy, but it may not be so obvious to those in the midst of interpersonal interactions. By measuring participants’ confidence in judgment, we can assess the degree to which people are aware of which strategies provide better insight into the mind of another person than others. Specifically, we conducted a replication of Experiments 22 and 23, in which participants predicted their romantic partner’s agree- ment or disagreement with a series of opinion statements. Partic- ipants in the perspective taking condition followed the same in- structions as in Experiments 22 and 23, whereas participants in the control condition were instructed to “use whatever strategy you think is best.” Each participant in the perspective getting condition, in contrast, was first given the chance to ask his or her partner either half or all of the opinion statements, listen to the partner’s verbal response, and then to later predict how his or her partner would respond on the numeric preference scale for each item. Allowing participants to get their partners’ perspective on either a subset of the items, or the full set of items, enables us to more precisely assess the impact of this approach on accuracy.We predicted thatgettinga partner’s perspective would increase accuracy compared withtakinghis or her perspective and to the control condition. Because the survey items we used were de- signed so as to be uncorrelated with each other (Hoch, 1987), we expected that getting perspective would increase accuracy only on the items people discussed. Those in the partial perspective-getting conditions, who discuss only half the items, should therefore obtain accuracy rates somewhere in between the control and full perspective getting condition (where participants discuss all of the items). Obviously, these results would change if we used a set of highly intercorrelated survey items. Finally, given the tenuous relationship between confidence and accuracy in judgment, we expected to observe a smaller difference in participants’ confi- dence across conditions than in accuracy across conditions. Those in the perspective-getting conditions, we predicted, would not be fully aware of just how much their judgment improved compared with the other experimental conditions. Method Participants.One hundred four heterosexual romantic cou- ples were recruited in the community to complete a short survey. Of these, 58% were married. Participants ranged in age from 19 to 72 (M 36), and were in a relationship between one month and 43 years (M 10 years). Materials and procedure.Couples were invited to partici- pate in a study on how well people can gauge their partner’s opinions, using the same test as reported in Experiments 22 and 23. One member of each couple (predictor) was asked to predict how their partner would respond to 20 opinion statements selected from Consumer Reports(Hoch, 1987) and then report his or her own opinions. The other member (target) was only asked to rate his or her own opinions. Predictors were randomly assigned to one of five strategies and read the following instructions: Control condition.Participants read, “We would like for you to use whatever strategy you think is best.” Participants in the control condition received no further suggestions on what these strategies might be. Perspective taking condition.Participants read, “We would like for you to take the perspective of your partner. Please imagine Table 13 Meta-Analysis on Egocentric Projection (Mean Correlations Between Predictions of Partners’ Responses and Own Responses) for Perspective Taking Versus Control Conditions, Experiments 16 –24 Experiment Task Location (N) Control PT: Other’s shoesMeta-analysis results dSECI lower limitCI upper limitZp 16 Activities (partners) Community #1 (74) .45 (.20) .40 (.21) .25 .23 .70 .21 1.06 .291 17 Activities (partners) Community #1 (66) .38 (.23) .39 (.28) .14 .25 .35 .62 .56 .578 18 Movies (strangers) US U. #2 (80) .44 (.51) .36 (.44) .25 .22 .69 .19 1.12 .262 19 Jokes (strangers) Community #1 (75) .31 (.39) .27 (.42) .01 .23 .47 .44 .06 .954 20 Videos (strangers) US U. #2 (92) .29 (.47) .15 (.59) .29 .21 .70 .13 1.36 .173 21 Art (strangers) US U. #2 (92) .52 (.31) .49 (.31) .14 .21 .55 .27 .69 .491 22 Opinions (partners) Community #1 (82) .57 (.26) .37 (.27) .76 .23 1.21 .31 3.33 .001 23 Opinions (partners) Community #1 (80) .36 (.29) .43 (.30) .29 .23 .15 .73 1.29 .198 23 Opinions (strangers) Community #1 (79) .19 (.32) .22 (.28) .06 .23 .39 .50 .25 .799 Total .14 .10 .34 .06 1.38 .168 Note. The meta-analysis was conducted on a Fisher-transformation of the correlations. For ease of interpretation we report the mean Pearson correlations. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 563 PERSPECTIVE MISTAKING a typical day in the life of your partner as if you were him/her, looking at the world through his/her eyes and walking through the world in his/her shoes. You should start from the beginning of your partner’s day to the end, focusing on his/her thoughts and feelings. Please take approximately five minutes to write about a day in the life of your partner. Once you have done that, we would like for you to use this information to rate the extent to which your partner would agree or disagree with the following statements. Please use this strategy even if you think another strategy would be better.” Perspective getting (–all, – even, and – odd) conditions. Participants read, Before you rate the extent to which your partner would agree or disagree with the following statements, we would like for you to ask your partner to tell you about their opinions. We will give you a list of statements. Please take approximately five minutes to ask your partner about the extent to which they agree or disagree with each of the statements on the list, trying to get a sense of the range of your partner’s opinions. Your partner might strongly agree with some statements, somewhat agree with others, and they may strongly dis- agree with others. Once you have done that, we would like for you to use the information you got from your partner to predict the extent to which your partner would agree or disagree with these statements. Please use this strategy even if you think another strategy would be better. Participants in theperspective getting—allcondition received the full list of statements, and those in theperspective getting-evenand -oddconditions received a list with only the even- or odd- numbered statements, respectively. Each participant in the perspective taking condition was given five minutes in which to write about a day in the life of his or her partner, a commonly used perspective-taking manipulation (adapted fromMacrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994). Each participant in the perspective getting conditions was given five minutes in which to ask his or her partner about their opinions on the items provided. Note that perspective getting participants sim- ply discussed their opinions verbally, rather than putting them on the numeric scale that they would use later in the experiment. This is important because participants in the perspective getting condi- tion still had to infer their partner’s numeric response from their verbal answer, rather than simply remember the exact numeric answer that a partner provided. After this 5-min period, partners were moved to separate locations and given the full list of opinion statements. Targets reported their opinion on each item on a7-point scale ( 3 strongly disagree,3 strongly agree). Predictors guessed how their target would respond to each item on the same scales. We next measured participants’ confidence in the accuracy of their own or their partner’s judgment in two different ways. First, predictors rated how confident they were that their predictions of their partner’s opinions were correct, and targets rated how con- fident they were that their partner’s predictions of their opinions were correct on an 11-point scale (0 not at all confident,10 extremely confident). Second, predictors indicated the number of responses they thought they predicted exactly correctly, and targets also indicated the number of responses they thought their partner predicted exactly correctly. Finally, participants reported how long they and their partner had been romantically involved and how long (if applicable) they had been married. Participants were then reunited with their part- ners and debriefed. Results Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the different dependent measures are presented inTable 14. Accuracy.We assessed accuracy in three ways. First, we calculated the absolute mean difference between predicted and actual opinions (larger absolute differences indicate smaller accu- racy). Second, we calculated the correlation between predicted and actual opinions (larger correlations indicate greater accuracy), using a Fisher-transformation to correct for non-normality in Pear- son correlations (Fisher, 1915). For ease of interpretation, we report untransformed Pearson correlations in the tables and text. Third, we calculated the number of items predictors guessed cor- rectly. All results are presented inTable 14. Across these mea- sures, perspective getting improved accuracy relative to the control condition. Perspective taking did not increase accuracy. If any- thing, it again decreased accuracy. Accuracy as measured by the absolute mean difference between predicted and actual ratings significantly varied by experimental condition,F(4, 99) 14.61,p .001, p2 .37. Compared with the control condition, participants were significantly more accurate (reflected in smaller absolute differences between predicted and actual responses) in the perspective getting-full condition, t(99) 4.89,p .001,d 1.85, perspective getting-even condition,t(99) 2.62,p .010,d 0.75, and perspective Table 14 Results for Experiment 25 Measure ControlPT: Other’s shoesPerspective getting (even)Perspective getting (odd)Perspective getting (all) 1. Accuracy (ABS difference between predicted and actual opinions) 1.46 a(.31)1.71 b(.43)1.15 c(.49)1.21 c(.29).88 d(.32) 2. Accuracy (Mean correlation between predicted and actual opinions) .50 a (.15).39 a (.24).65 b(.23).66 b(.16).81 c(.12) 3. Accuracy (# of correct predictions) 4.90 a (1.70)3.95 a (1.94)7.43 b(2.79)6.35 bc(2.52)8.60 cd(3.02) 4. Projection (ABS difference between predicted and self opinions) 1.62 (.33) 1.56 (.60) 1.45 (.56) 1.47 (.42) 1.42 (.52) 5. Projection (Mean correlation between predicted and self opinions) .35 a (.24).37 ab (.30).49 ab (.24).44 ab(.24).53 c (.23) 6. Confidence (Ratings) 7.30 (1.13) 7.05 (1.63) 7.00 (1.26) 6.65 (2.01) 7.55 (1.36) 7. Confidence (# of estimated correct predictions) 12.60 a(3.21)13.48 ab(3.12)14.45 b(2.46)13.53 ab(3.36)14.80 b(2.75) 8. Overconfidence (Difference between #7 and #3) 7.60 a(3.73)9.67 b(4.25)6.65 ac(2.93)7.00 ac(3.90)6.20 ac(3.65) Note. There are 20 items in the Hoch questionnaire. Within each measure, numbers that do not share a superscript differ significantly atp .05. For numbers that share an identical number of asterisks the difference is marginally significant atp .10. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 564 EYAL, STEFFEL, AND EPLEY getting-odd condition,t(99) 2.04,p .044,d 0.82. How- ever, participants were significantlylessaccurate in the perspec- tive taking condition than in the control condition,t(99) 2.20, p .031,d 0.68. Accuracy as measured by the correlation between predicted and actual ratings also varied by experimental condition,F(4, 99) 15.24,p .001, p2 .38. Compared with the control condition, participants were significantly more accurate in in the perspective getting-full condition,t(99) 5.23,p .001,d 2.28, perspec- tive getting-even condition,t(99) 2.66,p .009,d 0.77, and perspective getting-odd condition,t(99) 2.68,p .009,d 1.03. Participants in the perspective taking condition were not more accurate than those in the control condition,t(99) 1.89, p .061,d 0.55. If anything, they were again directionally less accurate. The number of items predictors guessed exactly correctly also varied by experimental condition,F(4, 99) 12.41,p .001, p2 .33. Compared with the control condition, participants pre- dicted significantly more items correctly in the perspective getting- full condition,t(99) 4.86,p .001,d 1.50, and the perspec- tive getting-even condition,t(99) 3.36,p .001,d 1.09, and marginally more items in the perspective getting-odd condition, t(99) 1.90,p .060,d 0.68. Participants in the perspective taking condition again were not more accurate than those in the control condition,t(99) 1.28,p .20,d 0.52. They were directionally less accurate. Notice that the two perspective getting conditions that discussed only half of the survey items yielded accuracy that fell midway between the perspective getting-full condition and the control condition on both absolute mean difference and correlational ac- curacy, the two accuracy measures for which we had item-level measures of predicted and actual accuracy. This moderate increase in accuracy compared with the control condition occurred because predictors’ accuracy significantly increased only on the items thatpredictors discussed explicitly with their partners. On those items, participants in the two partial perspective-getting conditions were as accurate as those in the perspective getting-all conditions, but they were no more accurate than the control condition on the items they did not discuss with their partner. We discuss the details of these secondary analyses in the Supplemental Materials. Again, we note that the items within this survey were designed so as to be independent from each other, and so these results simply reflect the nature of the survey items used in the experiment. Accurate insight gained from any strategy generalizes to other contexts only to the extent that those contexts are intercorrelated. These results make it clear that participants gained insight into their partner’s opinions when they got the person’s perspective directly, in this case through a bottom-up process of directly asking him or her to report on an opinion. As in the preceding experi- ments, taking another’s perspective through a top-down process of inference did not increase accuracy compared with a control con- dition. If anything, perspective taking again decreased accuracy. Confidence and overconfidence.Despite large differences in accuracy across conditions, the right panel ofFigure 2shows that confidence in the accuracy of their judgment (measured on 0 –10 scales) did not vary across conditions,F(4, 97) 1.01,p .41, p2 .04. These confidence ratings were also nonsignificantly correlated with absolute mean difference accuracy,r .08,p .44, correlational accuracy,r .08,p .44, and the number of items participants predicted correctly,r .12,p .21. We also measured participants’ sense of their own accuracy by asking them to predict how many items they guessed exactly correctly. Again despite large differences in the actual accuracy, participants’ predictions of the number guessed exactly correctly did not vary by experimental condition,F(4, 95) 1.69,p .16, p2 .07. Predictors’ beliefs about the number they guessed exactly correctly was nonsignificantly correlated with the number they actually guessed correctly,r .15,p .13. It was also Figure 2.Confidence and overconfidence measures as a function of condition, Experiment 25. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 565 PERSPECTIVE MISTAKING nonsignificantly correlated with absolute mean difference accu- racy,r .13,p .19, and correlational accuracy,r .10,p .31. Comparing the predicted number of items guessed correctly against the actual number of items guessed correctly provides a direct measure of overconfidence. As shown in the left panel of Figure 2, participants had very limited insight into how their prediction strategy affected their actual accuracy. A 5 (Condi- tion) 2 (Number correct: Actual vs. Predicted) ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor indicated that participants across conditions were dramatically overconfident, believing they predicted more items correctly (M 13.71,SD 3.22) than they actually did (M 6.20,SD 2.92),F(1, 95) 408.76,p .001, p2 .81. The interaction was not significant,F(4, 95) 1.02,p .403, p2 .04, indicating that overconfidence did not vary by experimental condition. Reducing egocentrism.We also calculated the correspon- dence between predictors’ own stated opinions and their predic- tions of partner’s stated opinions in two different ways. First, as the absolute mean difference between each predictor’s own opin- ions and predictions of his or her partner’s opinions. Second, as the correlation between each predictor’s own opinions and predictions of his or her partner’s opinions. We report the results of these analyses for the sake of consistency with the preceding experi- ments, but urge caution interpreting these results in the perspective getting conditions. In particular, predictors in the perspective get- ting conditions may have aligned their attitudes with their partner’s stated opinions, meaning that these measures may reflect social influence rather than projection. Indeed, partners in the perspective getting-full condition reported more similar preferences than those in the control condition: contrast analyses indicated that the abso- lute difference between own and partner’s opinions was margin- ally smaller in the perspective getting-full condition (M 1.54, SD .25) than in the control condition (M 1.77,SD .43), t(30.36) 2.00,p .054,d 0.65, and the correlation between own and partner’s opinions was significantly larger in the perspective getting—full condition (M .44,SD .24) than in the control condition (M .31,SD .17),t(98) 2.01,p .047, d 0.63. These results in the perspective getting conditions are therefore difficult to interpret. With that concern in mind, the absolute difference between own opinions and predicted partner’s opinions did not vary by experi- mental condition,F(4, 98) .58,p .68, p2 .02, but the correlation between these two measures did,F(4, 97) 2.61,p .040, p2 .10. In contrast to the meta-analysis of Experiments 16 –24, we did not observe a significantly smaller correlation in the perspective taking condition (M .37,SD .30) than in the control condition (M .35,SD .24),t(97) 0.08,p .94,d 0.08, indicating that perspective taking did not significantly reduce egocentrism in this experiment. In contrast, compared with the control condition, the correlation was significantly larger in the perspective getting-full (M .53,SD .23),t(97) 2.38,p .019,d 0.77, and perspective getting-even conditions (M .49, SD .24),t(97) 2.13,p .036,d 0.58. The correlation between own opinions and predicted partner opinions did not differ significantly between the perspective getting-odd condition (M .44,SD .24) and the control condition,t(97) 1.17,p .25,d 0.37. Discussion Romantic partners, most of whom were married, and who had been together for an average of 10 years, presumably know a lot about their partner’s perspective. Nevertheless, trying to take a partner’s perspective again failed to increase insight into their partner’s mind. Instead, compared with predicting their partner’s responses without special instructions, perspective taking in- creased confidence but decreased accuracy, thereby increasing overconfidence. This is not the outcome that perspective taking is presumably intended to create. This experiment also tested a more obvious strategy for increas- ing accuracy into the mind of one’s partner: getting another’s perspective by asking him or her directly. We referred to this as perspective-getting to contrast a bottom-up approach to understand another person against a top-down approach of trying to take another’s perspective by shifting cognitive attention to another’s point of view. Although asking one’s partner to state his or her preferences is an obvious way to increase understanding, perhaps the most important result from this experiment is that participants themselves did not seem to be aware of how this strategy actually affected their insight compared with the relatively ineffective strategies used in our other conditions. One might imagine that students who ask their teacher the answers to exam questions would be more confident when completing the exam than students who did not. Our romantic partners in the perspective-getting conditions did something conceptually similar and yet were not markedly more confident than those whose accuracy was some- times only slightly better than chance guessing in the control and perspective taking conditions. Taking perspective and getting per- spective are two obviously different approaches to understanding the mind of another person. The obvious benefit of one strategy compared with the other was not, however, so obvious to those who were actually using each strategy. General Discussion A survey of 1,020 Americans asked them to indicate which of 5 superpowers they would most like to possess: invisibility, telepor- tation, flight, time travel, or reading others’ minds (Marist, 2011). Tied with time travel for the most desired superpower was the ability to read the minds of others. On the one hand, this is somewhat ironic as the ability to read the minds of others is arguably the only capacity among that list that people already possess. The human brain stands out in our primate lineage for its relatively large neocortex (Jerison, 1971;Herrmann et al., 2007), a feature that may be the product of natural selection to handle the cognitive requirements of living in large social groups (Dunbar, 1993). By the age of 2, human toddlers’ capacity to understand the minds of others has already surpassed that of our nearest primate relatives, the chimpanzee (Herrmann et al., 2007). On the other hand, being able to understand the mind of another person does not mean that one is able to do so perfectly. Studies of human social cognition routinely reveal accuracy rates in understanding others’ beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and intentions that are significantly better than random chance but also markedly worse than perfect (e.g.,Ambady, Bernieri, & Richeson, 2000;Funder, 1995;Hall & Schmid Mast, 2007;Ickes, 1997;Kenny, 1991;Swann & Gill, 1997;Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-Siedlecki, 2015). In many ways, everyday life would be much easier if people were This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 566 EYAL, STEFFEL, AND EPLEY able to understand exactly what others thought of them, could understand when others were lying versus telling the truth, could identify who really loved them and who was just pretending, and could anticipate others’ actions based on an accurate understand- ing of their intentions. It is therefore easy to understand why a person might want to make this potential super power work even better. Here we reported the results of 25 experiments that tested one common sense strategy for enabling more accurate mind reading: perspective taking. Across a wide variety of experimental tests, involving relationships that ranged from strangers to spouses, we found no evidence that perspective taking systematically increased one’s ability to accurately understand the mind of another person compared with a control condition. If anything, we found that perspective taking tended todecreaseinterpersonal accuracy. A meta-analysis on all 25 experiments (number of correct responses in Experiments 1–15 and absolute differences in Experiments 16 –25) yielded a statistically significant, albeit small,negative effect of perspective taking on accuracy,d 0.23, 95% CI [ 0.32, 0.13],z 4.72,p .001. This result does not change in a meaningful way if the meta-analysis includes other accuracy measures for Experiments 16 –25 (for correlations between pre- dicted and actual responses,d 0.21 and for number of items predicted correctly,d 0.17).Dale Carnegie (1936)suggested that “trying honestly to see things from the other person’s point of view” was a “formula that will work wonders for you.” Perspective taking may indeed work some interpersonal wonders, but our results suggest that increasing insight into the mind of another person is not among them. It is worth noting that we began our research presuming, con- sistent with the common sense we observed in the pretest reported in the introduction and with existing psychological theory, that shifting perspective to another person’s point of view could in- crease interpersonal accuracy in many circumstances. We con- ducted such a large number of experiments across a wide variety of contexts and utilizing a variety of interpersonal understanding measures because we kept searching for contexts as well as mea- sures that might reveal, based on existing theory, circumstances in which perspective taking could increase accuracy. Because the scientific method is unable to confidently affirm the null hypoth- esis, our experiments are unable to confirm that perspective taking is ineffective for increasing interpersonal accuracy. They can only show the absence of positive evidence despite a concerted effort to test the most likely contexts where we, our pretest participants, and existing psychological theory presumed that perspective taking could increase accuracy. That perspective taking failed to increase accuracy was not the product of ineffective experimental manipulations. In a manipula- tion check across Experiments 1–15, participants in the perspective taking conditions reported trying harder to adopt another’s per- spective than participants in the control conditions. In addition, in a meta-analysis across all experiments in which we measured perceived difficulty, perspective taking was perceived as more difficult,d 0.13, 95% CI [0.03, 0.23],z 2.54,p .011. This perception was stronger and more reliable in Experiments 1–15 than in Experiments 20 –23, perhaps because participants were less familiar with the judgmental tasks or the targets of judgment. We also found evidence that perspective taking tended to decrease egocentric biases in judgment. This effect was stronger and moreconsistent when measured by the false belief task (Experiments 4, 5, 8, and 13) than when measured incidentally as the correspon- dence between one’s own opinions and preferences and a target’s opinions and preferences (Experiments 16 –23). However, even when perspective taking reliably decreased egocentrism it did not reliably increase accuracy. Finally, we did not find a reliable effect of perspective taking on confidence. In a meta-analysis across all experiments in which participants estimated the number of correct responses as a measure of confidence, perspective taking de- creased confidence, although this effect was only marginally sig- nificant,d 0.10, 95% CI [ 0.20, 0.01],z 1.81,p .070. This reduction in confidence was mostly evident in Experi- ments 1–15. As reported before, in Experiments 16 –25, this effect was reversed, with perspective taking directionally increasing con- fidence. This non reliable effect of perspective taking on confi- dence across experiments may be because participants in the perspective taking condition in Experiments16-25 were more fa- miliar with and had more knowledge about the other person’s perspective to rely on than participants in Experiments 1–15. However, even when perspective taking increased confidence it did not reliably increase accuracy. 4 Some of the additional conditions we included across experi- ments, discussed in more detail in the Supplemental Materials, were meant to address potential explanations for these negative results of perspective taking on accuracy. None of these conditions yielded what we believe is a clear explanation. For instance, it is possible that perspective taking caused people to thinktoo hard, leading them to overlook intuitive responses that might have been correct. However, an explicit instruction for participants to think hard in Experiment 3 did not significantly reduce accuracy com- pared with the control condition (Ms 18.83 vs. 18.48, respec- tively,t(119) .46,p .64,d 0.02). Perspective taking might also have led participants to distrust their intuitions and kept them from going with their first more accurate intuitive response, but an explicit instruction to rely on intuitions actuallydecreasedaccu- racy in Experiment 4 compared with the control condition (Ms 17.84 vs. 18.89,t(129) 2.03,p .044,d 0.46). We also tested whether perspective taking leads to greater mimicry, but an ex- plicit instruction to mimic the smile of the person in the video did not change accuracy in Experiment 13 compared with the condi- tion (Ms 13.23 vs. 12.42, respectively,t(116) 1.15,p .252, d 0.30). It could also be argued that perspective taking did not reduce egocentrismenoughto measurably improve accuracy. Our experiments suggest otherwise: Explicitly instructing participants 4We also examined whether accuracy was predicted by three variables that yielded interesting results— confidence, response time, and perceived effort. Across Experiments 1–25 there was an overall weak positive rela- tionship between confidence and accuracy. This was true for all three measures of accuracy in Experiments 16-25: mean absolute difference,r .10,CI(.04, .15),Z 3.42,p .001, correlations between predicted and actual responses,r .11,CI(.05, .16),Z 3.64,p .001, and number of correct predictions,r .14,CI(.07, .20),Z 4.11,p .001. None of these correlations differed by condition: mean absolute difference,Q(1) 0.41,p .52, correlations between predicted and actual responses,Q(1) 0.28,p .59, and number of correct predictions,Q(1) 1.96,p .16. In Experiment 1-15, accuracy was weakly predicted by response time, r .08,CI( .16, .01),Z 2.26,p .024, but this relationship between accuracy and response time did not differ by condition,Q(1) 0.16,p .69. Accuracy, however, was not predicted by effort,r .03, CI( .10, .04),Z 0.83,p .41. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 567 PERSPECTIVE MISTAKING to rely on their own perspectives in Experiments 16 –20 and Experiments 22–23 meaningfully increased egocentrism (when measured as absolute difference between predicted and self- responses) relative to control conditions,d 0.64, 95% CI [ 0.94, 0.33],z 4.08,p .001, but did not significantly decrease accuracy (when measured as absolute difference between predicted and actual responses),d 0.09, 95% CI [0.07, 0.25], z 1.08,p .28. Although our experiments do not provide an explanation for why perspective taking sometimesdecreasedac- curacy, they clearly demonstrate that perspective taking does not systematicallyincreaseaccuracy. Of course, it is important to keep these results in perspective. In particular, to measure the accuracy of social judgment, participants in our control conditions also needed to be predicting others’ thoughts, beliefs, or mental states. This means that participants in the control conditions of our experiments were already making inferences about another person’s perspective. Perspective taking could increase the use of accurate information that people already possess about another person when making decisions if they would have overlooked this information otherwise. For instance, perspec- tive taking might increase the likelihood that a politician would consider what he or she already knows about citizen’s attitudes and beliefs before proposing a policy. Such a result would simply reflect an increased accessibility about others’ thoughts and feel- ings while making a decision. Our research suggests that perspec- tive taking would not systematically increase the accuracy of a politician’s inferences about a citizen’s attitudes and beliefs. How perspective taking affects the use of available social knowledge is distinct from how perspective taking affects the accuracy of avail- able social knowledge. Interestingly, the negative effect of perspective taking on accu- racy that we observed was more pronounced for strangers (Exper- iments 18 –21, 23, 24) than for partners in a relationship (Exper- iments 16, 17, 22, 23, 25) when accuracy was measured as absolute differences between predicted and actual responses (Strangers:d 0.20, 95% CI [0.07, 0.34],z 2.89,p .004, Partners:d 0.16, 95% CI [ 0.17, 0.48],z 0.96,p .34). This decrease in accuracy following perspective taking for strangers compared with partners was also apparent, but weaker, when accuracy was measured as the number of predicted correct re- sponses (Strangers:d 0.06, 95% CI [ 0.26, 0.14],z 0.62, p .54, Partners:d 0.05, 95% CI [ 0.47, 0.37],z 0.24, p .81) and as correlations between predicted and actual re- sponses (Strangers:d 0.12, 95% CI [ 0.32, 0.08],z 1.21, p .23, Partners:d 0.10, 95% CI [ 0.31, 0.10],z 0.97, p .33). Thus, the difference between partners and strangers in the effect of perspective taking on accuracy was unreliable. It is worthwhile to note, that for both strangers and close others, we failed to find any evidence that perspective taking systematically increasedinterpersonal accuracy. Our final experiment suggests that there are likely to be much more effective ways of gaining more accurate insight into another person’s mind. In particular, human beings have also evolved a sophisticated language whose primary purpose is to convey the contents of one conscious mind to another (Pinker & Bloom, 1990). Increasing interpersonal understanding may come most readily from becoming a more effective questioner and listener, like a skilled journalist or a survey interviewer, rather than by trying to become a more routine perspective taker. If you want toknow what another person is thinking, it may be best to put them in a situation where they can answer honestly and then ask them directly. This may seem like an obvious solution to increasing interper- sonal insight, but our final experiment found little evidence that this was obvious to the participants who were actually using this strategy. Indeed, the most interesting aspect of Experiment 25 was the notable disconnect between confidence and accuracy. Despite large differences in accuracy that came from using different strat- egies, confidence in judgment did not vary meaningfully across conditions. This is important because it suggests that people may have little insight into which strategies are likely to increase interpersonal understanding and which are not. This result is consistent with a small body of emerging research that finds meaningful misunderstanding of effective versus ineffective strat- egies for improving social cognition. In one experiment (Zhou et al., 2017), participants were asked to guess another person’s emo- tional reactions to an evocative series of images. Participants made their predictions either byreadingthe target’s expression by watching a video of his or her facial expressing, or bybeingin the person’s situation by seeing the image the target was rating. Results indicated that participants were dramatically more accurate when they saw the image the target was rating, and yet participants tended to dramatically overestimate how effectively they could read the target’s expressions. In another experiment (Gilbert, Kill- ingsworth, Eyre, & Wilson, 2009), participants attempted to pre- dict their own emotional experience in an unknown event either by learning about details of the event or by getting another person’s report of his or her experience. Participants tended to believe they would be more accurate if they learned about details of the event, when they were actually more accurate if they got another person’s report of the experience. Each of these three lines of research suggest that people may overestimate the effectiveness of top- down processes of inference for understanding the mind of another person compared with bottom-up process of direct experience or knowledge acquisition. Mistaken expectations about how best to understand the minds of others could lead people to choose inef- fective strategies, thereby increasingmisunderstanding. Learning the cause of these mistaken expectations, and identifying their consequences, are pressing issues for future research. Of course, there are limits to the accuracy that can be gained by trying to get another person’s perspective through bottom-up pro- cesses. Others may not tell the truth or know their own minds, such that self-reports are inaccurate. Emotional reactions to an experi- ence may differ, such that one person’s experience is a poor simulation for another’s experience. Or a simulation may turn out to be a poor proxy for the situation being simulated, such as a sighted person trying to simulate the experience of lifelong blind- ness by walking around a room blindfolded (Silverman, Gwinn, & Van Boven, 2015). No strategy for interpersonal understanding is perfect. The useful comparison standard is therefore not perfec- tion, but rather the accuracy obtained from other available strate- gies, as well as people’s beliefs about the effectiveness of these strategies. Research on both of these comparison standards is currently limited, and offer promising opportunities for future research. When it comes to understanding the mind of others, existing evidence suggests that people may systematically misun- derstand what’s good for them. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 568 EYAL, STEFFEL, AND EPLEY Finally, we believe our experiments may be of practical value to those who are trying to understand the most complicated system any of us will ever think about—another person’s mind—a little bit better. Engaging in active perspective taking appears to have a number of reliable interpersonal consequences: it increases empa- thy for another person, increases the sense of similarity and con- nection to others, and encourages cooperation in negotiations. One recent theoretical model argues that perspective taking’s main benefit, in fact, is to strengthen social bonds (Galinsky et al., 2005). Our experiments are not inconsistent with this perspective. If a person is wanting to feel more connected to another person, then imagining oneself in another’s shoes is likely to be a useful strategy to adopt. But if a person is really trying to gain an accurate understanding of another person’s mind, then another approach seems to be called for. If you really want to know what’s on the mind of another person, it is hard to do better than getting their perspective by just asking them. References Adams, G. S., Flynn, F. J., & Norton, M. I. (2012). 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Journal of Business Ethics (2022) 175:117–133 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-020-04582-6 ORIGINAL PAPER Contesting Dishonesty: When and Why Perspective‑Taking Decreases Ethical Tolerance of Marketplace Deception Guang‑Xin Xie 1 · Hua Chang 2 · Tracy Rank‑Christman 3 Received: 29 November 2019 / Accepted: 16 July 2020 / Published online: 23 July 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020 Abstract Deception is common in the marketplace where individuals pursue self-interests from their perspectives. Extant research suggests that perspective-taking, a cognitive process of putting oneself in other’s situation, increases consumers’ ethical toler – ance for marketers’ deceptive behaviors. By contrast, the current research demonstrates that consumers (as observers) who take the dishonest marketers’ perspective (vs. not) become less tolerant of deception when consumers’ moral self-awareness is high. This eect is driven by moral self-other dierentiation as consumers contemplate deception from the marketers’ perspective: high awareness of the “moral self” motivates consumers to distance themselves from the “immoral other.” The ndings shed new light on how self-morality can vicariously shape social consideration in ethical judgments. Keywords Ethical tolerance · Moral self-awareness · Perspective-taking Introduction Deception is ubiquitous during marketplace interactions among consumers and marketers 1 (Boush et al. 2009). Extant research focuses on dening and characterizing deception in specic functional areas such as advertising and personal selling (e.g., Gardner 1975; Hyman 1990; Xie et al. 2015a, b ), and how consumers respond to marketers’ deceptive per – suasion attempts (e.g., Craig et al. 2012; Darke and Ritchie 2007). From an ethical standpoint, anecdotal evidence suggests that consumers’ tolerance toward marketers’ acts of deception can be inuenced by the social perspective they take (Boush et al. 2009; Ekman 2001). Previous studies have explored various aspects of the consumer’s or the deceiver’s perspective, respectively (e.g., Argo et  al. 2006; Cowley and Anthony 2019; Mazar et al. 2008; Gino and Bazerman 2009; Rotman et al. 2018). However, little is known about whether taking the deceiver’s perspective inuences con- sumer’s ethical tolerance toward marketplace deception. Imagine the following: you sit down with friends, John and Katy, and tell them about your recent experience with a car salesperson. You explain to them that you felt bothered, as the salesperson lied about the invoice price of a car you were interested in buying. Katy says: “Why wouldn’t he just be honest? It doesn’t make sense.” John has an opposite view, “I see where he was coming from. If I was in his shoes, I would probably have done the same thing.” “It’s unethical; I would have been honest if I were him,” Katy adds. This conversation exemplies an intriguing, yet under-researched question: when it comes to judging marketplace deception, why does perspective-taking increase ethical tolerance for some people, but decrease it for others? This research aims to understand better when and why such dierent ethical judgments occur at the individual level. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https ://doi.org/10.1007/s1055 1-020-04582 -6) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. * Guang-Xin Xie [email protected] Hua Chang [email protected] Tracy Rank -Christman [email protected] 1 College of Management, University of Massachusetts Boston, 100 Morrissey Blvd., Boston, MA 02125, USA 2 College of Business and Economics, Towson University, Towson, MD, USA 3 Lubar School of Business, University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, USA 1 In this article, “marketer” is used as a broad term referring to “a person or company that advertises or promotes something” (Lexico 2020), including a seller, a salesperson, or a sales agent. Thus, these terms will be used interchangeably throughout the manuscript. Vol.:(0123456789) 1 3 118 G.-X. Xie et al. Perspective-taking is “the process of imagining the world from another’s vantage point or imagining oneself in anoth- er’s shoes” (Galinsky et al. 2005, p. 110), whereas ethical tolerance refers to the extent to which one considers ethi- cally questionable behaviors acceptable (Ashkanasy et al. 2000 ; Nenkov et al. 2019; Weeks et al. 2005 ). It appears obvious that consumers who take a deceiver’s perspective (vs. not) will be more tolerant, as a wealth of literature has documented that perspective-taking often fosters the under – standing of dierent viewpoints and moderates negative social judgments (for a review, see Ku et al. 2015). How – ever, empirical evidence is scarce. In the literature, only two studies have reported correlational data on the eects of dispositional tendency to take others’ perspectives on one’s perceptions of others’ deceptive behaviors. Cohen (2010) nds that the perspective-taking, as a personality trait, is not signicantly correlated with people’s approval level of using deceitful negotiation tactics. Further, Cojuharenco and Sguera (2015) examine perspective-taking as a personality trait to understand its eect on employees’ acceptability of lying to protect their company’s interest. The ndings show that perspective-taking is negatively correlated with the acceptability of lying among participants who tended to do things quickly and in a hurry at work. In both studies, the research participants were not instructed explicitly to think as observers or actors, although the use of rst- and second- person pronouns (e.g., “intentionally misrepresent informa – tion to your opponent in order to strengthen your negotiating arguments or position;” “at work, I tend to do things fast”) in the questionnaires may have primed them toward think – ing as actors (i.e., negotiators or employees). These ndings suggest that perspective-taking does not necessarily increase ethical tolerance for deception, but it remains unclear as to whether any causal eect of perspective-taking exists, espe- cially beyond the actor’s standpoint. The present research explicitly explores consumer observ – ers’ judgments of marketplace deception, examining the causal eect of perspective-taking on their ethical tolerance and the moderating role of their moral self-awareness. Moral self-awareness is “a mindset informed by reection on moral identity, namely what one’s actions say about oneself given (a) the negative impact on others or society that one’s action may eect, and (b) what one contributes to others and/or society by taking a given action” (Friedland and Cole 2019, p. 196). In theory, people can think of themselves as moral and/or immoral. In line with extant literature, this research focuses on one’s awareness of the moral self, rather than the immoral self, that evokes deontological moral princi- ples (e.g., “it is wrong to act dishonestly”) and/or virtue moral motivation (e.g., “acting honestly is personally fulll- ing”) toward self-actualization (Friedland et al. 2020). For instance, previous work shows that people tend to uphold a sense of moral self in justifying their dishonest behaviors (e.g., Mazar et al. 2008; Mulder and Aquino 2013). In par – ticular, Mazar et al. (2008) nd that people rationalize their inconsequential dishonest behaviors in order to maintain positive self-concepts of being honest, suggesting that moral self-awareness plays an important role in shaping ethical judgments of one’s own deceptive behaviors. It awaits to be examined whether and how moral self-awareness inuences ethical tolerance of marketers’ deceptive behaviors, when people have an opportunity to deliberate about the situation from the marketer’s perspective. As people switch their van – tage points by deliberating the marketer’s situation vicari- ously, it is plausible that a dierent set of social norms can be evoked (Gino and Galinsky 2012). The current research examines whether and how moral self-awareness can shift consumer observers’ ethical judgments in line with their own moral compasses in perspective-taking. In two experiments and one correlational study, this research demonstrates that when consumers observe a mar – keter’s act of deception, taking the marketer’s perspective decreases ethical tolerance, specically when consumers’ moral self-awareness is high. In other words, while observ – ing a marketer’s deceptive behavior, consumers are less ethi- cally tolerant when taking the marketer’s perspective (vs. not) if they are particularly aware of their moral self. Further, the ndings pinpoint an essential aspect of the underlying mechanism, “moral self-other dierentiation,” a psychologi- cal process dened as the extent to which people dierenti- ate themselves from others as a result of perceived conict- ing moral identities (Aquino and Reed II 2002; Berger and Heath 2008). When moral self-awareness is high, consum- ers who take the marketer’s perspective (vs. not) are moti- vated to dierentiate their “moral self” from the “immoral other” to a greater extent. Thus, consumers tend to vicari- ously distance themselves from the marketer by weighing more on moral ramications instead of material gains in the marketer’s situation. The greater extent of moral self-other dierentiation results in harsher ethical judgments, decreas- ing consumers’ ethical tolerance of the marketer’s act of deception. These ndings contribute to three streams of research: ethi- cal judgment, marketplace deception, and perspective-taking. Foremost, the current research proposes and demonstrates the moderating role of moral self-awareness in shaping one’s ethical judgment from beyond his or her own perspective. It provides the rst direct empirical evidence concerning the psy – chological eect of a novel construct, moral self-awareness (Friedland and Cole 2019), in the business ethics literature. This work extends previous research on the eects of self-ori- ented motivations on consumers’ ethical consumption behav – iors (e.g., Hwang and Kim 2018). Interestingly, when con- sidering ethical behavior from the marketer’s vantage point, consumers tend to rely on their own moral compass as elicited by moral self-priming (Study 1 and 3) or behavioral projection 1 3 119 (Study 2). While a vast majority of empirical studies on ethical judgment are derived from one particular type of perspective (for the most recent reviews, see Craft 2013; Lehnert et al. 2015; Sparks and Pan 2010), this research examines ethical tolerance when consumers take marketers’ perspective that can be diagonally dierent from their own. Specically, pre- vious studies (e.g., Gino et al. 2009; Gino and Galinsky 2012) demonstrate one’s own selsh behavior can be inuenced by feeling connected with selsh others when people take others’ perspectives. By contrast, the current work shows that one’s sense of self-morality can vicariously shape the eect of the social component of morality. That is, one’s own moral com- pass can indeed resist social connectedness, and “self-correct” when people feel motivated to dierentiate themselves morally from an unethical other. This occurs when one’s moral self- awareness is indeed moral and particularly high (vs. low) at the moment of taking the other’s perspective. Second, this research expands the current understandings of how consumers respond to marketplace deception. Rather than defensively rejecting a marketer’s deceptive behaviors as prior studies have documented (e.g., Craig et al. 2012; Darke and Ritchie 2007; Xie et al. 2015a, b), consumers are capable of contemplating situational or social norms from dierent viewpoints when taking the marketer’s perspective. Whether consumers are tolerant of such deceptive behaviors, how – ever, depends largely upon the extent to which their moral self-awareness psychologically separates themselves from the marketer. This nding can also have broader implications for understanding moral judgments of deception in other contexts, such as personal interactions, workplace negotiations, and pub- lic aairs. Third, this research reveals a counter-intuitive eect of per – spective-taking on ethical judgments. Prior research suggests that perspective-taking reduces the psychological distance between people with conicting interests or viewpoints (Bat- son et al. 1997; Davis et al. 1996; Galinsky et al. 2005; Gino and Galinsky 2012; Todd and Burgmer 2013). By contrast, this work demonstrates when and why one’s sense of self- morality can separate people psychologically, and thus reverse the otherwise positive perspective-taking eect on ethical tol- erance. The “moral self-other dierentiation” highlighted in this research presents a sharp contrast to the well-documented “self-other overlap,” adding a new perspective on the under – lying mechanisms of perspective-taking, specically when it comes to ethical tolerance of marketplace deception. Theoretical Development Perspectives on Marketplace Deception Marketplace deception is at the core of academic research on marketplace morality, marketing public policy, and consumer protection (Boush et al. 2009; Campbell and Win – terich 2018). From a communication standpoint, deception is “the act of knowingly transmitting a message intended to lead a receiver to false belief or conclusion” (Burgoon et al. 1999, p. 669). For instance, it is deceptive when peo- ple provide online product reviews, stating that they had purchased an item that they had never purchased (Ander – son and Simester 2014). The marketplace is a social context where ethical or moral judgments are particularly relevant to consumers. Marketplace interactions are featured by one’s pursuit of self-interests from exchanges, transactions, or relationships (Campbell and Winterich 2018). Deception in the marketplace is often perceived intentional (Boush et al. 2009), compared to sometimes unintentional decep- tion in other contexts (e.g., social gatherings of friends or strangers). For the deceivers in the marketplace, deception is instrumental in gaining material or psychological benets (Argo et al. 2006; Shalvi 2012). Meanwhile, the marketplace demands certain moral values such as abiding social con- tracts and serving greater goods (Grayson 2014), which can demotivate deceptive behaviors. Thus, conicts or tradeos between self-interest and self-morality often underlie the dierent perspectives on the perceived ethicality of market- place deception (Bhattacharjee et al. 2013; Campbell and Winterich 2018; Kirmani et al. 2017). The consumer research literature on marketplace decep- tion entails two main perspectives: (1) the “deceiver’s” per – spective—how and why consumers themselves act decep- tively (e.g., Anthony and Cowley 2012; Argo and Shiv 2012; Cowley and Anthony 2019; Rotman et al. 2018; Sengupta et al. 2002), and (2) the “target’s” perspective—how and why consumers respond to deceivers who attempt to deceive them or other consumers (e.g., Craig et al. 2012; Darke and Ritchie 2007; Johar 1995). Concerning the “deceiver’s per – spective,” consumers can act dishonestly, while delicately balancing considerations of self-interest and self-morality. For instance, Mazar et al. (2008) demonstrate that consum- ers can lie without deeming themselves as being dishonest, as long as they consider the lies trivial. The authors nd that this eect is driven by “self-concept maintenance,” a theory suggesting that consumers rationalize or justify their acts of dishonesty (i.e., lying or cheating) in order to maintain a moral self-concept. Similarly, Rotman et al. (2018) nd that consumers can lie to demand compensations from harmful companies, while they do not feel immoral. When it comes to consumers as the “target,” extant stud- ies suggest that consumers tend to resent deception and react defensively. Negative repercussions of perceived deception are extensive: consumers are inclined to terminate process- ing marketing messages involving explicit deception (Craig et  al. 2012); they are more likely to hold strongly nega- tive attitudes toward deceptive advertisements (Xie et al. 2015a, b); and they are less likely to consider purchasing Contesting Dishonesty: When and Why Perspective‑Taking Decreases Ethical Tolerance of… 1 3 120 G.-X. Xie et al. from deceptive agents (Barone and Miniard 1999). Elevated distrust underlying such unequivocally negative responses toward a dishonest marketer can spill over to other innocent marketers that do not engage in deception, similar to a nega- tive “halo eect” (Darke and Ritchie 2007). Despite the rich ndings around the consequences of deception, this literature has yet examined how consumers would judge deceptive behaviors ethically when the deceiv – er’s and the target’s perspectives collide. More specically, when consumers take the deceiver’s perspective, do they realize that they themselves might also deceive a target in pursuit of self-interest? Or, do they disassociate themselves from the deceiver by adhering to moral values of being honest? This inquiry expands the current understanding of how consumers cope with conicts between self-interest and self-morality in the marketplace from beyond the tar – get’s or the deceiver’s perspective alone. Based on previous perspective-taking research, the next section discusses the plausible eects regarding what might occur when consumer observers take the deceiver’s perspective. Eects of Perspective‑Taking Perspective-taking is an ability as well as a process. A classic denition of perspective-taking is “the ability to put oneself in the place of others and recognize that other individuals may have points of view dierent from one’s own” (Johnson 1975, p. 241). Over the past four decades, the denition has evolved to be more process-focused, referring to “the active cognitive process of imagining the world from another’s vantage point or imagining oneself in another’s shoes to understand their visual viewpoint, thoughts, motivations, intentions, and/or emotions” (Ku et al. 2015, pp. 94–95). Extant research has documented multiple antecedents and consequences of perspective-taking in a variety of contexts (see Ku et al. 2015 for a review). Individuals’ tendency to think actively from others’ perspectives is contingent upon both personal and situational factors, such as perceiver’s developmental stage (Gjerde et al. 1986), perceiver-target dependency (Wu and Keysar 2007), and perceiver’s power status (Galinsky et  al. 2006). The consequences are pre- dominantly positive, such as eliciting empathy toward oth- ers (Batson et al. 1997), enhancing self-other relationships (Arriaga and Rusbult 1998), and attenuating stereotypes toward others (Laurent and Myers 2011). In the context of marketplace, Mazzocco et al. (2012) nd that perspective- taking can promote consumers to identify temporarily with an out-group, motivating conspicuous consumption. Regarding the mechanisms underlying the perspective- taking eects, the notion of “self-other overlap” and its vari- ants have emerged as a primary cognitive account (Batson et al. 1997; Galinsky et al. 2005; Ku et al. 2015). That is, taking another’s perspective prompts people to associate a greater percentage of self-descriptive traits with others, as if oneself and the other share more similar beliefs, viewpoints, and even identities (Davis et al. 1996). For instance, Galin- sky et al. (2008) nd that perspective-takers rate both posi- tive and negative stereotypic traits of others as being more self-descriptive. Due to incorporating these traits of others in the self, perspective-takers tend to behave in ways that are consistent with stereotypes toward others. Variants of “self- other overlap” include concepts such as “merged identities” (Goldstein and Cialdini 2007), “psychological closeness” (Gino and Galinsky 2012), and “psychological connected- ness” (Todd and Burgmer 2013). Despite some nuances, these concepts converge at the point that perspective-takers are inclined to focus on self-other similarities when they deliberate about situations from others’ vantage points. Despite the vast amount of research around the self-other overlap, a handful of studies suggest that people do not nec- essarily “overlap” with others in perspective-taking (e.g., Lucas et al. 2016; Skorinko and Sinclair 2013; Tarrant et al. 2012). Lucas et al. (2016) show that perspective-taking can reinforce negative judgments of others when people access stereotypes more readily and refrain from associating the self with others. Similarly, Skorinko and Sinclair (2013) dem- onstrate that when an out-group target carries salient (vs. ambiguous) stereotypical traits, out-group biases increase among those observers who engage in perspective-taking. Tarrant et al. (2012) also nd that the perspective-takers who identify highly (vs. not) with their own in-group identities use a greater number of negative traits to describe disad- vantaged others from an out-group. These ndings suggest that perspective-taking can result in “self-other dierentia- tion” rather than “self-other overlap,” driven by perspective- takers’ self-concepts. Extending this stream of research, the current work examines specically how high or low aware- ness of one’s moral self can shape perspective-takers’ ethical tolerance for marketplace deception, as discussed next. Role of Moral Self‑awareness The moral self is a critical component of one’s self-concept regarding how moral people view themselves and relate to others (Aquino and Reed II 2002; Bartels et al. 2014; Darley and Shultz 1990). Prior studies show that people tend to favor those who share the same moral identities with them- selves in evaluating others’ ideas or behaviors (e.g., Liu et al. 2019; Reed II 2004; Sachdeva et al. 2009; Winterich et al. 2009). When it comes to understanding how consumers judge marketplace deception, moral self-awareness becomes a crucial factor to consider, as the previous work on self- awareness in general suggests that “inconsistencies become much more aversive when people direct their attention to the self” (Goukens et al. 2009, p. 682). Vincent et al. (2013) nd that the positive aect facilitates moral disengagement 1 3 121 and promotes dishonest acts; but when one’s self-awareness of morality becomes high, the facilitative eect of positive aect on dishonest acts is mitigated. In this regard, moral self-awareness is a situational mental state reecting the accessibility of one’s moral self-identity, which informs people whether one’s actions are morally right or wrong, and whether others are relatable or not (Friedland and Cole 2019). Once accessible and diagnostic to a situation, the moral self-identity can function as an “egocentric anchor” that guides one’s judgments of others (Bolton and Reed II 2004; Naylor et al. 2011). This anchor then inuences the decision process by directing people to consider how mor – ally similar or dierent others are to the self (Sachdeva et al. 2009). In line with previous research on marketplace deception (e.g., Darke and Ritchie 2007; Xie et al. 2015a, b), the cur – rent work postulates that when observing acts of deception in the marketplace, consumers would, in general, consider deceptive behaviors unethical, inappropriate, unacceptable, or unfair, which indicates low ethical tolerance. When moral self-awareness is low, perspective-taking will increase con- sumers’ ethical tolerance due to “self-other overlap.” That is, when consumer observers take the perspective of the deceiver (vs. not), they tend to justify the dishonest behav – iors to a greater extent, as they would consider the pursuit of self-interest in the deceiver’s position more acceptable and/ or they would probably act similarly as the deceiver does (Gino and Galinsky 2012). Consumers are more likely to feel psychologically connected with the deceiver when tak – ing the deceiver’s perspective. As a result, perspective-tak – ers’ ethical tolerance of marketplace deception will increase. Whereas when one’s moral self-awareness is high, the current work postulates that consumer observers will dis- tance the “moral self” from the “immoral other” to a greater extent when taking the deceiver’s perspective (vs. not). This phenomenon occurs in that people are motivated to maintain or enhance a positive moral self-concept and can do so by comparing themselves to others in a given situation (Argo et al. 2006; Gino and Bazerman 2009; Mazar et al. 2008). Perspective-taking (vs. not) will elicit more deliberation con – cerning the moral wrongness of deception in a deceiver’s sit- uation, which can outweigh one’s social consideration about self-interest from the deceiver’s vantage point. In particular, those perspective-takers who would project acting honestly when in the deceiver’s situation would tolerate deception to a much less extent to maintain or enhance their sense of moral self. Based on this reasoning and consistent with a more gen- eral “egocentric anchoring” mechanism in social judgments (Naylor et al. 2011), the hypothesis 1 (H1) posits that per – spective-takers are less tolerant toward marketers’ deceptive acts when their moral self-awareness is high. Importantly, this hypothesis suggests that moral self-awareness does not simply attenuate the positive eect of perspective-taking on ethical tolerance. Instead, moral self-awareness will reverse the perspective-taking eect toward making harsher ethical judgments on marketplace deception. In short, H1 posits that moral self-awareness moderates the perspective-taking eect on ethical tolerance, as the following: H1 When consumer observers’ moral self-awareness is high (vs. low),  perspective-taking will decrease (vs. increase) ethical tolerance for marketplace deception. Regarding the underlying mechanism, the hypothesis 2 (H2) posits that the conditional eect of perspective-taking on ethical tolerance will be driven by “moral self-other dif- ferentiation.” In the context of taking a dishonest marketer’s perspective, high moral self-awareness will motivate con – sumer observers to distance themselves from the marketer to a greater extent due to a more considerable contrast between the “moral self” and the “immoral other.” Using an anal- ogy, they would project themselves standing on the higher moral ground to maintain or enhance their own sense of being moral. When consumer observers’ moral self-aware- ness is low, taking the marketer’s perspective would make them feel more connected psychologically to the marketer from his or her viewpoint, as reected by a less degree of “moral self-other dierentiation.” By contrast, when con- sumer observers’ moral self-awareness is high, taking the marketer’s perspective would vicariously evoke a sharper contrast between the marketer’s immorality and one’s sense of self-morality. The moral self-awareness, in eect, enacts consumers’ thinking or feeling about their identities as being a moral person. Previous research suggests that when such identities become salient, people become more sensitive to situational cues that are consistent or inconsistent with their identities (e.g., Coleman and Williams 2015; Oyserman 2019; Reed II 2004). People generally prefer to act in ways that they consider consistent with such identities (LeBoeuf et al. 2010; Oyserman 2019) and avoid acting in ways that are inconsistent with such identities (e.g., Berger and Heath 2008; Rank-Christman et al. 2017; Ward and Broniarczyk 2011). In line with this stream of research, the current work postulates when one’s moral self-awareness is high, perspec- tive-taking (vs. not) would make the inconsistency between the “moral self” and the “immoral other” more pronounced, because of the projected conicting moral identities. To resolve the inconsistency, perspective-takers with high moral self-awareness reconrm or reinforce their moral identities with less ethical tolerance for deception. In other words, when perspective-takers with high awareness of the moral self deliberate about a marketer’s deceptive act, they tend to think it is wrong for themselves to deceive, and/or it is personally fullling to be honest, in the marketer’s situation. As a result, they will be more likely to project themselves as being dierent from the dishonest marketer, as reected by Contesting Dishonesty: When and Why Perspective‑Taking Decreases Ethical Tolerance of… 1 3 122 G.-X. Xie et al. a greater degree of moral self-other dierentiation, which in turn decreases ethical tolerance for deception. In short, H2 posits a moderated mediation mechanism explaining why the hypothesized moderated eect of perspective-taking occurs in the context of marketplace deception, as the following: H2 The moderated eect of perspective-taking on ethical tolerance is mediated by moral self-other dierentiation. Figure  1 illustrates the conceptual model that H1 and H2 present. Overview of Empirical Studies Three studies examine the conditional eects of perspec – tive-taking on consumer observers’ ethical tolerance for marketplace deception when their moral self-awareness is high (vs. low). In Study 1, as observers, participants evalu- ated a dishonest salesperson in a personal selling scenario after they took the salesperson’s perspective (vs. not). High moral self-awareness was elicited by priming participants to elaborate on moral values of being honest relating to their personal experiences. Moral self-other dierentiation was measured and tested as a mediator of the hypothesized inter – action between perspective-taking and moral self-awareness. In other words, moral self-other dierentiation was opera – tionalized as perceived “psychological distance” (Gino and Galinsky 2012; Liberman and Trope 2014), as this meas – ure captures how socially dierent participants would feel toward the salesperson as a result of moral concerns in this context. In Study 2, participants not only took the dishon- est salesperson’s perspective, but also indicated what they would do if they were in the salesperson’s situation. This unique design elicited perspective-takers’ moral self-aware- ness distinctively from Study 1 and specically measured the extent to which the participant would act honestly if they were in the salesperson’s situation. Study 3 presented a dif- ferent context using a dishonest online seller. Participants again were instructed to take the seller’s perspective (vs. not) experimentally. In this study, moral self-awareness was manipulated dierently from that in Study 1, by priming participants to elaborate on their personal experiences of acting honestly. Study 1: “The Moral Self ” vs. “The Immoral Other” The purpose of Study 1 was to test the moderated eect of perspective-taking on ethical tolerance when moral self-awareness is high (vs. low). Study 1 also examined the underlying mechanism driven by moral self-other dierentiation. Sample, Design, and Procedure One hundred and sixty participants (55 females, M age = 36.2) from Amazon Mechanical Turk (M-Turk) participated in an online experiment in exchange for a small monetary sum. 2 The experiment employed a 2 (perspective-taking vs. con- trol) × 2 (high vs. low moral self-awareness) randomized between-subjects design. First, participants completed a moral self-awareness priming (vs. neutral) task by typing three morality-laden (vs. morality-neutral) sentences in the given space of the online questionnaire: “no legacy is so rich as honesty,” “honesty is the rst chapter in the book of wisdom,” and “honesty is the best policy” (vs. “there’s no place like home,” “soccer is the rst sport that many American children play,” and “summer is the best time”). 3 All participants were instructed to think about what these sentences meant to them. Then, they all wrote a short story about themselves reecting on these sen – tences (inspired by Sachdeva et al. 2009). The instructions were: “In the space below, please write a short story (less than 100 words) about yourself reecting on ALL of these sentences. Your story can be ctional. Please visualize the story and how it relates to your characteristics.” The moral self-awareness priming (vs. neutral) task described above was tested in an independent pretest on its ecacy in increasing one’s awareness of moral self. One hundred and seventy-two participants from M-Turk (71 females, M age = 35.7) participated in an online experi- ment in exchange for a small monetary sum. They were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (i.e., high vs. low moral self-awareness). After completing the priming (vs. neutral) task, participants indicated their moral self- awareness on the following three-item scale (adapted from Fig. 1 Conceptual model 2 The compensation amounts and median durations of all studies are available in Web Appendix W4. 3 Twenty-one participants did not follow the priming or neutral instructions by typing three sentences as instructed. Responses from those participants who followed the instructions (n = 139; 50 females, M age = 36.9) were used for data analysis. 1 3 123 Vincent et al. 2013): “At this moment, I am aware of my own morals;” “I am reecting on my own moral self;” and “I am attentive to how moral I am as a person” (1 = com- pletely disagree, 7 = completely agree). The scale was uni- dimensional and highly reliable (α = 0.90). Results from a one-way ANOVA suggest that the priming task was highly eective in increasing moral self-awareness (M priming = 6.06, SD = 1.03) relative to the neutral task (M neutral = 5.22, SD = 1.44), F (1,170) = 18.78, p < 0.001. In the main study, participants then read a vignette describing a situation about a car salesperson (see Web Appendix W1). In the scenario, the salesperson tells a customer that the margin of a chosen car is $500. The customer nds out that the true margin is $800, and that the salesperson lied by $300. Participants were instructed to imagine watching the situation as observers and to take the salesperson’s perspective: “While reading the scenario as an observer, please take the perspective of the sales- person. Imagine, if you will, walking in the salesperson’s shoes and thinking as the salesperson would while reading the scenario” (adapted from Galinsky et al. 2008). Partici- pants in the control condition read the vignette without the perspective-taking instruction. After reading the vignette, participants in the perspec- tive-taking condition were reminded to take the sales- person’s perspective. Those participants in the control condition were not given this reminder. All participants then completed a thought-listing task by typing out their thoughts about the salesperson. The combination of the perspective-taking instruction (vs. control), the reminder (vs. control), and the thought-listing task manipulated the degree to which participants took the salesperson’s perspective. Participants then evaluated the salesperson’s dishon – est behavior on a four-item scale: “ethical,” “acceptable,” “appropriate,” “fair” (1 = denitely not, 7 = denitely yes). These items reected key dimensions of ethical tolerance as documented in the previous studies, including “perceived fairness” (Lee et al. 2018), “acceptability” (Gino and Bazer – man 2009), “perceived ethicality” (Ashkanasy et al. 2000), and “appropriateness” (Cohen 2010). The scale was unidi- mensional and highly reliable (α = 0.96). The average rat- ing was calculated to create a measure of ethical tolerance. Participants also indicated the degree of “moral self-other dierentiation.” The hypothesized mediator was measured by the perceived psychological distance between oneself and the salesperson on a 3-item scale: “similar,” “related,” and “psychologically close” (1 = not at all, 7 = to a great extent; adapted from Gino and Galinsky 2012). This scale was unidimensional and highly reliable (α = 0.95). In addition, participants reported the extent to which they took the sales- person’s perspective (1 = denitely not, 7 = denitely yes). Basic demographics (e.g., age, gender) were also collected. Results As a manipulation check, results from a one-way ANOVA show that the participants in the perspective-taking condi – tion ( M = 6.14, SD = 1.17) took the salesperson’s perspective to a signicantly greater extent than those in the control con- dition (M = 4.43, SD = 1.83), F (1,137) = 43.33, p < 0.001. A 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA on ethical tolerance reveals a marginally signicant main eect for moral self- awareness, F (1,135) = 3.43, p = 0.07. The main eect of perspective-taking was not signicant, F (1,135) = 0.74, p = 0.39. As expected, the interaction between the two was significant, F (1,135) = 14.00, p < 0.001. Further contrasts show that in the low moral self-awareness con- dition, perspective-taking increased ethical tolerance ( M perspective-taking = 4.13, SD = 1.82 vs. M control = 2.86, SD = 1.55), F (1,70) = 9.77, p < 0.01. In the high moral self-awareness condition, perspective-taking decreased ethical tolerance (M perspective-taking = 2.59, SD = 1.23 vs. M control = 3.38, SD = 1.65), F (1,65) = − 4.63, p = 0.04. H1 was supported. Figure  2 illustrates the interaction. A moderated mediation model was tested to predict ethical tolerance following Hayes’ PROCESS procedure ( 2018, version 3.4; Model 7) with 5,000 bootstrap samples. Perspective-taking (binary: perspective-taking = 1 and con- trol = 0, manipulated) was tested as the predictor, and moral self-other dierentiation (continuous; measured) was tested as the mediator. Moral self-awareness (binary: moral self- awareness high = 1 and low = 0; manipulated) was tested as a moderator of the eect of perspective-taking on moral self- other dierentiation, which in turn aects ethical tolerance. The results show that the interaction between perspective- taking and moral self-awareness on moral self-other dier – entiation was signicant (β = − 2.29, se = 0.55, p < 0.001). Moral self-other differentiation was also a significant 2.59 4.13 3.38 2.86 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 High Moral Self-Awarenes sLow Moral Self-Awareness Perspec ve-takingControl Fig. 2 Study 1: ethical tolerance as a function of perspective-taking and moral self-awareness Contesting Dishonesty: When and Why Perspective‑Taking Decreases Ethical Tolerance of… 1 3 124 G.-X. Xie et al. predictor of ethical tolerance (β = 0.59, se = 0.07, p < 0.001). As expected, the hypothesized moderated mediation eect was supported (95% LLCI = − 2.09 to ULCI = − 0.71, excluding zero). Specically, in the low moral self-aware- ness condition, perspective-taking was a signicant predictor of moral self-other dierentiation, t (70) = − 4.05, p < 0.001 (95% LLCI = − 2.31 to ULCC = − 0.80, excluding zero). The mediation pathway from perspective-taking to ethical toler – ance via moral self-other dierentiation was signicant (95% LLCI = − 1.43 to ULCI = − 0.49, excluding zero). Whereas in the high moral self-awareness condition, perspective-tak – ing was a marginally signicant predictor of moral self-other dierentiation in an opposite direction, t (65) = 1.84, p = 0.07 (95% LLCI = − 0.06 to ULCC = 1.52, including zero). The mediation pathway from perspective-taking to ethical toler – ance via moral self-other dierentiation was not signicant (95% LLCI = − 0.01 to ULCI = 0.91, including zero). Discussion The ndings from Study 1 provide initial evidence support- ing H1, showing that when observers’ moral self-awareness is high (vs. low), perspective-taking decreases ethical toler – ance of marketplace deception. In the context of observing a dishonest car salesperson, the perspective-taking eect was conditional, depending upon one’s moral self-awareness. These ndings also support H2, showing that the conditional eect is partially due to a greater extent of moral self-other dierentiation, as reected by the greater psychological dis- tance between the self and a dishonest salesperson. When moral self-awareness is high, perspective-takers dieren- tiate themselves further from the dishonest salesperson to uphold a sense of moral self. It is worthy to note that in this study, perspective-taking and moral self-awareness were manipulated experimentally. As suggested by the experimental research paradigm, the random assignment of research participants to each of the experimental conditions ensured that the potential eect of any individual dierences (i.e., perspective-taking trait and moral self-awareness) was controlled (Calder et al. 1981; Campbell and Stanley 1966; Cook and Campbell 1975; Gilovich et  al. 2006; Howell 2002). To ensure the ndings from Study 1 were robust, Study 2 employed a unique design to replicate the perspec- tive-taking eect when moral self-awareness was high or low. Study 2 also measured and tested the dispositional dif- ference in perspective-taking as a personality trait variable. Study 2: Vicarious (Dis)Honesty The purpose of Study 2 was to test the eect of moral self- awareness in perspective-taking with a more naturalistic approach beyond experimental manipulation. In the same context of observing a dishonest salesperson as that in Study 1, participants took the salesperson’s perspective and indi- cated how they themselves would act in the salesperson’s situation. The self-reported vicarious honesty (or dishon- esty) indicated the extent of moral self-awareness concep- tually so that perspective-takers who projected themselves acting honestly (vs. not) would have evoked higher moral self-awareness. Sample, Design, and Procedure Two hundred M-Turk participants (88 females, M age = 35.7) participated in an online study in exchange for a small mon- etary sum. Participants read the same vignette from Study 1, which described a personal selling situation about a car salesperson. In the scenario, the salesperson tells a customer that the margin of a chosen car is $500. The customer nds out that the true margin is $800 and that the salesperson lied by $300. Participants were instructed to imagine watching the situation as observers and take the salesperson’s perspec- tive. After reading the vignette, participants were reminded to take the salesperson’s perspective. Importantly, partici- pants then were asked to indicate a specic margin that they would have told the customer if participants were in the salesperson’s position: “what would you tell Jamie about the margin in the salesperson’s position (in $ amount), consider – ing that the salesperson says the margin is $500 when in fact it is $800?” This “vicarious (dis)honesty” task elicited moral self-awareness by having participants contemplate the extent to which they would have acted honestly in the salesperson’s situation. The task ecacy was tested in an independent pretest to ensure that moral self-awareness was higher for those participants who indicated they would act honestly, compared to those who would act dishonestly. One hundred and twenty participants from M-Turk (46 females, M age = 34.5) took part in an online pretest in exchange for a small monetary sum. They followed the exact task procedure as in the main study. After reading the scenario and reporting how honest they would act in the salesperson’s situation, participants completed a moral self-awareness scale using the same three items from Study 1. Again, the scale was both unidimensional and reliable ( α = 0.80). One-way ANOVA revealed a signicant dif- ference in moral self-awareness for those participants who would act honestly (n = 39) compared to those who would act dishonestly (n = 81). Moral self-awareness was significantly higher among “honest perspective-takers” ( M honest = 5.96, SD = 1.29) than “dishonest perspective-tak – ers” (M dishonest = 5.50, SD = 1.04), F (1,118) = 4.26, p = 0.04. In the main study, participants reported their ethical tolerance of salesperson’s dishonest behavior on the same four-item scale as that in Study 1 (unidimensional; α = 0.95). Participants also reported the extent to which they had taken 1 3 125 the salesperson’s perspective (1 = denitely not, 7 = de- nitely yes), indicating the degree of perspective-taking in the situation (i.e., “perspective-taking”). Further, given that previous research shows that perspective-taking, as a per – sonality trait, may inuence ethical judgments of deception (Cohen 2010; Cojuharenco and Sguera 2015), participants completed the perspective-taking trait scale assessing their tendencies to spontaneously adopt the point of view of oth- ers (i.e., “perspective-taking trait,” Davis 1983) toward the end of the study. This scale included six items 4 including “I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision;” and “when I’m upset at someone, I usu- ally try to ‘put myself in his shoes’ for a while” (1 = does not describe me at all, 7 = describes me very well). The scale was unidimensional and highly reliable (α = 0.84). The aver- age ratings were used to calculate a perspective-taking trait measure, which accounted for participants’ dispositional ten – dencies to engage in perspective-taking while following the perspective-taking instructions. Basic demographics (e.g., age, gender) were also collected. Results Regarding the margins that participants would tell the cus- tomer if they were in the salesperson’s position, all par- ticipants reported numbers no greater than $800. These numbers met the premise that a salesperson should not tell customers a margin higher than the actual one, suggesting that participants followed the instructions and projected rea- sonable acts in the salesperson’s situation. The degree of their projected act of (dis) honesty was calculated, subtract- ing the self-reported margin from the true margin $800. In eect, the less participants would have lied to the customer in the salesperson’s situation, the more projected honesty they could have demonstrated. In total, eighty-four participants (42%) indicated they would have told the customer the true margin $800, suggest – ing that they would have acted honestly in the salesperson’s situation. The other one hundred and sixteen participants (58%) reported a value ranging from $300 to $800, suggest- ing that they would have been dishonest to some extent if they were in the salesperson’s situation. Accordingly, two linear regression tests were performed (see Web Appendix W2): the rst examined how “perspective-taking” and the “perspective-taking trait” would impact ethical tolerance among those “honest perspective-takers”(i.e., high moral self-awareness), and the second examined how these two variables would impact ethical tolerance among those “dis- honest perspective-takers”(i.e., low moral self-awareness), as illustrated next. Those participants who indicated that they would tell the customer the true margin were identied as “honest perspec- tive-takers” ( n = 84). These “honest” participants were con – ceptually equivalent to those participants in the high moral self-awareness condition in Study 1, as the pretest results suggested. The rst linear regression model (Model 1) was tested with “ethical tolerance” as the dependent measure, and “perspective-taking” and “perspective-taking trait” as the predictors for the “honest perspective-takers.” The standard coecient test results show that perspective-taking was a signicant predictor of ethical tolerance (β = − 0.22, p = 0.05). The more these “honest” participants would take the salesperson’s perspective, the less tolerant they were of the salesperson’s act of deception. The “perspective-taking trait” was not a signicant predictor of ethical tolerance ( β = − 0.09, p = 0.44). In contrast, those participants who would not tell the customer the true margin were identi- ed as “dishonest perspective-takers” (n = 115). The second linear regression model (Model 2) was tested with “ethical tolerance” as the dependent measure, and “perspective-tak – ing” and “perspective-taking trait” as the predictors for the “dishonest perspective-takers.” The standard coecient test results show that perspective-taking (β = − 0.06, p = 0.54) and the “perspective-taking trait” (β = 0.10, p = 0.31) were not signicant predictors of ethical tolerance. Discussion Study 2 provides further evidence that perspective-taking can reduce ethical tolerance of a salesperson’s deceptive act, specically for those consumer observers who would have acted honestly if they were in the salesperson’s situation. Conceptually, the vicarious sense of acting honestly (vs. dishonestly) serves as a proxy of high (vs. low) awareness of moral self. The pretest results supported that when per – spective-takers projected acting honestly (vs. dishonestly), their moral self-awareness was indeed signicantly higher. Consistent with Study 1, Study 2 results show that the more participants took the dishonest salesperson’s perspective, the less ethically tolerant they were, when their moral self- awareness was high. It is worth noting that the specic context used in Study 1 and Study 2 may have elicited negative stereotypical views against car salespersons that made it relatively easy to dif- ferentiate the “moral self” from the “immoral other” in per – spective-taking. Past research suggests that negative stereo- typical defaults often result in “convenient” social judgments when people are engaged in perspective-taking (Galinsky et al. 2003). Study 3 addressed this potential “convenience” 4 The original perspective-taking trait scale has seven items. In this study, participants rated all seven items. One item, “If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other peo- ple’s argument,” did not t well with our research context, and it was inconsistent with the other six items and would signicantly reduce the scale reliability to 0.53. Thus, it was excluded from the analysis. Contesting Dishonesty: When and Why Perspective‑Taking Decreases Ethical Tolerance of… 1 3 126 G.-X. Xie et al. bias by testing the generalizability of the moderated eect of perspective-taking in a dierent scenario. Instead of involv – ing a car salesperson, Study 3 introduced participants to an online seller who was not identied as a professional sales- person. In addition, previous research suggests that “ration- alization,” a cognitive process where people can rational- ize deceptive behaviors by referring to situational factors such as marketplace norms (e.g., Mazar et al. 2008), could contribute to lower moral self-awareness. In Study 3, the potential eect of rationalization on ethical tolerance was measured and controlled for empirically. Study 3: The Dishonest Online Seller The purpose of Study 3 was to test whether the moderated eect of perspective-taking on ethical tolerance could be replicated beyond the context of Studies 1 and 2. Study 3 also used a dierent priming technique to ensure the moral self-awareness manipulation could be replicated conceptu- ally beyond one specic priming method. In Study 3, an ordinary person reselling a product was used in place of a car salesperson to avoid stereotype-based ethical judgments from taking the seller’s perspective. Finally, Study 3 meas- ured and explored the potential eect of “rationalization” as a covariate. Sample, Design, and Procedure Four hundred and four participants (205 females, M age = 34.5) from M-Turk took part in this online experi- ment in exchange for a small monetary sum. The experi- ment employed a randomized 2 (perspective-taking vs. control) × 2 (high vs. low moral self-awareness) between- subjects design. First, participants in high moral self-awareness condition completed a priming task, deliberating about how they dem- onstrate their honesty to others: “Please think about a point in time when you were being, are being, or will be honest to others. For the next few minutes, think about the ways you would show someone else that you are being honest. Please list at least 3 (and up to 10) things that you would do to demonstrate your honesty” (inspired by Sachdeva et al. 2009). All participants in the high moral-awareness condi- tion typed in at least three pieces of reasonable narratives to demonstrate their honesty. Those participants in the low moral self-awareness condition were not given this priming task. The priming task (vs. no priming) was pretested to exam- ine its ecacy in manipulating moral self-awareness. One hundred and twenty-seven participants from a public uni- versity in the U.S. (73 females, M age = 23.0) took part in this online experiment in exchange for partial course credit. They were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (i.e., prim- ing vs. no priming). After completing the priming task (vs. not), participants completed the same moral self-awareness scale used in Studies 1 and 2 (unidimensional; α = 0.88). Results from a one-way ANOVA suggest that participants’ moral self-awareness was signicantly higher in the prim – ing condition (M priming = 5.87, SD = 0.95) when compared to the no-priming condition ( M no priming = 5.43, SD = 1.27), F (1,125) = 4.90, p = 0.03. In the main study, all participants then were instructed to read a vignette describing a seller representing an ordinary person (see Web Appendix W3). In the scenario, the seller posts an online ad for a used bike. In the ad, the seller lies about the original purchase price. As in Studies 1 and 2, participants were instructed to imagine watching the situa- tion as observers. Those in the perspective-taking condition were instructed to take the salesperson’s perspective: “While reading the scenario as an observer, please take the perspec- tive of the salesperson. Imagine, if you will, walking in the salesperson’s shoes and thinking as the salesperson would while reading the scenario” (adapted from Galinsky et al. 2008). Participants in the control condition were not given this perspective-taking instruction. Ethical tolerance and perspective-taking measures remained the same as those used in Studies 1 and 2. The scale of ethical tolerance was unidimensional and highly reliable (α = 0.97). In addition, Study 3 included a measure about the extent to which participants rationalized the sell- er’s behavior: “The seller added other costs (e.g., sales tax) when posting the purchase price of the bicycle” (1 = de- nitely not, 7 = denitely yes; referred to as “rationalization” hereafter). This measure was tested as a covariate to control the potential eect of rationalization. Basic demographics (e.g., age, gender) were also collected. Results As a manipulation check, those in the perspective-taking condition ( M perspecive-taking = 6.11, SD = 1.32) took the sales – person’s perspective to a signicantly greater extent than those in the control condition (M control = 4.71, SD = 1.76), t (402) = 8.99, p < 0.001. A 2 × 2 between-subjects ANCOVA was conducted on ethical tolerance, treating “rationalization” as a covariate. The results show that the main eect of perspective-tak – ing was not signicant (F (1,399) = 0.55, p = 0.46). Nei- ther was the main eect of moral self-awareness priming ( F (1,399) = 0.06, p = 0.81). The covariate “rationaliza – tion” was a signicant predictor of ethical tolerance (F (1,399) = 90.61, p < 0.001). As expected, the interaction between moral self-awareness and perspective-taking was also signicant, F (1,399) = 4.65, p = 0.03. It is noteworthy 1 3 127 that without the covariate, the interaction remained signi- cant, F (1,400) = 5.64, p = 0.02. In the low moral self-awareness condition, the one-way ANOVA results show that participants’ ethical tolerance was signicantly higher in the perspective-taking condi- tion (M perspecive-taking = 4.19, SD = 1.63) relative to the con- trol condition (M control = 3.73, SD = 1.66), F (1,224) = 4.38, p = 0.04. Interestingly, when controlling the eect of ration- alization as a covariate in one-way ANCOVA, the eect of perspective-taking on ethical tolerance was no longer sig- nicant, F (1,223) = 0.86, p = 0.36. In the high moral self-awareness condition, the one-way ANCOVA results show that participants’ ethical tolerance was marginally lower in the perspective-taking condition ( M perspecive-taking = 3.87, SD = 1.38) relative to the control condition (M control = 4.18, SD = 1.41), F (1,175) = 3.47, p = 0.06, while the eect of rationalization was signicant as a covariate, F (1,175) = 27.32, p < 0.001. Without control- ling the eect of rationalization as a covariate in one-way ANOVA, the eect of perspective-taking on ethical toler – ance was no longer signicant, F (1,176) = 1.73, p = 0.19. Figure  3 illustrates the interaction. Discussion Study 3 provides further support to the hypothesis that when consumer observers’ moral self-awareness is high (vs. low), perspective-taking decreases ethical tolerance for market- place deception. In a context where consumers observe an ordinary person (instead of a car salesperson) reselling a product, the ndings replicated the moderation role of moral self-awareness in shaping the eect of perspective-taking. When moral self-awareness was low, perspective-taking increased consumers’ ethical tolerance. When moral self- awareness was high, however, the perspective-taking eect on ethical tolerance was reversed. The reversed eect of perspective-taking could not be attributed to the context- specic factor involving stereotypes against car salespersons as in Studies 1 and 2. Further, it is evident that rationalization played a signi- cant role in aecting ethical tolerance in relation to perspec- tive-taking and moral self-awareness. In the low moral self- awareness conditions, rationalization appeared to account for the positive eect of perspective-taking by eliciting a greater extent of tolerance. In the high moral self-awareness conditions, the reversed eect of perspective-taking became signicant when rationalization was controlled statistically, suggesting that perspective-takers were inclined to contest rather than tolerate deception. General Discussion In three studies, the current research proposes and demon- strates that moral self-awareness can reverse the otherwise positive perspective-taking eect on consumer observers’ ethical tolerance for marketplace deception. Study 1 shows that perspective-taking decreases, rather than increases, con- sumers’ ethical tolerance when their moral self-awareness is high. This eect is mediated by moral self-other dieren- tiation, specically when consumers contemplate about the situation from the dishonest salesperson’s perspective. Study 2 replicates the reversed perspective-taking eect by exam- ining how consumer observers would project themselves to act from a salesperson’s standpoint. Consumers are less ethi- cally tolerant toward a marketer’s act of deception among those who have indicated that they would act honestly (i.e., high moral self-awareness) if they were in the marketer’s situation. Study 3 replicates the moderated eect of perspec- tive-taking in a dierent marketplace context, using a dier – ent method to manipulate heightened moral self-awareness. Together, these ndings showcase the generalizability of the reversed perspective-taking eect on ethical tolerance when consumers observers’ moral self-awareness is high. Contributions Foremost, this current research is the rst of its kind that experimentally manipulates and measures the novel con – struct moral self-awareness (Friedland and Cole 2019 ) in the business ethics literature. Extending previous studies on how self-oriented motivations drive ethical consumption behaviors (e.g., Hwang and Kim 2018 ), ndings from the three studies provide unique insights on the moderating role of moral self-awareness in shaping ethical judgment beyond one’s own vantage point. Moral self-awareness vicariously elicits not only rule-based moral reasoning (i.e., “deontol- ogy”) but also moral motivations toward self-actualization 3.87 4.19 4.18 3.73 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 High Moral Self-Awarenes sLow Moral Self-Awareness Perspec ve-takingControl Fig. 3 Study 3: ethical tolerance as a function of perspective-taking and moral self-awareness Contesting Dishonesty: When and Why Perspective‑Taking Decreases Ethical Tolerance of… 1 3 128 G.-X. Xie et al. (i.e., “virtue theory”). According to Friedland et al. (2020), “deontology is etymologically dened as the logic of duty. This means that what is good is taken to be a matter of strict rule-based principle and not of consequences” (pp. 3–4). By contrast, “virtue theory conceptualizes the Good as a natural developmental function of all living things. As such, it is dened psychologically as that at which all things aim, namely, self-actualization” (p. 5). Friedland et al. (2020) nd that these two lines of moral reasoning are signicantly overlapped as “Deontology-Virtue” (p. 17), as demonstrated by the convergence of four empirical measures of people’s tendency in making moral judgment: I try to never break any moral rules, I try to think and act logically in every situation, when I choose to act ethically, I am also choos- ing to become a better person, and acting ethically is more personally fullling to me than acting unethically (p. 17). The “Deontology-Virtue” overlapping makes it possible for perspective-takers with high moral self-awareness to evoke either of or both lines of moral judgment when in the mar – ketplace. That is, moral reasoning driven by deontology would center on essential moral rules such as “it is morally wrong to act dishonestly.” While moral reasoning driven by self-actualization (i.e., virtue theory) would center on fullling one’s personal goals of being honest such as “I would be honest if I were in the marketer’s situation because acting honestly is personally fullling to me.” In this regard, the current work extends the research streams on moral self in the literature by revealing the role of a novel construct, moral self-awareness, compared to previously documented constructs such as “self-focused attention” (e.g., Wickland 1975; Gibbons 1990), “self-concept maintenance” (e.g., Mazar et al. 2008), and “self-consciousness” (e.g., Gouk – ens, et al. 2009). More specically, the principle of deontology posits that perceived morality of one’s action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action (Conway and Gawronski 2013; Darley and Shultz 1990). Prior research shows that people tend to perceive deception as inherently wrong and react negatively regardless of harmful consequences (Shu et al. 2011; Xie et  al. 2015a , b). This research shows that when taking a deceiver’s perspective, consumers’ ethical judgments can diverge as a result of their own moral compass. When moral self-awareness is high, ethical judgments tend to be consist- ent with the deontological principle to a greater extent. That is, when considering ethicality from a dishonest marketer’s vantage point, consumers can refer to one’s own moral self as a benchmark. The sense of being an honest person has moral implications that go beyond one’s own perspective and apply in a projected situation. Therefore, deontologi- cal ethical judgment can be inherently conditional, and it is imperative to consider the role of one’s moral self and its eects. It is important to note that the deontology and virtue-theory lines of moral reasoning can be inherently intertwined (Friedland et al. 2020). Perspective-takers can reason along deontological and/or virtue-theoretical lines when making ethical judgments regarding a dishonest mar – keter, specically when their sense of the moral self is high. The reversed eect of perspective-taking on ethical tolerance can be attributed to vicarious rule-based moral reasoning and/or heightened motivation to act toward self-actualization (Friedland et al. 2020). That is, perspective-takers with high moral self-awareness may apply the rule of honesty and/ or feel motivated to act honestly in the marketer’s station, which increases moral self-other dierentiation, which in turn, decreases ethical tolerance for deception. Second, the ndings from this research shed new light on consumer responses to marketplace deception when deceiver- and target’s perspectives collide. Marketplace is an important social context to study deceptive behaviors and tolerance toward deception, especially from an ethical standpoint. In marketplace interactions, deception is often intentional, consequential, and morality-laden (Boush et al. 2009). In general, the marketplace exchanges require a cer – tain level of trust between buyers and sellers to complete transactions. Consumers understand that honesty is essen- tial for building trust toward mutually benecial transac- tions. Thus, the norm of honesty provides an easy-to-access heuristic for consumers to make a quick ethical judgment about dishonest sellers. Most studies in the literature suggest that consumers naturally guard themselves against decep- tive practices, which is driven by such heuristic processing (e.g., Darke and Ritchie 2007). The present research shows a less intuitive type of response. When consumers take a dishonest marketer’s perspective, they can go through either a heuristic process based on one’s self-morality, or a sys – temic process weighing self-morality and self-interest from another vantage point. Consumer responses to deception are contingent upon how they themselves resolve potential con- icts as a result of dierent social perspectives. In that sense, the present work reveals more nuanced understandings of the circumstances under which consumer judgments of market- place deception are based on more systematic rather than heuristic processing. Indeed, the ndings from this work may have broader implications for understanding one’s ethical judgment of deception beyond the context of marketplace. For example, during workplace interactions or negotiations, when manag- ers act dishonestly, employee’s moral/ethical judgments can vary signicantly. In a similar vein, the general public is constantly exposed to news that politicians, celebrities, and inuencers engage in deceptive behaviors. While some peo- ple choose to tolerate deception via perspective-taking, some others may choose to resist deception to a greater extent, depending upon their high or low moral self-awareness. Third, this research contributes to the perspective-tak – ing literature by revealing a novel eect driven by “moral 1 3 129 self-other dierentiation.” Prior studies use primarily “self- other overlap” (or its conceptual variants) to explain the positive eects of perspective-taking on interpersonal or social judgments (e.g., Ames et al. 2008; Davis et al. 1996). In contrast, the present research nds that perspective-takers can indeed dissociate the self from others when their moral self-awareness is high. These ndings are one of the rst to provide empirical evidence that consumers can distance themselves from deceivers without engaging the projected act of deception. Such “moral self-other dierentiation” is clearly distinguishable from “egocentric bias” (Hattula et al. 2015) or “egocentric anchoring” (Epley et al. 2004; Sassen- rath et al. 2014) in the literature, as moral self-other dier – entiation requires a relatively more deliberate cognitive pro- cess; one that evokes individuals to consider the complexity of other’s situations beyond egocentrism. In fact, it requires observers to make a vicarious trade-o choosing between, or balancing, projected self-interest and self-morality. A notable theoretical implication of “moral self-other dierentiation” is about two types of perspective-taking: “elaborative” vs. “intuitive.” Perspective-taking is inherently cognitive demanding and thus often requires an elaborative process. For instance, Yeomans (2019) nds that consumer recommenders enjoyed themselves less when they had to take their recipients’ perspective, because they understood that the recipients’ tastes were often dierent from their own. However, the perspective-taking manipulations in many prior studies may have unintentionally encouraged participants to engage in an automatic, less thoughtful, and pro-target “intuitive” process. A classic example can be seen with typical perspective-taking manipulations, which often ask research participants to “put yourself into his or her shoes.” The semantics of such instructions appear to prime participants to align their stances with the others in the rst place. When the perspective-taking manipulation encourages participants to engage in more elaborative think – ing, by contrast, it appears that the eects of perspective- taking become more complicated (e.g., Epley et al. 2004; Trötschel et al. 2011). For instance, Trötschel et al. (2011, p. 775) instructed participants during personal negotiations to “focus on other party’s perspective, such as the other party’s intention and interests in the negotiation.” Perspective-takers were more likely to exchange concessions on low- versus high-preference issues by identifying the potential of inte- grative gains (i.e., mutually benecial). This current work demonstrates that perspective-taking eects can result from a more elaborative process, when participants contemplated what they would do in the other’s situation (Study 2). More – over, in Studies 1 and 3, when moral self-awareness was high (vs. low), taking other’s perspective entailed making a more elaborative trade-o between self-interest and self-morality. Combined, these ndings suggest that perspective-taking can involve a deliberate type of moral reasoning, which enriches process-based moral judgment models beyond one’s own vantage point (e.g., Bartels et al. 2014; Conway and Gawronski 2013). Limitations and Future Research This research focuses on ethical tolerance of observers who take a deceiver’s perspective. In line with prior studies docu- menting the dierence between observers and actors (Hung and Mukhopadhyay 2012), it is plausible that the perspec- tive-taking eect on ethical tolerance diers when consum- ers are the “targets” of deceptive behaviors (i.e., buyer or customer). As the example at the beginning of the introduc- tion illustrates, a customer who has been deceived can be more emotional in response to deceptive behaviors. There- fore, the customer may access such “hot cognitions” that moderate the perspective-taking eects on ethical tolerance. Future research should explore the role of elicited emotions to understand better how being a victim of deception versus an observer of deception impacts responses to ethical toler – ance. Moreover, it is noteworthy that participants’ role as a customer or observer may have also inuenced participant’s cognitive busyness (Campbell and Kirmani 2000, Study 1), which suggests another direction for future research in line with a cognitive account. Future research can also explore the dynamics of in-group vs. out-group identities between perspective-takers and deceivers. Previous research suggests that people are pro- tective of their in-group’s identity as moral when faced with a dishonest or immoral out-group member (e.g., Gino et al. 2009; Tarrant et al. 2012). For instance, in Experiment 1 of Gino et al. (2009, p. 396), research participants’ act of cheat- ing was highest in the in-group-identity condition, when par – ticipants presumably shared the same university aliation with a study confederate. When the confederate appeared to be from another local university (i.e., an out-group other), by contrast, participants’ act of cheating was signicantly lower. Due to in-group vs. out-group identity’s plausible interaction with moral self-awareness, future research should explore how social identity (e.g., group membership) inu- ences perspective-takers’ ethical judgments. It is also worth considering how more nuanced aspects of an individual’s personal identity impact the eect of per – spective-taking as well as the process of moral self-other dierentiation. That is, how do perspective-takers respond to others’ moral misconducts, when specic aspects of their identities are salient when they take the other’s perspective? For instance, future research may prime perspective-takers to think about their individuality (e.g., Ambady et al. 2004; Rank-Christman et al. 2017), or their identities as being tal- ented, intelligent, or competent (e.g., Kirmani et al. 2017). Such nuances may move perspective-takers’ deliberation from being self-morality centric toward being self-interest Contesting Dishonesty: When and Why Perspective‑Taking Decreases Ethical Tolerance of… 1 3 130 G.-X. Xie et al. centric, and thus tolerate moral misconducts to a greater extent. In a similar vein, when the rational, analytical, or logical (vs. emotional, intuitive, or aective) aspects of per – sonal identities are salient, perspective-takers may become more deliberative (vs. intuitive) in considering the situa- tional norms, which could moderate the outcomes of moral self-other dierentiation. Importantly, while the current work focuses on observ – ers’ sense of moral self-awareness (i.e., awareness of their honesty), consumers can also become highly aware of their dishonest behaviors at times. That is, people’s self-awareness of their “immoral self” can be high (vs. low), which may aect the eects of perspective-taking on ethical tolerance toward others’ deceptive behaviors. When judging dishon- est sellers, it is relatively easy for perspective-takers to assume that they would act honestly in the seller’s situation. However, consumers too lie (e.g., using expired coupons), especially when they are suciently aware that dishonest behaviors have little harmful consequences for them (Mazar et  al. 2008; Shu et  al. 2011). Under such circumstances, consumers’ awareness of immoral self may be high. There- fore, future research should consider examining situations under which consumers, as observers of marketer’s decep- tion, believe that they do not have to act honestly. In some cases, such dishonesty can be rationalized without involving immoral self. For instance, a salesperson’s honest act (e.g., implying a consumer is overweight and does not t a skirt or suit) can adversely hurt consumers’ feelings (Liu et al. 2019). If perspective-takers believe that it is legitimate to use “white lies” under such situations (e.g., Argo and Shiv 2012), their ethical tolerance may be higher. In some other cases, it would be harder for perspective-takers to justify dishonesty if they themselves knowingly and willingly cheat (e.g., in “wardrobing,” consumers purposefully purchase a product, use it, and return the used product while claiming for a full refund; e.g., see Campbell and Winterich 2018 for types of immoral consumer behaviors). Future studies should explore how one’s awareness of the darker side of the self (i.e., “immoral self-awareness”) inuences the per – spective-taking eect on ethical tolerance. Lastly, it is worth noting that three test results are mar – ginally signicant as the p values are slightly higher than 0.05 (and below 0.10), which suggests the corresponding effects are indicative yet not necessarily conclusive. In experimental studies, marginal signicance can be attributed to exogenous factors such as random errors and contextual variances. Future studies are needed to address marginal sig- nicance by increasing statistical power and replicating the eects beyond the current contexts. Importantly, such mar – ginal signicance would not change the focal patterns of the signicant cross-cover interactions in Study 1 and Study 3 ( p < 0.05), suggesting that moral self-awareness indeed mod- erates the eect of perspective-taking on ethical tolerance. Concluding Remarks This research documents a novel eect of perspective-taking on ethical tolerance for marketplace deception: perspective- taking reduces consumers’ tolerance when observing mar – keter’s deceptive behaviors when their awareness of moral self is high. This eect is driven by moral self-other dieren- tiation, which demonstrates that consumers are motivated to distance their moral self from an immoral other further when taking a dishonest marketer’s perspective. The ndings from three studies contribute to the ethical judgment, marketplace deception, and perspective-taking literatures, and suggest fruitful directions for future research. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the three anony – mous reviewers for their constructive comments. The authors would also like to thank Peter Darke, Kent Grayson, Ann Kronrod, Namika Sagara, and Lan Xia for their helpful comments on previous versions of the article. This research project was supported by the Joseph P. 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See attached document for literature review instructions. Use attached beginning paragraph for reference. Use the following citation, plus ones attached (4): Best, L. M., & Shelley, D. J. (2018).
NON-CHEATER AND CHEATER FEELINGS Cheaters and Non-Cheater’s Feelings Throughout Assessment: Perspective Taking Cheaters and Non-Cheater’s Feelings Throughout Assessment: Perspective Taking Perspective-taking can be altered depending on where a person stands within a situation. Just because one person feels or acts a certain way towards a situation, doesn’t mean all parties involved will feel and think the same way. One topic that may have various perspectives would be cheating; it comes in all forms, whether it’s physical or emotional. In recent years, more and more cases of academic dishonesty are now of the digital/cyber formats (Best & Shelly 2018). Cheaters, non-cheaters, and hesitant cheaters will all partake in this study regarding whether they feel as though their actions are considered cheating or non-cheating. References Best, L. M., & Shelley, D. J. (2018). Academic dishonesty: Does social media allow for increased and more sophisticated levels of student cheating? International Journal of Information and Communication Technology Education, 14(3), 1-14. https://doi.org/10.4018/IJICTE.2018070101

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